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Abstract 
 
This research explores the reverberations of the colonial experience in the European 
Union (EU) peacebuilding policymaking towards the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC). In particular, it aims to reconstruct the linkages between the European colonial 
past and modern-day European Union, in order to assess to what extent such historical 
heritage is manifested in the discursive practices of EU policymaking on 
peacebuilding towards the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Thus, the thesis seeks to answer the following research question: How can 
postcolonial and decolonial theory help us understand the dominant discourses and 
politics that frame the EU construction of peacebuilding practice in DRC? 
To do so, the research positions itself in a critical conversation with EU Studies and 
Postcolonial Studies, and mobilises a Discourse-Historical Approach influenced by 
Colonial Discourse Theory as a methodological tool.   
After having gathered interviews with EU Officials working on peacebuilding 
policies; having conducted archival research in the Historical Archives of the 
European Union; and having undertaken participant-observation at the European 
External Action Service, the results of this research are mainly twofold: 
Firstly, this study shows that within EU peacebuilding, the European colonial legacy is 
hardly addressed by policy-makers; however, the EU relies on a dehistoricised regime 
where selective historical events are mobilised towards the objective of legitimising 
EU peacebuilding actions.  
Secondly, the research identifies discursive strategies that reproduce colonial 
discourses in EU peacebuilding policymaking. These strategies, mainly based on racial 
stereotypes, connote an unchanging order based on a fixed donor/recipient binary. 
Such pervasive discourses tend to perpetuate dependency, instead of reaffirming an 
independent peace process that is supposed to be the end goal of EU peacebuilding 
policies. 
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Introduction 
 
 
1. The Puzzle 
This thesis examines the colonial legacies present in the European Union (EU) 
peacebuilding system by analysing continuities and discontinuities of colonial 
discourse within the EU policymaking on peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC). 
The research reconstructs the link between the EU and the European colonial past in 
order to determine the extent to which such historical heritage is manifested in the 
discursive construction of EU peacebuilding policies.   
In practical terms, this study investigates the ways in which the EU’s peacebuilding 
policy discourse is shaped by a framework that reproduces a “colonial matrix of 
power” (Mignolo, 2007; 2011). This study unpacks this by analysing the speeches, 
actions, and texts of EU representatives and individual civil servants in the European 
Commission (EC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) working on EU 
peacebuilding policymaking towards the DRC. 
The interest in pursuing the above-mentioned investigation was triggered by 
dissatisfaction with the current literature on EU Studies and EU Peacebuilding Studies, 
which so far appear to not have taken into sufficient consideration the relevance of 
European colonial history in the formation of the EU and the repercussions that this 
phenomenon has had on the EU role as peacebuilder towards countries that were 
former colonies of EU member states. On the contrary, EU Studies tends to produce a 
narrative of the EU as though created by a “virgin birth” (Nicolaïdis, 2002; 2015) in a 
historically neutral space (Deloye, 2006).  
This has led some scholars to talk about a “loud silence” (Barrinha, 2008) or “colonial 
amnesia” (Shilliam, 2017), a silence and amnesia largely reflected in the literature on 
EU peacebuilding (see for example, Hughes, 2013; Olsen, 2009; Richmond, 
Björkdahl, & Kappler, 2011; Tocci, 2007).   
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As the political representative body of Europe, the EU is deeply rooted in European 
history; and it is by virtue of the way European history unfolded that the EU took 
shape and has acquired its current political and economic weight. Familiarity with the 
earliest roots of ‘Europe’ is therefore important if we are to understand European 
integration as well as its relationship with the rest of the world.  
For instance, without knowledge of the two World Wars it would be difficult to 
explain the quest for an economic alliance after 1945; without recognising the origins 
of the Balkan Wars, we would have an incomplete understanding of the irregular 
process of EU enlargement to the East; more recently, we ought not to forget the 
singularities of Britain’s history (e.g., its imperial legacy and perceived position as a 
transatlantic country) if we are to comprehend some of the drivers of Brexit.  
Using this a foundation, the main argument of the thesis is that in order to have a 
comprehensive understanding of EU peacebuilding practices in the DRC, it is 
necessary to be grounded in and have a profound consciousness of the history that 
linked Europe to the Congo. From this longue durée perspective, the modern 
relationship between the EU and the DRC is merely an on-going chapter in an 
enormous book.  
Such a book, the pages of which would span from the 15
th
 century up to the present 
day, would mainly be filled with stories of political violence, slavery, inequality, the 
eradication of culture and values, and the partition of the country according to foreign 
greed and continuous transfer of material resources. In other words: colonialism.  
Focusing only on the latest chapter of this long history would mean overlooking 
important historical features that could contribute towards explaining the current 
political relationship between the EU and DRC, but would also disregards key realities 
that may also help to improve the relationship.  
This historical omission may create the situation where ‘noble gestures’ and 
benevolent overtures — such as helping to promote peace, opening electoral 
participation, or assisting army reform — may end up counter-productive if interpreted 
as underpinned by underlying colonial biases. 
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This thesis is thus firmly rooted in the debate surrounding the EU’s identity in the 
international sphere and its deployment in peacebuilding policies. It unpacks the 
current literature and demonstrates that the way in which academics have studied these 
themes so far has been predominantly Eurocentric. Although valuable contributions to 
the literature, available studies tend to overlook the complex history of the creation of 
the EU and how this history continues to impact the relationship between the EU and 
former European colonies, now recipients of EU peacebuilding assistance. 
It is for this reason that this thesis locates its theoretical and methodological 
foundations in postcolonial and decolonial theory. Postcolonial and decolonial theory 
provide this research with the epistemological tools to unpack to what extent colonial 
discourses are still embedded in peacebuilding policies and why the EU struggles to 
free itself from paternalistic discourses towards the DRC. This thesis thus relies on the 
postcolonial and decolonial theories of international relations that focus on the 
persistence of colonial forms of power and the continuing existence of colonial 
legacies in modern day world politics.  
However, postcolonial and decolonial scholars have rarely considered the EU’s 
peacebuilding policies as a meaningful unit of analysis. Postcolonial and decolonial 
scholarship tends to focus on ethnographic accounts of the non-European subaltern 
experience in order to support in making emerging marginal voices heard; to shed 
lights on unequal international processes; to silence histories; and to promote the 
struggle of peoples for economic justice and equality (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; 
Sabaratnam, 2011; Shilliam, 2015 among others). By focusing largely on the ‘other’, 
they rarely reflected on the history and the subjectivity from the position of the former 
colonial power, or ‘the master’ so to speak, as this research does.  
In doing so, this research takes the claim of anticolonial and postcolonial theorists 
(Cesaire, 1972; Fanon, 1991 [1961]) seriously, examining how the culture of the 
colonisers have been shaped through colonial encounters, and how colonisation 
impacted metropolitan countries as significantly as colonised countries. 
Indeed, this thesis can be considered postcolonial and decolonial to the extent that it 
focuses on finding colonial continuities and ‘coloniality’ within the master 
subjectivity, rather than finding counter-narratives and resistance to the dominant 
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accounts. Therefore, the disciplinary site for this investigation is the intersection 
between the EU Studies, Peacebuilding Studies, and Postcolonial Studies, and locates 
itself in the literature by addressing these gaps. 
The selected methodological position of this thesis reflects this unique 
interdisciplinary situation. It was necessary to select a methodology which is both 
sensitive to historical processes, but at the same time applicable to the analysis of 
present EU peacebuilding compounds. These two stipulations are satisfied by the 
selection of discourse analysis.   
Indeed, discourse analysis is a tool used in a plurality of disciplines and here is 
particularly applicable to understanding if and to what extent there are legacies of a 
colonial mindset in the discourses and practices of EU practitioners dealing with 
DRC’s peacebuilding policies. More precisely, the methodology used in this thesis can 
be considered as Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) influenced by Colonial 
Discourse Theory. Indeed, if the former can be helpful to link discursive practice to 
historical contexts, the latter can more incisively pinpoint the way in which narratives 
tend to reproduce colonial discourses. 
By applying a postcolonial perspective and utilising discourse analysis supported by 
colonial discourse theory, the thesis intends to answer the following central question: 
How can postcolonial and decolonial theory help us understand the dominant 
discourses and politics that frame the EU construction of peacebuilding practice in 
DRC? 
The above core research question has been unpacked and developed into the following 
sub-questions, both conceptually and empirically: 
 To what extent do EU peacebuilding practitioners reproduce colonial 
knowledge related to DRC? 
 What are the consequences of the presence of a ‘colonial legacy’ for the 
construction of peacebuilding practices? 
This thesis’ foundation is grounded on three key pillars: the EU’s colonial subjectivity; 
the historicity of peacebuilding; and colonial discourse.  
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In order to answer the research questions and to examine colonial reverberations 
within the EU peacebuilding system, the thesis provides three important 
‘reconstructions’, each associated with one of the three pillars. Reconstructions, in the 
postcolonial context, are a reflective attempt to deconstruct dominant accounts and 
rebuild different articulations of political rationality or theoretical categories in order 
to open different perspectives.  Reconstructions allow us to think differently about 
forms of understanding — concepts, categories, and methods — and to use this 
reflection to incorporate new data and evidence (see Bhambra, 2007). 
Therefore, these reconstructions are an epistemological intervention that provides a 
historical, theoretical, and methodological platform that allows us to empirically 
scrutinise the presence of colonial legacies in EU peacebuilding discourses towards 
DRC.   
These three reconstructions are: (a) the reconstruction of EU’s colonial subjectivity by 
reconnecting the EU with European colonial history (chapters one and three); (b) the 
reconstruction of colonial continuities and discontinues in the discourse of ‘bringing 
peace to Africa’ from its advent in the colonial period to the recent creation of EU 
peacebuilding policies (chapters four and five); and, (c) the reconstruction of the 
meaning of colonial discourse by a methodological intervention which connects 
colonial discourse theory with current manifestations of colonial discourse in 
contemporary politics (chapter two). 
Although presented in separate chapters, these three reconstructions are not limited to 
them. On the contrary, they crisscross through the thesis as key interpretative 
concepts. These reconstructions allow for the framing of the EU’s colonial legacy; 
peacebuilding and colonial discourse in a postcolonial framework; and to best ground 
the empirical research. 
 
 2. First Reconstruction: The EU’s Colonial History 
 
When presenting my research in conferences or seminars, I quite often receive 
comments from the audience that my inquiry was not about EU Studies, but that I was 
just using the EU as a case study for my postcolonial analysis. At first glance, such 
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comments triggered a certain discomfort and uncertainty within me. However, upon 
reflection, I came to understand that they were, in fact, just reinforcing my argument: 
the omission of colonial memory within the European Studies discipline is so 
profound that it has lead to the incapability of even considering such a topic as a 
pertinent object of analysis within EU Studies. Thus, the research of colonial legacy in 
EU peacebuilding needs to be framed in a broader consideration of the historical 
trajectory which connects colonialism to the EU. 
In doing so, the research considers first why and how the creation of such a ‘colonial 
amnesia’ has made this possible, pointing out that the reasons might be linked to the 
specificity of EU Studies as a disciplinary field (to be discussed futher in chapter one) 
as well to the process of EU’s  memory formation (to be discussed futher in chapter 
three).  
Building on the acknowledgement of this amnesia, the thesis’ endeavour is to 
reconstruct the impact which the colonial phenomenon had and continues to have on 
the EU. 
This reconstruction answers a series of crucial interrogations which set the basis for 
the research: can colonialism be considered an EU matter or is it exclusively a concern 
for the former colonial powers individually? How can we claim that colonialism was a 
European phenomenon — and consequently an EU concern — when only some of the 
European states, even if the majority, had colonies?  
By answering these question, the research draws upon the limited yet insightful studies 
on European colonialism which tends to challenge the conception that discussions 
concerning the EU should only be forward-looking and to embrace the colonial story 
in the in the domain of EU Studies (see for example Hansen and Jonsson, 2014; 
Nicolaïdis, K. & Sèbe, 2014;  Pasture, 2015).  
The research thus reveals that the European subjectivity was profoundly influenced by 
the relationship of domination imposed by European colonial powers, and both the 
colonial and the decolonising moment crucially determined the contours of the EU as 
we know it. The thesis points to the conclusion that the privileged position the EU 
occupies in the international sphere is, in part, parasitically-derived as an 
conglomerate of countries that had previously pillaged large portions of the world. 
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What is more, this reconstruction opens the door to the notion that the very birth of the 
EU was deeply entangled with colonial aspirations.  
By showing salient moments of EU integration, the research demonstrates that the 
birth of the European Economic Community (EEC) did not take place in opposition to 
the colonial aspirations of the member states. On the contrary, European integration 
happens with the intention of keeping and “recycling” the imperial structure of 
domination, even after decolonisation. 
 
3. Second  Reconstruction: The Roots of Peacebuilding in Africa 
The second reconstruction looks at the other central concept of the thesis: 
peacebuilding. The choice of focusing on peacebuilding practices relies on the 
profound interest in looking at how ‘peace has always been at the core of the European 
interest – internally and externally.  
Peace, indeed, is central to the ‘myth’ of the creation of the EU. Indeed, the official 
historiography of the EU allocates a crucial role to the notion of “peace” (Ifversen, 
2010), as it is commonly said that the EU has been historically conceived as a peace 
project with the aim of ending the division produced from two World Wars (see Tocci, 
2008 and 2011; Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler, 2009; Natorsky, 2011).   
Similarly, in 2012, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to 
the EU because of its role at helping to transform “most of Europe from a continent of 
war to a continent of peace” (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2012). This indicates that 
the EU’s raison d'être is to be a peace project ending centuries of warfare in Europe 
and that peace has fundamentally shaped its external mission. Yet, the internal 
dimension of peace was historically mirrored in an external dimension of bringing 
peace outside of European borders. Before and after the ‘peaceful integration’, Europe 
has acted as a peace ambassador externally. 
Despite the fact that peacebuilding is frequently seen as a relatively new set of 
instruments that allows the EU to engage in conflict-prone countries, it is the intention 
in this inquiry to show that the moral discourse of bringing peace is not new and it can 
tied to European colonial aspirations of effectuating peace abroad.  
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It is with these dimensions that the thesis aims at reconstructing the historicity of the 
concept of “bringing peace to Africa” by looking at the continuities and discontinuities 
from the European colonial discourse of effectuating peace abroad to the current 
peacebuilding missions. In this milieu, the EU discourse in bringing peace to Africa is 
mobilised as the central example. This reconstruction shows the continuity and 
discontinuities and makes visible the discursive conditions that allowed the creation of 
contemporary EU peacebuilding policies 
 
4. Third Reconstruction: a Methodology for the Study of Colonial 
Discourse 
The third reconstruction is focused on another fundamental concept of the research: 
colonial discourse. Despite the plethora of studies on colonial discourses (see Bhabha, 
1984 and 1994; Mohanty, 1988; Said, 1978; Smith, 2012 [1999]; Chrisman & 
Williams, 2015; Parry, 1987; Vidal, 1993 among others) this research has identified a 
gap, specifically in the methodologies deployed to analyse them.   
Indeed, it is very difficult to find specific methodological tools in postcolonial and 
decolonial literature that can answer questions such as: how to analyse colonial 
discourses? How to make a claim that a discourse is colonial? How to compare 
colonial discourses over time? How to operationalise a diachronic and synchronic 
comparison of colonial discourses?  
In other words, I realised the need to devise a methodology that would explore 
possible connections between the older, cruder version of colonial discourse during 
colonial times on the one hand and the current manifestation of such legacies on the 
other.  
In order to find an answer to this methodological question, the thesis seeks to address 
the gap that is present between the vast literature around colonial discourse theory and 
its practical application. In doing so, the thesis aims at making a methodological 
contribution by way of bridging the theoretical analysis of colonial discourses 
(Colonial Discourse Theory) with discourse analysis, privileging the Discourse-
Historical Approach part of the Critical Discourse Analysis methodology. 
20 
 
This operationalisation allows for the reconstruction of colonial discourse as an 
interpretative concept that can be used in the analysis of current manifestation of post-
imperial Eurocentrism, and the underlying colonial mindset it entails.  
It should be acknowledged that delivering such methodological reconstruction proved 
to be quite a challenging task. First, the combination of the Discourse-Historical 
Approach with the field of Colonial Discourse Theory made this operation quite 
challenging, due to the novelty of the approach and to the limited number of scholars 
to draw on.  
What is more, the specific operationalisation of colonial discourse was rendered much 
more challenging by the sensitivity of the subject under analysis. Digging into the 
colonial legacy and trying to dismantle the Eurocentric underpinnings of the EU is 
quite an uncomfortable position for a researcher. In this process, I was often 
confronted with reluctance from interviewees and with a certain degree of hostility in 
a certain academic environment. These challenges will be explained more in details in 
the thesis. 
Sabaratnam (2013: 274), referring to her work as anticolonial scholars in IR devoted to 
challenging Eurocentrism, explains: 
This is certainly not the easiest place for scholars to start with 
methodologically, either in terms of the practicalities of conducting substantive 
empirical research or in terms of the personal and psychological disorientation 
that this kind of research may involve. Moreover, one may never be able to 
fully erase the sedimentations of Eurocentric knowledge, which in some ways 
goes to the very heart of the practice of professional scholarship. 
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5.  Methods, Data, and Case Study 
 
One of the main principles of DHA is that of triangulation, which enables researchers 
to minimise ‘cherry-picking’ due to its endeavour to work on the basis of a variety of 
different data, methods, and background information (Wodak, 2001: 65; Wodak and 
Boukala, 2014: 178). As such, the ‘triangulatory’ approach of the thesis is based on a 
wide range of sources: interviews, archival research, participant observation, and 
document analysis.  
The empirical basis of this thesis is grounded on 62 interviews conducted from April 
to December 2015 and from March to August 2016 conducted with EU officials 
working on peacebuilding policies. Moreover, the interviews have been complemented 
by six months of participant observation at the Central African Division of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). Substantial archival research has been 
done in the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU) and other relevant 
archives. The historical analysis has allowed for the juxtaposition of the qualitative 
data obtained by interviews and participant observation with historical knowledge. 
Finally, the research benefitted from the analysis of EU’s official documents, and from 
exploratory interviews with members of civil society organisations. 
As remarked, the significance of the notion of ‘peace’ for the internal and external 
history of the EU is one of the main reasons that led me to select the policies of EU 
peacebuilding as a case study. Indeed, it is extremely interesting to unpack whether 
this historical emphasis on building internal and external peace had an impact on the 
peacebuilding policies in the contemporary context.  
Furthermore, the specific unit of analysis is the construction of peacebuilding practices 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The DRC has been selected as a relevant case 
study for two main reasons: first, due to the long history of colonisation and barbaric 
exploitation that lead some scholars to frame it as genocide (see Hochschild, 1998); 
and, second, the DRC is extremely relevant for this study because it has been defined 
as “the largest laboratory for EU crisis management” (Grevi, 2007:114), where the EU 
has somehow “tested” all its peacebuilding instruments. Indeed, five missions have 
been deployed since the birth of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 
along with the employment of peace mediation efforts (dialogue conferences, funds 
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for reconciliations), funds from the European Development Fund, the Instrument for 
Stability, the European Peacebuilding Partnership, humanitarian assistance 
instruments. Although the analysis of the discursive practices is focused on this 
specific area for methodological reasons, the theory chosen and the specific analytical 
methodology can be be duplicated towards different aspects of the EU actions.  
Therefore, it is hoped that the concerns and preoccupations, and avenues of research 
and reconstruction presented here may resonate with a broader reading public. 
 
6. Original Contributions 
Each of the three reconstructions provides an original contribution to the academic and 
political debates as they bring forward a new understanding of three concepts: (a) a 
reconstruction of the EU’s colonial subjectivity which provides an understanding of 
the EU’s colonial underpinnings; (b) a reconstruction of continuity and discontinuity 
in the discourse of bringing peace which provides a conceptualisation of the longue 
durée of the peacebuilding’s moral bases; (c) the reconstruction of a methodology of 
analysis for colonial discourse which allows for the comprehension of present-day 
manifestations of colonial discourse in contemporary politics. 
Moreover, these three reconstructions provide a solid historical, theoretical, and 
methodological platform that creates an avenue to empirically scrutinise the presence 
of colonial legacies in EU peacebuilding discourses towards the DRC.  Within this 
overall analytical framework, it has been possible to deconstruct the documents, the 
actions and the speeches of EU practitioners about the construction of peacebuilding 
policies in the DRC. This empirical effort allows for the demonstration of the 
existence of a colonial legacy in peacebuilding policymaking. Notably, the thesis 
illustrates that colonial discourse in EU peacebuilding is sustained by two main 
interlinked discursive strands: the first, concerning the colonial erasure in EU 
peacebuilding in the DRC, and the second, admitting a positive legacy of colonialism 
in contemporary peacebuilding in the DRC, focusing on the relevance of former 
colonisers as experts.  
The coexistence of these two discursive strands and their ambivalence indicate the 
presence of a colonial rationale that is based on a dehistoricised regime: only partial 
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historical events are mobilised to justify the EU’s peacebuilding actions and to 
legitimise its interventions. 
Moreover, the thesis demonstrates that the absence of a critical rethinking of European 
colonial history, which has led to a general reproduction of colonial discourse 
underpinning EU peacebuilding practices in the DRC.  
The analysis of discourses on peacebuilding in the DRC proves that such colonial 
epistemology is supported by a series of discursive strategies. The discursive strategies 
encountered reinforce stereotypes and maintain a colonial order of discourse.  
This order of discourse is structured in the traditional dichotomist relations that 
conjure up such notions as centre vs. margin, peaceful vs. violent, 
master/knowledgeable vs. infant/recipient. These dichotomies continue to fix 
representational regimes according to which “northern/EU” is cast hierarchically 
above “southern/DRC” spaces and identities.  
Finally, the research illustrates that the colonial order of discourse is maintained, and 
this is built on a regime of truth in which the EU’s power is naturalised and its moral 
justification is pervasive. This does not leave much margin to autonomous ownership 
and appropriation of the peace process by the recipients, which is supposed to be the 
final goal of peacebuilding practices.   
 
7. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis begins with an analysis of the debate around colonialism within EU and 
Peacebuilding Studies. Despite the importance of connecting the EU’s colonial past 
with the construction of its identity and memory, EU Studies literature largely 
overlooks many significant segments of history. In fact, a major part of EU Studies 
literature seems rooted in a Eurocentric perspective: a clear example of this being the 
production of a plethora of studies that wants to define the EU’s international power as 
a unique value-driven force.  
Therefore, the first chapter analyses the literature on EU Studies. The chapter shows 
the contradiction of denying the EU’s colonial legacies while at the same time 
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preserving its Eurocentric discourses in academia. Furthermore, this chapter opens the 
door to academic publications that have began to reflect on the significance of 
colonialism in EU external relations, moving away from obsolete Eurocentric 
accounts. The chapter also engages with the literature on EU peacebuilding and 
highlights critical voices that have challenged the normative value-driven connotations 
in EU peacebuilding policies.           
The second chapter substantiates the argument of the importance of borrowing 
insights from postcolonial scholars and decolonial scholars to understand the intrinsic 
presence of colonial structures in the international system. Central to the argument in 
this thesis is the concept of colonial discourse and how it can be grasped through a 
poststructuralist perspective. This is followed by a discussion of how postcolonial 
insights can be operationalised in a research methodology, building and 
conceptualising a Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) influenced by Colonial 
Discourse Theory.  Finally, the main sources used in the investigation to gather data 
are explained. 
What follows is a historical overview that builds the foundation of the overall thesis 
argument. Drawing upon scholarship on European history (Kiernan, 1980; Sierp, 
2014; Pasture, 2015 among others), the third chapter reflects on the significance of 
conceiving the colonial past not only as a matter of concern for individual former 
colonial powers but as a collective European issue. Furthermore, claims are made that 
we should consider colonialism as part not only of European history but also of the EU 
collective memory.  
In doing so, the research provides a historical detour focused on colonialism framed as 
a European phenomenon and how it is also fundamentally linked with the birth of the 
European Union. Despite the tendency in EU Studies and EU policy-making not to 
reflect on theirs colonial underpinnings, this chapter presentes how the opening of the 
House of European History by the European Parliament shed new light on the 
conceptualisation of colonialism as part of the EU memory. 
The fourth chapter provides a more specific focus on EU-Africa “peace” relations. 
Relying on archival documents, interviews, and on a multiplicity of EU documents, 
the chapter gives a historical overview of the EU-Africa relations based on the “peace-
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imperative”. It explains that norms regarding Europe’s essential task and ethical 
responsibility to facilitate Africa’s peace have long been embedded in the relationship 
with Africa; and demonstrates how the discourse of bringing peace to Africa evolved 
over the course of history.  It considers how the discourse changed gradually as an 
effect of European Integration and decolonisation and how after the end of the Cold 
War the notion of bringing peace to Africa returned to the fore.   
The analysis provides context for the fifth chapter which focuses on EU 
peacebuilding policies in DRC. It discusses the conceptualisation of the notion of 
international peacebuilding before outlining the peculiarity of the EU peacebuilding 
framework. The chapter then moves on to the analysis of EU peacebuilding in the 
DRC, providing an explanation of what have historically been the EU peace policies in 
the DRC from decolonisation. The empirical basis of the chapter is constituted by 
documents found in the HAEU. Furthermore, the chapter illustrates the peacebuilding 
instruments deployed in the DRC in order to provide a framework of reference for the 
last two empirical chapters that deal specifically with the case study.  
The sixth chapter unpacks the main discourses around colonial legacy in EU 
peacebuilding policies in the DRC. This chapter analyes the results of 62 interviews 
conducted with EU Officials working on peacebuilding policies in DRC in order to 
understand the extent of colonial legacies in this sphere.  It looks at ways in which 
discourse influences the EU’s colonial past in the context of its peacebuilding 
activities in the DRC from the standpoints of the EU’s institutional representatives and 
individual civil servants in the Commission and the European External Action Service. 
Using the Discourse-Historical Approach, this chapter charts the emergence of the 
dominant discursive strands found in the interviews, in order to analyse to what extent 
they tend to reproduce the colonial discourse. The main result of this enquiry is the 
recognition of two main interlinked discursive strands: one concerning the total 
irrelevance of colonial history for EU peacebuilding in DRC, and the other admitting a 
positive legacy of colonialism in contemporary EU peacebuilding in the DRC. Such 
discursive strands, apparently contradictory, confirm the presence of colonial 
discourse as composed of ambivalent and unstable utterances that nonetheless 
reproduce and naturalise a “regime of truth” (Foucault, 2003 [1976]) in which 
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colonialism is silenced but contemporarily reproduced in the promotion of the former 
coloniser’s role.  
Building upon the findings of chapter six, finally,  the seventh chapter claims that the 
absence of a deep rethinking of the European colonial history and its implications for 
peacebuilding policies leads to a reproduction of a colonial epistemology and 
pedagogy in the EU peacebuilding practices in the DRC. Relying on the results of 
interviews and participant observation in the Central African Division of the EEAS, 
this claim is substatiated by the analysis of several stereotypes typical of colonial 
knowledge, that have been noticed in the analysed interviews and in the documents: 
the idea of Congolese as backward, infantile, lax, violent, and of the DRC as a pre-
modern, failed country. Such stereotypes have been considered as embedded in 
discursive strategies that naturalise a dichotomist relationship between EU and the 
DRC. Finally, the research shows how such discourses tend to marginalise the local in 
the resolution of conflict and to exert power through conditional peacebuilding.  
In the conclusion, the thesis reflects on the main findings of the research and discusses 
the extent to which the reproduction of colonial discourse in peacebuilding is 
detrimental to the fulfilment of EU peacebuilding goals. Indeed, such discourses tend 
to perpetuate dependency instead of reaffirming an independent peace process that is 
supposed to be the final goal of EU peacebuilding policies. The thesis concludes by 
providing thoughts on avenues for further research.  
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Chapter One 
 
 
A Review of the Literature on the Civilising 
Legacy in EU Peacebuilding 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis’ core objective of connecting EU peacebuilding policymaking with 
European colonial history, and in finding legacies of the latter in the former, was 
triggered by a certain degree of dissatisfaction with current EU Studies literature. In 
this sense, the research aligns with scholars in the literature who seek to unpack the 
incapacity of EU Studies to address European colonial legacy. In particular, the thesis 
owes a great debt to researchers such as Peo Hansen, Veronique Dimier, Kalypso 
Nicolaïdis, and Patrick Pasture (among others) who first opened the door to a 
historical rethinking of the EU in its global role.  
Despite the attention paid in academia to interpreting what kind of power the EU 
represents in the international arena, it is impossible not to notice that until a decade 
ago there has been a silence in discussions regarding the origins of this power.  
Indeed, in EU Studies several scholars have already argued that there has been a gap 
for years in the comprehension of the historicity of EU identity, often giving the 
impression that the EU has been created as a new entity that had nothing to do with 
previous experiences of its member states as colonial powers. The omission of the 
conceptualisation of the colonial past in EU Studies has led some scholars to talk 
about a “loud silence” (Barrinha, 2008) or a “virgin birth” (Nicolaïdis, 2002; 2015). 
Steinmetz contends that the field of EU studies has constituted itself through a series 
of exclusions and negative boundaries. Hence, for a long time, EU Studies defined 
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itself against the deeper European past and, at the same time, it tended to define itself 
rather rigidly as anchored in the social sciences and as excluding the humanities and 
interdisciplinary approaches more broadly (2003). In this sense, the EU Studies’ field 
has long resisted the contamination of other approaches.  
More relevant for this research, we can see EU Studies particularly guarded itself from 
being an object of postcolonial studies, thus reinforcing a boundary against the rest of 
the world, and being impermeable to the attempts of colonial studies to transcend the 
“West versus the rest” model (Ibid., 2003).   
While wondering why learned scholars have, for decades, overlooked the historicity of 
the EU, we should take into account the complex disciplinary history of EU Studies: 
first of all, it is necessary to take into account the fact that European Integration 
Studies have only recently established themselves, after a long period of being 
considered as a subfield of International Relations (IR). In this sense, EU Studies 
maintained the Eurocentric approach of IR - rooted in the Westphalian system - that 
has only recently been challenged (see Buzan, B., & Little, R., 2002; Capan, 2017 and 
Shilliam, 2011 among others). 
Secondly, it is worth exploring the close relationship between the field of EU Studies - 
in terms of theoretical traditions - and the object of study, namely the EU and its 
changing policies. Rosamond (2007b) considered that the dual relationship between 
the intellectual evolution of EU Studies and its object of analysis (mainly EU policies) 
has been understood by scholars in two ways: some saw that the trajectory of EU 
studies is a function of the changing nature of the EU over time (Ibid.: 25) whereas 
other scholars interrogated EU studies’ potential to act as the intellectual legitimation 
of particular ideologies associated with the object of study (Ibid.). This, following 
Rosamond, is similar to Wolfgang Wessels’ (2006) discussion of ‘pull’ factors (from 
the EU) and ‘push’ factors (from the discipline) that together act to shape the 
disciplinary historical turns of the field of EU Studies. Such push and pull factors do 
not operate independently of one another. This could also be grasped in the more 
reflexive lens of Giddens’ notion of the double hermeneutic: concepts developed in 
EU scholarly analyses can themselves come to impact on and become constitutive of 
practices under analysis.   
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The ‘double hermeneutics’ that links EU studies field and the EU itself, is a useful 
way into a critical analysis of the exclusion of the colonial phenomenon both from the 
academic enquiry and from debates on EU foreign policy after integration.  
In this sense, the academic theorisations have been bound by certain walls, governed 
on one side by its object of study (the EU and its practitioner’s views) and on the other 
by the sociology of knowledge. One of the outputs of this double hermeneutics might 
be considered the almost total omission from both sides - the EU practitioner side and 
the academic one -  of the colonial memory and the legacy of it in the EU context. 
Both omissions seem to therefore reinforece themselves and strengthen a certain 
regime of truth about EU past. Simaliry, Hansen and Jonsson (2017) noted that 
“historians and political scientists have tended to situate European integration as an 
intergovernmental and supranational political project both outside of and beyond the 
history of colonialism” and considered that there is “a near perfect fit between such 
scholarly accounts and the self-admiring story that the EU itself often tells about its 
past” (Ibid.: 5). The thesis will consider the EU’s colonial memory in Chapter Three 
and will continue reflecting on this link between the scholarship traditions and its 
object of study in the considerations about Member State colonial past. 
The lack of reflection on colonial history expands not only to studies about the EU 
nature but also to studies on EU external relations. Particularity relevant for this 
research is the fact that the majority of studies conducted on EU peacebuilding also 
tend to ignore the complex historical roots of the EU. They overlook the power 
derived from the imperialist past of EU Member States and the consequences that this 
reproduces in the relation between the EU and EU Member States’ former colonies 
and peacebuilding recipients. Only in the last few years, postcolonial perspectives 
have made inroads into EU Studies, and voices have started speaking up regarding the 
importance of engaging with the imperialistic past in the EU Studies realm (see for 
example Behr, 2007; Hansen and Jonsson, 2014; Merlingen, 2013; Nicolaïdis, 2013; 
Pasture, 2015).  
The end result is that within academic circles, the investigation of the effects of 
colonialism in the current external policies of the EU, and in particular in its 
peacebuilding policies, remains heavily under-addressed.  
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The objective of this investigation is, therefore, to address this lacuna in the literature 
by linking EU Studies with Postcolonial Studies. This theoretical bridge would allow 
for the articulation of a large section of EU discourses and practices in peacebuilding 
policymaking in order to identify to what extent the EU has addressed its colonial 
legacies and possible continuities and discontinuities in colonial discourses. In this 
context, this first chapter explores the main debates around the EU’s discursive 
identity in International Relations and its deployment in peacebuilding policies. 
Unpacking the existing literature on EU identity and EU peacebuilding, this chapter 
shows that the way in which academics have studied these themes so far has been 
mainly Eurocentric.  
As such, the chapter is structured around two sections: the first section leads with an 
examination of the EU’s international identity/power debate, focusing on the work of 
several authors whose mutually-influencing works represent incisive contributions to 
the formation of the current idea of the EU. Ranging from the concepts of civilian 
power (Duchêne, 1973; Maull, 1996; Telò, 2006) and normative power (Manners, 
2002) to ethical power (Aggestam, 2008), the chapter engages with a number of 
authors that emphasize the uniqueness of the EU project, and at the same time, its 
moral superiority. 
Subsequently, an important shift in this debate is provided by scholars such as 
Linklater (2005 and 2011) and Keene (2013) who started correlating the EU as a 
civilian/normative/ethical power with the notion of ‘civilising’ power. By stressing the 
civilising legacy in EU civilian and normative power (Linklater, 2005), these scholars 
started to promote a historical understanding of EU identity.  Being aware of such a 
historical legacy, other scholars add to this debate the call to provincialise the 
Eurocentric accounts of EU foreign policy (see Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013).  
The second section of this chapter locates the debate around civil and normative power 
Europe within the context of EU peacebuilding. To do so, the section provides firstly 
an overview of the extensive literature about the liberal peacebuilding debate in IR. It 
engages with theories that put in relation the current ‘liberal peacebuilding’ approach 
with the colonial civilizing mission, ranging from scholars who see international 
peacebuilding as a benign “new imperialist” turn (Ferguson, 2004 and Paris, 2002 
among others), to the critical debate that challenges the “liberal peace” as a system of 
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ideologically driven interventions (Duffield, 2001; Jabri, 2007, Mc Ginty, 2011; Selbi, 
2013 among others). 
Successively, the chapter engages more specifically with the field of EU 
Peacebuilding Studies, looking at the way normative/civilian power Europe has been 
employed in considering the uniqueness of the EU peacebuilding approach.   
In the final, concluding section, space is given to those scholars starting to explore the 
limitations of the EU peacebuilding approach and reconnecting this with the European 
colonial legacy. By doing so, limitations and exclusions are explored and it is argued 
that it is possible to identify important gaps in how the debate has unfolded. Indeed, it 
can be argued that in order to overcome the lacuna of this academic literature there 
needs to be a bridge between EU Studies and the postcolonial approaches. Thus, this 
thesis creates space for a new kind of analytical framing of EU identity in 
peacebuilding.  
  
32 
 
1. EUniqueness? The Debate around the Nature of EU External 
Identity  
 
1.1. The Civilian, Normative, and Ethical Power Europe 
 
During the past twenty years, there has been an almost continuous debate about the 
nature of the European Union as an international actor. The considerable quantity of 
literature on this theme denotes a sort of “obsession” with the concept of European 
identity in academia (Stråth, 2000). In these discussions a large number of scholars - 
mainly from Liberal International Relations Theory and from the Liberal Realism 
tradition - tend to theorize the uniqueness of the EU in international politics, 
underlining the distinctiveness of its values-oriented politics, mainly in the promotion 
of universal principles abroad (Elgström and Smith, 2006). Despite the fact that in the 
last couple of years an important shift has been made from a strong normativism to a 
more pragmatic approach regarding the analysis of the EU’s role in the world, it is 
noticeable that the civilising aspect is still present.  
 
Over the last three decades, the concept of civilian power has been associated with the 
EU’s image in international relations. This idea was first promoted in the early 
seventies by François Duchêne. Duchêne was a key adviser to Jean Monnet and  EU 
scholars himself, which well exemplifies the entanglement between European political 
agents and academics that have been considered above. 
Duchêne described the European Community as an “exemplar of a new stage in 
political civilization” (1973: 19). According to the author, European civilian power 
influences the international system by promoting its ideas of democracy, human rights, 
economic growth and international cooperation:  
The European Community must be a force for the international diffusion 
of civilian and democratic standards” and for the promotion of values that 
belong to its inner characteristics, such as equality, justice and tolerance 
and an interest for the poor abroad. 
(Duchêne, 1973: 20).  
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According to Duchêne, thus, “civilian power Europe” marks an important step in the 
civilisation process as it attempts “to domesticate relations between states, including 
those of its members and those with states outside its frontiers” (ibid). What this 
civilising process is and where it comes from, however, is not explained by the author 
who takes for granted the leading role of the newly integrated Europe in human 
evolution. After Duchêne, the idea of civilian power has been embraced by several 
scholars that have emphasized different aspects of this notion. 
Mario Telò, for instance, proposes a pragmatic understanding of civilian power, 
looking primarily at the evolution of the EU as a civilian power since the end of the 
Second World War, which he identifies as the moment of construction of the “new 
Europe’s international identity” (Telò, 2006: 1). This understanding of the EU looks at 
the gradual peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the EU and neighbouring 
states, guaranteed by a worldview in which order and the spread of democracy and 
human rights are assured though rules, regimes, multilateral institutions, and values 
(Ibid.). Similar to Duchêne, Telò acknowledges the importance of the historical roots 
of the emerging EU civilian attitude, yet he does not dedicate space to the legacy of 
this historical component in the formation of the EU.   
In alignment with Telò, Hans Maull defines a civilian power as a “conception of 
foreign policy role and behaviour bounded to particular aims, values, principles, as 
well as forms of influence and instruments of power in the name of a civilisation of 
international relations” (1996, as quoted in Diaz, 2005). Other authors reinforced the 
debate on civilian power, some criticizing the ideal-typical features (see Smith, 2005) 
other considering that the militarising of the Union would allow to better act as a 
civilian power in the world, considering this as “a force for the external promotion of 
democratic principles” (Stavridis, 2001: 44).   
The presence of a normative commitment in these definitions resembles the concept 
created some years later by Ian Manners, and it is to this author that the analysis now 
turns to explore the debate. 
In 2000, Ian Manners provided a conceptual shift in this debate, arguing that the label 
‘normative power’ would be more appropriate to describe the EU (Manners, 2000 and 
2002). 
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Manners’ concept of normative power emphasizes the ideational impact of the EU’s 
international identity, which is able to “shape conceptions of normal” in international 
relations (Manners, 2002: 239). Manners takes inspiration from the idea of power over 
opinion developed by Russell and Carr (1946) and from the critical perspective of 
Johan Galtung about ideological power as a power of ideas (1973) to describe a 
normative power of an ideational nature characterised by common principles. 
Peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights are identified 
as the five core values which are central to the EU’s acquis communautaire and are 
argued to be promoted in the EU's internal and external rhetoric, discourses and 
actions.  
The thesis of ‘normative power Europe’ is that one of the key roles of the EU is to 
shape the norms by which other states operate and that it does so not just by saying 
and doing things, but in part simply by being different, by embodying a distinctive set 
of values that others wish to emulate (see, for instance, Manners and Whitman, 2003). 
In other words, what is relevant for this discussion, is that Manners himself presented 
normative power as an ontological, positivist quality of the EU, due to its particular 
historical evolution that gives a normatively different basis for its relations with the 
world (Manners, 2002: 252). 
The moral ideational underpinnings of the normative power Europe, according to 
Manners – and other scholars – are rooted in the historical context of the creation of 
the EU. In other words, the normative power “was created in a post-war historical 
environment which reviled the nationalisms that had led to barbarous wars and 
genocide” (Manners, 2002: 240). But, as typical among EU Scholars, Manners also 
strongly argues against stretching the historical comparison back into Europe’s past of 
imperialism and the mission civilisatrice (Keene, 2013: 950). Indeed, he observes that 
one of the main purposes of his normative power thesis is ‘an attempt to escape 
civilising missions by countering the neocolonial discourses of claims implicit (or 
explicit) in civilian power’ (Manners, 2006: 175).  
The moral inclination in the dominant self-image of the EU has been deepened in 2008 
when Lisbeth Aggestam contributed to the debate by promoting the concept of ethical 
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power Europe as a positive model that “proactively works to change the world in the 
direction of a global common good” (Aggestam, 2008: 1).  
As we said, EU academics often endorse the thoughts of EU practitioners, and in this 
case, Aggestam declares to take inspiration form Robert Cooper
1
, diplomat and expert 
involved in drawing up proposals for the EEAS and the Global Strategy of 2003. 
According to Cooper, the European Union should be a “cooperative empire” (2006: 
80-84) because of the EU features that best serve the essence of the postmodern 
system (ibid.). Indeed, Cooper classifies the world in three hierarchic spheres 
(postmodern, modern and pre-modern) and advocates the birth of a new Western 
postmodern imperialism that is compatible with human rights and cosmopolitan 
values.  
Paraphrasing Robert Cooper’s vision, Aggestam argues that the EU is stepping out of 
its “postmodern” paradise to bring its message of peace and justice to the “modern” 
and “premodern” worlds. (ibid.: 2). What Aggestam is proposing is a concept inspired 
by the moral superiority of the EU, able to categorise the world in a hierarchic scale of 
modernity from its “Kantian paradise” (Kagan, 2003)2. 
Moreover, Aggestam argues that ethical power is derived from two aspects. First, a 
cosmopolitan view in which ethical principles can be considered universal natural 
rights. Second, an image of the EU as a role model and example, drawing on “the 
specific European experience in achieving peace and reconciliation” (Aggestam, 2008: 
7). The author admits that the problem with this ambition to shape the world in 
                                                          
1
 As former Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the 
Council of the European Union, he assisted Javier Solana with the implementation of European 
strategic, security and defence policy and after the Lisbon Treaty he drew up the proposals for the 
new European External Action Service 
2
 Cooper was indeed claiming that a new form of voluntary imperialism is necessary to supervise and 
bring order in fragile states (Cooper, 2006).  Fittingly, Barbara Delcourt notices that the writings of 
Cooper seem inspired by liberal philosophers like Stuart Mill who developed an apologetic vision of 
British colonialism, resting on a conception of the history of mankind as being a civilizational 
development in four stages: savagery, slavery, barbarism and modern civilization (2007: 185). Needless 
to say, Cooper’s presentation of the European Union’s superiority and his reference to new forms of 
colonisation raises numerous concerns regarding the use of civilian power in peacebuilding.  As John 
Ikenberry points out, Cooper’s vision is fraught with unexamined peril (2003). Indeed, his thoughts 
instantly reminds us of the justification of colonialism. Yet, there is an emergent tension in his renewed 
imperialism. Indeed, on the one hand Cooper believes that a new era of imperialism should come to 
order the premodern world, but on the other hand the birth of the CSDP seems to be created in rupture 
to the historical past, and a new benign European Union is the antithesis of the past imperial era.  
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Europe’s image is that it is based on an assumption that European values and ways of 
doing things are intrinsically superior and could be perceived as incipient cultural 
imperialism. However, she does not solve the troubling prospect that arises from this. 
Like many other scholars, Aggestam was deeply influenced by the work of Manners, 
who had a considerable impact on the study of European foreign policy. After his first 
publication, many other scholars have highlighted the EU’s normative, value-driven 
external policy. As Youngs (2004:415) convincingly shows, after Manners, most 
analysts have come to “posit a pre-eminence of ideational dynamics as key to the EU’s 
distinctiveness as an international actor”. 
One of the reasons for the success of this concept might be the fact that it actually 
endorses –thus legitimises- the external action of the EU. It provides a theorisation of 
the “goodness” of the EU by reflecting the official vision of the EU as a “force for 
good”. 
 
1.2. The Normative Power in the EU’s Global Strategies 
The ‘double hermeneutics’ that links EU academics and their object of study is seen in 
the ways the theorisation of normative power was inspired by the EU action abroad 
and, at the same time,  permeated and reinforced by such a role. Therefore, 
speculations about civilian/normative power Europe seemed supporting the belief that 
the uniqueness of EU legitimises its action in “strengthening the international order” 
(Council of the European Union, 2003).  
By looking at the European Security Strategies in primis, as well as documents of the 
Council of the European Union and speeches of the  High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs, we can easily distinguish this entanglement. For example, in 2000, 
Romano Prodi, former President of the European Commission (1999–2004) said: “We 
must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global 
development. After all, only by ensuring sustainable global development can Europe 
guarantee its own strategic security” (European Parlament, 2000: 3); while his 
successor Josè Manuel Barroso in 2007 said: “in terms of normative power, I broadly 
agree: we are one of the most important, if not the most important, normative powers 
in the world” (DIIS, 2007). 
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Javier Solana, EU former High Representative for the Common Security and Defence 
Policy, in his famous statement, explains the core meaning of the European Security 
Strategy of 2003 by considering that is the EU’s role to bring the peace in the world, to 
be the “force for good”.  
The peaceful unification of our continent has been our great achievement, 
and now our main challenge is to act as a credible force for good. From a 
continental agenda, we should move to a global agenda. From building 
peace in Europe to being a peace-builder in the world. 
(Council of the European Union, 2007). 
In the same year, during a speech to the College of Europe at Bruges, David Miliband 
proposes that the EU should aspire to be a “model power”:  
The EU has the opportunity to be a model power. It can chart a course for 
regional cooperation between medium-sized and small countries. Through 
its common action, it can add value to the national effort, and develop 
shared values amidst differences of nationality and religion. As a club that 
countries want to join, it can persuade countries to play by the rules, and 
set global standards. In the way it dispenses its responsibilities around the 
world, it can be a role model that others follow. 
(Miliband, 2007)  
This, “force for good”, this “club that countries want to join”, this “role model that 
others follow”, is exactly the expression of normative power Europe, and it permeates 
the European Security Strategy of 2003 and the revisions that followed. The idea of 
the EU as a model, as a normative example to follow, is very similar to what by 
Cooper considered as a post-modern Europe as an example and a force to change the 
pre-modern states. Not surprisingly, it was the same Cooper who drew up the 
proposals for the new European External Action Service and for the Global Security 
Strategy of 2003. As discussed in the previous section, Cooper was both a practitioner 
involved in the creation of the EEAS and an academic, as well as a major promoter of 
the liberal-imperialistic idea (Delcourt, 2007). 
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The last Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy 
(EUGS) presented by High Representative Federica Mogherini in 2016 represents an 
important turning point regarding the ideational aspect of EU international identity
3
. 
More conscious of the international limits to its action, the EU seems to shift between 
“dreamy idealism and unprincipled pragmatism” (Biscop, 2016) under the new 
heading of what the EUGS calls “principled pragmatism”. Several academics 
perceived the EUGS as a considerable change from the normative EU commitment 
(Czaputowicz, 2016 and Smith, 2017 among others), however, I argue that the new 
“doctrine” of principled pragmatism still contains a normative commitment and the 
EU is not giving up on the idea of spreading its values in the world. 
The only difference from the previous approaches is that this philosophy entails a 
realistic look into the international sphere which imposes on the EU to be more modest 
in its external positioning. For instance, the EU is lowering the level of ambition in 
terms of democratisation not because its values of spreading the EU’s conception of 
democracy changed, but more as an acceptance that the international situation does not 
allow anymore for the EU to have such a role: “This is all about being honest with 
ourselves. The EU cannot democratize Egypt, so it should not pretend to” (Biscop, 
2016: 2). As Tocci puts it in an opening conference at the Institute of European 
Studies in Brussels: 
“In 2003 the philosophy was: the world is moving towards our direction, 
and we have to be magnanimous enough to make them becoming like us, 
spreading our norms and values. Now the world is a different place and 
there is the risk of a push back of going. Therefore, we propose a 
principled pragmatism in which we do not give up our values and rules, 
but we consider the realism of the world”. 
(Tocci, 2016) 
This late return to realpolitik, therefore, did not entail any self-reflection on the EU’s 
identity and position in international relations. The EU still believes in being a “force 
for good”, but it has to lower its ambitions in this sense, considering a changing world 
that might not be as receptive as before to its model role.   
                                                          
3
 For a deeper analysis of the EUGS see Tocci, N. (2016). Interview with Nathalie Tocci on the global 
strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy. The International Spectator, 51(3), 1-8. 
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1.3 From Civilian/Normative Power to Civilising Power 
Simultaneously to this extensive debate about the nature of EU power, some scholars 
started reflecting on the implication of this narrative for contemporary politics. Taking 
inspiration from poststructuralist work on self/other constructions in international 
politics, and engaging in a debate with Manners, Thomas Diez argues that the 
discourse on normative power Europe involves practices of “othering” as part of 
constructing the international identity of the EU in opposition to others ((Diez, 2005: 
15). In his discussion, Diez disputes that the idea of normative power, as well as the 
one of civilian power, is a practice of discursive representation rather than an objective 
category. Indeed, he argues that “not only is the success of this representation a 
precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set out by the EU; it also constructs 
an identity of the EU against an image of others in the ‘outside world’”(ibid.).  
Consequently, he points out the importance of considering the power that lies in the 
representation of the EU as a normative power as such and he identifies different 
strategies (mainly securitisation and orientalism) by which the EU is legitimising its 
universal assumptions. In further works (2007;2011), Diez suggests there is a strong 
relationship between the concept of normative power proposed by Manners and the 
Gramscian notion of hegemony as both ideas rely on the generation of consent by 
means of ideological leadership. By relating these two notions, he implicitly admits 
that any articulation of EU identity is infused with power and that EU foreign relations 
are ruled by a sort of dominance by consensus. However, as he clearly states, he does 
not consider this practice as a “bad thing” per se (Diez and Manners, 2007: 186).  
Yet, although Diez unfolds the importance of considering the role of power that acts in 
the discursive identity of the EU, he tends to judge this power to be neutral, 
underestimating the outcomes of this implicit normative superiority. Furthermore, 
despite a wide understanding of the character of political hegemony that underpins the 
foreign policy of the EU and creates a dichotomist construction of Self/Other, a 
historical account of the origin of this hegemonic power is missing. Indeed, what is 
still absent in Diez’s analysis is the incorporation of the historicity of the “civilian” 
discourses and their role in constructing the European/EU subject against other 
subjectivities.  
40 
 
An interesting contribution in this sense comes from Andreas Linklater which 
connected the concept of civilian/normative power with the idea of a civilising power. 
Linklater is convinced that the idea of civilian power marks an important conceptual 
shift, which he identifies in the exportation of the European internal civilizing process 
to the international arena. In order to explain his ideas, he uses the analysis of the 
civilizing process undertaken by the leading European sociologist, Norbert Elias
4
. 
Although Elias did not describe the EU as a new stage in the development of the 
civilizing process, Linklater highlights several parallels between the interpretations of 
the EU as a civilian power and the transposition of Elias’s work in international 
relations.  
More specifically, Linklater argues that some of the forces which Elias described (the 
widening of the scope of emotional identification, the growing aversion to cruelty and 
suffering and the rise of internal checks on aggressive inclinations) have come to be 
embedded in a broadening European system of international relations.   
According to Linklater, domestic value commitments have gradually come to 
influence relations between the European powers and their conduct towards the rest of 
the world, willing to redistribute wealth (2005). That is to say, the idea of a “civilian 
power Europe” can be regarded as an important new phase in the civilizing process.   
However, elsewhere Linklater (2011) underlines another crucial aspect of the process 
of civilisation: it brought Europeans to see themselves as more advanced than peoples 
in other regions of the world. Indeed, for Elias, the process of civilisation that started 
in Europe was spread with the aid of colonialism. The “standard of civilisation” which 
Europeans invented in the 19th century to justify the domination of the non-European 
world is quoted by Elias as a clear example of how the civilizing process shaped the 
development of the society of states in relation to non-European others.  
Although Linklater expresses the belief that the current process of civilisation should 
not be monopolized by European ideas, he also shows that Western societies have not 
shed earlier beliefs in cultural and racial superiority. Yet, Linklater’s account seems 
                                                          
4
 According to Elias, the civilizing process is the process by which individual European societies 
became pacified and the members of national populations came to identify more closely with one 
another between the 16
th
 century and the present day (Elias, 1978). 
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riven with a sense of tension between two seemingly conflicting ethical positions. On 
the one hand, he advocates European civilian power as a fundamental step in the 
civilizing process for the transformation of human society. On the other hand, he 
admits that in this civilizing process a hierarchical and hegemonic dimension still 
survives, the historical opposition stressed by Elias. 
That is quite similar to the argument made by Keene’s critique of normative power. 
According to this scholar, having previously sought to ‘civilize’ Asian and African 
peoples, Europeans found it necessary to civilize themselves or those elements 
escaping from the civilizing mission. But once that internal project had been 
successfully completed, Europe assumed its new institutional forms and could return 
to its mission of exporting values to the outside world (Keene, 2013: 953).  
Keene, therefore considers that the ‘civilized’ identity of 19th-century Europe was 
important in the delineation of normative power Europe, as the imperial powers were 
stressing already the ‘normative difference’ between Europe and the rest of the world 
(2013).   
Keene goes further in his analysis by contending that “one reason for the relatively 
high prestige attached to the EU’s ‘normative difference’ in international relations 
today is that it still draws on that legacy created in the 19th century”. Keene wittily 
stresses the continuities between ‘normative power Europe’ today and in the 19th 
century, from a sociological point of view, albeit considering that the structure of 
domination relies on a very different sociological basis (see Keene, 2013: 954). 
Within this debate, another remarkable tradition is the one that tries to make sense of 
European integration by using the category of ‘empire’. In this context, the most 
important contribution to the literature is offered by Zielonka who tried to explain the 
EU enlargement process by offering the analogy of the EU as a neo-medieval empire 
(2006).  The neo-medieval empire does not have to be confused with the empires of 
the last two centuries, which he considers rather as Westphalian empire models.  
According to him: 
The Union does not engage in military conquests, forced territorial 
annexations, and the colonial type of economic extraction. The Union is largely 
a civilian power enlarging its territory by consent and diplomatic bargaining. 
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Although some poor countries, especially from the Third World, may find the 
Union’s trade policies unduly discriminating, the Union is by and large seen as 
a vehicle of economic growth rather than economic exploitation. (2006: 183)  
Despite the voluntary and non-coercive nature of this empire, Zielonka also described 
the large asymmetry of power between the EU and other states. In particular, in “The 
Ideology of Empire: the EU’s Normative Power Discourse” (2011) he reflects on the 
normative self-image of the EU and its role in civilising the external environment. In 
this article, Zielonka took the distances from the contemporary debate about the moral 
virtues of European policies, considering the “EU’s normative discourse as a device to 
legitimize the EU’s imperial policies in its neighbourhood” (2011: 2). According to 
Zielonka, the EU’s normative attitude legitimizes the role of the EU’s empire through 
a post-modern mission civilisatrice. Continuing with this line of reasoning, that 
normative power is used to help peripheries of the empire but also to extend the EU's 
borders asserting the EU's political and economic control over the unstable and 
impoverished eastern part of the continent. In this analysis, the chance to generate 
positive outcomes for the empire relies on the legitimisation that the mission 
civilisatrice gains on formally sovereign actors. Indeed, Zielonka argues that 
normative power as mission civilisatrice is “equipped to determine the notion of 
legitimate behaviour, dictate international rules and impose domestic constraints to the 
periphery of the Empire” (ibid: 281).  
But Zielonka is not the only one claiming for a use of the empire framework of 
analysis in the study of the EU
5
. Behr (2008), for instance, argues that EU accession 
politics operates in the legacies of 19th-century imperial rule after comparing the EU 
accession politics with 19th century `standards of civilisation' developed by European 
states concluding treaties with non-European nations. More recently, a publication of 
2016 “Revisiting the European Union as an Empire”, collects the most relevant essays 
on this topic and seems to push this point further. 
In the publication, Behr and Stivachtis suggest that we should use the concept of 
Empire as a framework to understand the EU. Their idea is to see Empire without 
conceiving it as something “evil, martial and aggressive”, but to “reopen our 
                                                          
5
 Other authors have attempted to make such analogy with regard different aspect of the EU. For an  
overview look at  Behr, 2007; Böröcz, 2001; Diez, 1999; Eichengreen, 2008; Engelbrekt, 2002; Wæver, 
1997; Beck and Grande, 2007; Philipson, 2002; Phelan, 2012) 
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imagination” to comprehend empire as the Latin idea of “imperium” /”patrocinium” 
(Behr & Stivachtis, 2015), as this notion encompasses meanings such as “order”, 
responsibility, authority, power, rule, mandate patronage, responsibility, protectorate, 
that could make the discourse of empire a valuable analytical concept for the study of 
contemporary politics.  
The argument of these scholars, however, is less engaged in demonstrating empirically 
to what degree the EU can be seen as a form of empire, but rather builds on evidence 
of the existence of a form of empire and is interested in the question of how to 
mitigate possible collateral effects of  such “imperium” and (re)integrate them in a 
framework of accountable politics (ibid.). 
To summarise, the authors presented in this paragraph made an important connection 
between civilian/normative power and the legacy of the European civilising mission. 
However, most of them considered this to be a positive feature, whereas others simply 
advocated for a mitigation of the possible negative effects of such power. None of 
them considered, therefore, that the EU should actually revise its identity in the 
international system. 
This challenge has been instead undertaken by Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis in a 
relevant article published in 2013: “The decentering agenda: Europe as a post-colonial 
power”.   
Moving further the debate, their intent is to carry out a paradigmatic shift that 
decenters the study and practice of EU’s international relations by acknowledging the 
inflexions of colonialism in the EU project itself. 
The content of this article was anticipated in a previous work by Nicolaïdis and Howse 
(2002). Here, the authors identify the process in which the EU models itself on the 
utopia - the EUtopia - that it seeks to project on to the rest of the world to implement 
“the EU’s biggest project of all, its mission civilisatrice, which means to export its 
miracle to the rest of the world” (ibid. :782). 
In the “Decentering Agenda,” the authors understand “the denial of Europe’s pre-
world-war colonial past since the inception of the EU project” (Fisher Onar and 
Nicolaïdis, 2013: 284). Moreover, once the predominance of attitudes in the current 
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EU identity that “echo the era of European imperialism” are asserted (ibid. : 285) these 
scholars investigate three possible routes to decentering the Eurocentric agenda: 
questioning the Eurocentric accounts of world history, engaging others’ perspectives 
and recognizing the historical patterns underpinning the EU’s external relations.  
It must be acknowledged that this article is a turning point in EU Studies, as it 
challenges the Eurocentrism of the European messianic project and it locates the basis 
of the current Eurocentrism in the colonial past. However, although Fisher Onar and 
Nicolaïdis give a remarkable contribution to lead the academic debate in a non-
Eurocentric perspective, they do not address effectively the correlation between 
European imperialism and contemporary EU foreign policy. What does this legacy 
consist of, how is it deployed in the practices of foreign policy and how is it accepted 
by the “Other” countries?  
These questions draw on the significant considerations contained in this article, so that 
the primary theoretical concern in this research might be seen as an attempt to expand 
the meaning of the “decentering agenda”, questioning the Eurocentric “civilisational” 
assumptions and trying to understand how much such civilizing discourses are 
manifest in contemporary EU peacebuilding practices. As the research seeks to study 
how the common thread of European superiority, vastly theorized and accepted within 
academia, has been employed in EU peacebuilding, it is also important to focus on the 
literature that so far has explored the deployment of the “EUniqueness” in 
peacebuilding, from the supporter to the critiques. And this will be elucidated in the 
next section of this chapter. 
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2. Civilising Legacy  in EU Peacebuilding Literature 
As it has been examined in the previous section, the argument that the EU is a 
normative, civilian or civilizing power has gained considerable attention. Moreover, 
the study of this putative “humanitarian” identity has been used as a theoretical basis 
for scholars analysing different aspects of EU’s foreign policy.  
Peacebuilding scholars have been involved in this debate, as theories around EU 
civilian power have given rise to a similarly broad academic debate around the 
uniqueness of the EU’s ethics in international interventions and peacebuilding.  
In this section, an overview of the main theories regarding EU civilian power in 
peacebuilding will be provided through a selection of authors that more directly have 
addressed the relationship between the practices of peacebuilding and the civilizing 
discourses. Before going into explaining those theories, I firstly conceptualize what 
peacebuilding is and track the main aspects of the peacebuilding debate in 
International Relations. Here the emphasis is given to the emergence of a critical 
movement in the discipline which has begun to rethink peacebuilding from a less 
Eurocentric paradigm. Despite a plethora of studies on “decentering” international 
peacebuilding, it is argued that a critical approach has only tentatively emerged within 
EU peacebuilding.  
In this way, this will set the basis for the next section of the chapter in which a new 
approach is suggested in order to address the lacunae of the debate and to understand 
EU peacebuilding from a non-Eurocentric perspective. 
 
2.1. The Liberal Peacebuilding Paradigm 
Peacebuilding is commonly understood as a broad range of activities to solidify peace 
in conflict-prone and post-conflict countries and avoid the relapse into violent wars 
(Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009). It implies the effort to render those countries in 
conformity with “the international system’s prevailing standards of domestic 
governance” (Paris, 2002: 638) which Oliver Richmond defined as being comprised of 
democratisation, economic liberalisation, neoliberal development, human rights and 
the rule of law (2007).  
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The current debate refers to the term “liberal peace” or “liberal peacebuilding” to 
name the dominant framework applied to post-conflict interventions since the end of 
the Cold War. The academic debate on peacebuilding seems to follow the polarisation 
that Cox, referring to IR, envisaged in 1981 between “critical voices” who reject the 
premise of international intervention and their inherent values, and “problem solvers” 
who study the fault of current peacebuilding efforts, but do not necessarily question 
their inherent value (Cox, 1981).  
Within the “problem solvers”, we can see a recurrent linkage of peacebuilding with a 
civilizing ethos. The most direct example of the use of the notion of the civilizing 
mission to support peacebuilding can be observed in the work of Roland Paris. In his 
article “International peacebuilding and the mission civilisatrice”, the author declares 
that peacebuilding “resembles an updated and benign version of the mission 
civilisatrice, because, as the European imperial powers, peacebuilding has a duty to 
“civilize” dependent populations and territories” (Paris, 2002: 638). 
In other words, from Paris’ view, the ideological justification underpinning 
peacebuilding is not to be blamed. Indeed, he is one of the most prominent defenders 
of liberal peacebuilding. In his famous articles “Saving Liberal Peace” Paris argues 
that liberal democratic forms of governance are best-suited for managing and 
mitigating political conflict. According to Paris, in the absence of any viable 
alternative, liberal peacebuilding’s demise “would be tantamount to abandoning tens 
of millions of people to lawlessness, predation, disease and fear” (Paris, 2010: 338). 
In the same way, Kimberly Marten, in “Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the 
Imperial Past” (2004), gleans strategic lessons for peacebuilding from colonial times. 
She believes that liberal democracies in both eras have wanted to maintain a presence 
on foreign territory in order to make themselves more secure while sharing the 
benefits of their own cultures and societies. The author concludes that liberal 
peacebuilding is unrealistic, due to a lack of resources and international commitment, 
but also a desirable venture.  Similarly, Niall Ferguson (2004) in his book “Colossus” 
declares he has no objection in principle to an American empire. Indeed, Ferguson 
believes that “many parts of the world would benefit from a period of American rule” 
as the “experiment with decolonisation has largely failed. For many countries across 
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the continent, the only hope is to be folded into a new empire, which could finish the 
job that the British started” (Ferguson, 2004:2).  
The most shocking case in this sense is represented by the recent article published by 
Gilley, “The case for Colonialism” in which the author calls for a return of 
colonialism, citing the benefits of a “colonial governance” agenda which would 
involve overtaking state bureaucracies, recolonizing some areas, and creating new 
colonies “from scratch.” In his view, the new colonisation would assume the shape of 
a reinforced state-building- and peacebuilding process, in which a colonial governance 
agenda “resurrects the universalism of the liberal peace and with it a shared standard 
of what a well-governed country looks like”.  
In contrast, several critical authors challenge this cosmopolitan universalism prevalent 
in peacebuilding literature (Duffield, 2001; Jabri, 2007; Mac Ginty, 2011, 2012; Pugh, 
2004; Richmond 2005, 2011,2012; Selby, 2013; Tadjbakhsh, 2011, et al.). They point 
out that peacebuilding is a sort of social engineering internationally rendered (Jabri, 
2007) through which Western-led agency, institutions, and NGOs attempt “to unite the 
world under a hegemonic system” (Richmond, 2011:1) that replicates liberal 
institutions, norms, and political, social, and economic systems. Between these critical 
voices, a clear interest in dismantling the myth of civilisation is blossoming in the last 
years.   
Cunliffe (2012) provides an extensive overview of both supporters and critics of the 
imperial legacy in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding. He also argues that 
supporters of peacebuilding deploy an under-theorized and historically one-sided view 
of imperialism, whereas an exhaustive study of the theory and history of imperialism 
provides a rich resource for both the critique and conceptualisation of peacekeeping 
practice (212:426). 
As Sabaratnam (2013) perceptively argues, in this critical debate there has been a 
fertile expansion of literature that challenges the Eurocentric assumptions of liberal 
interventions proposing a new “decolonized” standpoint6. For instance, Lidén (2011) 
                                                          
6
Recent texts include, Hobson, J. M. (2004). The Eastern origins of Western civilisation. Cambridge, 
UK; New York, Cambridge University Press, Jones, B. G. (2006). Decolonizing international relations, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Agathangelou, A. M. and L. H. M. Ling (2009). Transforming world 
politics: from empire to multiple worlds, Taylor & Francis, Bhambra, G. K. and R. Shilliam (2009). 
Silencing human rights: critical engagements with a contested project, Palgrave MacMillan. Mignolo, 
48 
 
stigmatizes the resemblance between peacebuilding and the civilizing mission. He 
notices that the theoretical underpinnings of liberal peacebuilding rely on “a colonial 
logic of development that reduces war-torn societies to states that have fallen from the 
ladder of human progress and need a cure of liberal state-building to get back on 
track” (Lidén, 2011:57). However, Lidén seems to distinguish between the theory of 
peacebuilding, which has a residual of the colonial heritage, and the practices of 
peacebuilding that, despite being a consequence of the colonial rationale, are not 
necessarily hegemonic. 
Another example of this currently flourishing literature is the work of Sabaratnam 
(2011, 2013) which develops a critique of the debate on the liberal peace drawing 
inspiration from post-colonial thinkers, in order to engage the problematic of 
multifaceted and intersecting modes of domination through peacebuilding. Several 
scholars also suggest that the concept of peacebuilding still entails the 
civilized/barbarian divide, translated in democracies/non-democracies, strong/failed 
states in current parlance (see among others Duffield, 2001; Pugh, 2005, Heathershaw, 
2008). Hughes and Pupavac (2005) assert that this divide fixes culpability for the war 
on the recipient societies in question by rendering the local populations dysfunctional 
while casting international rescue interventions as functional. In this sense, policy 
failures are seen as technical failures that can be fixed by re-jigging the concepts and 
tools of peacebuilding, but also as ideologically-driven interpretations of the assumed 
political inability, and/or passivity of post-conflict communities (ibid). 
As Lidèn summarizes (2011: 57), the main criticisms of liberal peacebuilding argue 
that it promotes Western culture at the expense of other cultures, norms and identities, 
consolidating the asymmetric power of “the global North” over “the global South” in 
spite of having a potentially positive local impact. In a similar vein, Jabri believes that 
peacebuilding projects might reinforce the hierarchical conception of subjectivities 
premised on the primacy of the European liberal self as against others (2011). She 
                                                                                                                                                                       
W. and Escobar, A. (2010) Globalization and the Decolonial Option. London: Routledge. Nayak, M and 
Selbin, E. (2010). Decentering International Relations. London: Zed Books. Shillam, R. (2011). 
International Relations and Non Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of 
Global Modernity. New York: Routledge. Tadjbakhsh, S. (2011) Rethinking the Liberal Peace. External 
models and local alternatives. New York: Routledge. Hobson, J. M. (2012) The Eurocentric Conception 
of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010. Cambridge University Press. Seth, S. (ed) 
(2013). Postcolonial Theory and International Relations. A critical Introduction. London: Routledge.  
Jabri, V (2013). The Postcolonial subject. Claiming politics/governing others in the late modernity. 
London: Routledge. 
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interprets peace operations as being driven by a late modern form of colonial 
rationality wherein the imperative to govern populations precedes and informs 
practices on the ground (see Jabri 2011, 2013).  
Accordingly, Darby sees peacebuilding as “cast in the mould of colonialism” (2009: 
703) and its contention shows how imperial peacekeeping had an afterlife during and 
following the process of decolonisation, becoming a structural part of the current 
international peacebuilding. Darby also attempts to demonstrate the interconnection 
between security, development and the neoliberal economic order to show how 
humanitarianism has been hitched to the support of a highly inequitable global order 
(ibid). This criticism, that leaves an impression of liberal peacebuilding as a form of 
social engineering (Jabri,2011) or a form of imperialism “in denial” (Chandler,2006a), 
are mainly rooted in the idea that peacebuilding operations do not take into account the 
specific political, socioeconomic context of the recipient countries, applying blueprint 
measures (democratisation, open market, human rights and the rule of law among 
other) that are not always sensitive to the local environment. So doing, “First World” 
knowledge is valorised whereas the distinctive understandings of people in the rest of 
the world are marginalized or not recognized as knowledge at all; the problems to be 
tackled are located ‘out there’, in the otherness of the non-European world.  
A growing literature on critical political economy highlights how international 
intervention in post-conflict economies can exacerbate the challenges of 
transformation by propelling the political economies of war-torn societies into a 
scheme of global convergence towards market liberalisation. The imposition of an 
open market, in most of the cases, tends to aggravate problems by increasing the 
vulnerability of populations to poverty and shadow economic activity (see Pugh, 2005, 
2011; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008).  
Moreover, the introduction of liberal measures tends to replicate rather than transform 
power and authority, because for most of the cases it links the interveners with the 
local elite, with the effect of reaffirming unjust social and political divisions
7
. Mostly, 
the idea of local ownership, widely boasted by new bottom-up approaches on 
                                                          
7
 For a better understanding of the relationship between the local and the international actors see, 
among others: Donais, 2009; Hirblinger & Simons,2015, Leonardsson, & Rudd, 2015; Mac Ginty & 
Richmond,2013. 
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peacebuilding, tend to privilege a particular group of locals, empowering some actors 
and disempowering others. (see Hirblinger and Simons, 2015; Jabri, 2013a).  
Mobilising postcolonial and anticolonial approaches, Sabaratnam (2011) observes how 
peacebuilding not only is an alien practice, proposed by external interveners, but it is 
also alienating part of the local population, to the extent that it rarely entails an 
appropriation and actively underestimates local efforts to reach an autonomous 
recovery.  
Peacebuilding sets the limits of the collective frames in which social and political life 
is grounded. Locked into a world, not of their making, non-Western people tend to 
find the idea very difficult to autonomously restart a political process after an invasive 
external intervention, with the conclusion that this process profoundly disadvantages 
them (see Darby, 2011; Jabri, 2013b and Sabaratnam, 2011). Thus, through a 
postcolonial lens, peacebuilding could be interpreted as a way of marginalising the 
struggle of non-European peoples for economic justice and racial equality. In turn, this 
determines a depoliticisation of the internal setting, by reducing the political sphere in 
something that could be managed from the outside. Jabri (2013b), for example, argues 
that international interventions prevent the postcolonial countries from their “right to 
politics” and their right to be political subjects. She advocates for the access of the 
postcolonial subject to politics, independence and for autonomous access to the 
“international”. 
 
2.2.  African Scholarly Approaches to Peacebuilding 
The field of peace and conflict studies had been mostly discussed by and within 
Western institutions; and indeed continues to be largely comprised of scholars who 
predominantly hail from from Europe and North America. Besides recent 
improvements in inclusivity, this field of scholarship tends to not to take into account 
the fact that Africans had established and tested indigenous approaches and methods 
of conflict management and resolution many decades prior to any Western 
conceptualised approaches (see Aubyn, 2018 and Francis, 2007 among others).   This 
universalisation of peacebuilding theories and methodologies will be discussed 
alongside its specific consequences in chapter seven, where the thesis will reflect on 
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the fact that the marginalisation of African views on peacebuilding from the EU might 
be one of the causes of the effectiveness of EU peacebuilding in the case of DRC. 
The dominant European and North American approach to peacebuilding has limited 
and marginalised the emerging of the ‘Africanist worldview’ of peacebuilding 
(Aubyn, 2018). Against this backdrop, it is important to notice that there has been a 
remarkable expansion in African scholarly writing on peacebuilding and this growing 
scholarship is giving substantial contributions to the global peacebuilding debate.  
Although diverse perspectives are evident in the foregoing analysis of African 
peacebuilding literature, in recent years most of the African scholars have been 
concerned with the issue of “the suitability and sustainability of the liberal governance 
framework within the Africa context” (Aubyn, 2018: 25). The liberal peace approach 
is widely criticised by African scholars for its state-centric, top-down approach to 
dealing with the needs of post-conflict countries. According to Funmi Olonisakin and 
Alfred Muteru for example, the major premises of internationally-supported 
peacebuilding efforts obscure the important contributions that African traditional 
systems can make toward advancing peace. On the contrary, they argue that the local 
context and informal actors and initiatives need to be prioritised in the peacebuilding 
process.  
Related to this, many of the African researchers surveyed consider that the principle of 
local ownership, largely theorised in Western scholarly practices, has not been 
reflected on the ground, thus leading to the failure of sustainable practices. Citing 
some practical cases from the DRC, Josaphat Musamba Bussy and Carol Jean Gallo 
locate the cause of the failures of the UN and World Bank peacebuilding interventions 
within the liberal governance framework in Eastern DRC. According to Bussy and 
Gallo, interventions failed because the premises were wrong: they argued that 
intervenes considered that the primary reason conflict persists in the DRC was due to 
the absence of a strong liberal state, leading to the implementation of programs of a 
primarily top-down fashion, despite discourse on the importance of local ownership.  
Against this orthodox liberal approach, some scholars proposed different approaches 
based on hybridisation processes as a way to capture the complexity of the interactions 
between internal and external actors in peacebuilding contexts (see Bah, 2015; Aning 
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& Aubyn, 2018 among others). Others suggested to disengage completely from the 
liberal paradigm and to find solutions from de-lining from Western structures and 
finding a decolonial African way to peace (see for instance Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013) 
 
2.3. The EU Peacebuilding Debate 
While there is an increasingly prolific critical debate in IR challenging the Western 
postulations of liberal peacebuilding and the use of an updated civilizing narrative, in 
EU Studies a certain under-representation of such critical analysis can be observed. 
The attention of scholars seems to be more focused on UN-US international 
peacebuilding missions rather than on EU peacebuilding. Some studies have also 
looked at the way in which specific national peacebuilding policies present imperial 
features, mostly focusing on the case of imperial legacies in French interventions in 
Africa (see, Bergamaschi & Diawara, 2014; Charbonneau 2008, 2009,2014). This 
leaves the study of EU peacebuilding and its colonial legacy quite unexplored.  
This might be due to the limitation of how the EU Study evolved as a discipline, 
briefly sketched in the introduction. The strong prominence of the civilian/normative 
power discourse in the EU, which have always described the EU with ideational and 
essentialist features, monopolised the debate by implying a postulate of superiority 
that for a long time did not leave rooms to critical voices. 
Nevertheless, in the following part of the chapter, an examination of the works of four 
authors is provided that mainly contribute to the critical debate on EU peacebuilding: 
Michael Merlingen, Oliver Richmond, David Chandler and Olivia Rutazibwa.  
Michael Merlingen examines the role and governance of the CSDP missions through a 
Foucauldian perspective. He moves his critiques from the Manners’ constructivist idea 
of normative power, arguing that to comprehend entirely EU peacebuilding we should 
make a conceptual shift through the notion of normalizing power (Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaitė, 2006). Borrowing the Foucauldian concept of normalisation8, Merlingen 
argues that EU peacebuilding in its normalizing mode brings into play microphysical 
and non-sovereign forms of power that circulate through opaque capillaries, 
                                                          
8
 Normalisation can be defined as a construction of an idealized norm of conduct that reward or punish 
individuals for conforming to or deviating from an ideal, generating the maximum social control 
(Foucault, 1977). 
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generating constraints and domination (Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė, 2006:3). Using 
the Foucauldian toolkit Merlingen represents the normalizing power as a technology 
of power that extends CSDP governmentality (2012: 188). Furthermore, he argues that 
one of the main power effects of EU governmentality is that the ethical dimension of 
the CSDP discourse goes hand in hand with the discursive disempowerment of 
theatres of operation: they are in need of EU encouragement, assistance, support, 
guidance and discipline. (Merlingen, 2012:201).   
What at first glance appears an appealing theory, however, becomes quite 
controversial when the author tries to produce a reformatory agenda to minimize 
CSDP domination. He controversially envisages a “certain correspondence between 
Foucault’s political ethics and a more general ethos of liberal democracy” (Merlingen 
and Ostrauskaitė, 2006:32). Therefore, his mission turns to be “a firm normative 
commitment to enhance and provide a vigilant defence of liberal institutions and 
values against attack from within and from outside” (Stenson 1998: 338). 
A somewhat similar concern with the “illiberal” sides of the liberal peacebuilding 
animates the work of Oliver Richmond. Also inspired by Foucault, he shows how 
peacebuilding consolidates a hegemonic worldview, drawing a parallel between 
peacebuilding and colonial projects of improvement. He, thus, suggests that the peace 
implanted by peacebuilders is “simulated to be as it is in liberal states, though in 
practice it may be more like the situation that existed in former colonial dependencies” 
(Richmond 2004: 85).  
Such continuity between these two sets of practices encounters Richmond’s central 
problematic of alterity. The author disagrees with the way in which the liberal peace 
deals with “the other”, describing this phenomenon as the Orientalism of peace (2005, 
2011). 
Richmond calls for a modification of the liberal peace without necessarily calling for 
its abandonment, proposing an emancipatory post-liberal peace which is assumed to be 
equal, local-oriented and non-hegemonic. As Merlingen does, he attempts to retain the 
liberal peace while modifying its core. However, in the new post-liberal peace there 
remains a visible tension between the West and its Others as if the local recipients 
were unbridgeable categories. In short, a fine-grained analysis of this author’s work 
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allows for the conclusion that there is a contradiction between his general vision of 
peacebuilding as Orientalist, Eurocentric and hypocritical and his particular solution to 
this concern. Indeed, post-liberal peacebuilding seems to reproduce a moderate version 
of the same dominant logic that he criticizes. 
This Eurocentric residual view is even more problematic when he considers EU 
peacebuilding. Indeed, Richmond emphasizes that the EU has the potential to develop 
more balanced politics between security, active intervention and a more sophisticated 
notion of peace. Its added value, the normative commitment, according to Richmond, 
gives the EU an opportunity to produce a more far-reaching version of the global 
peacebuilding project and allows for the creation of strong legitimacy on the ground 
(Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler, 2009).  Both Merlingen and Richmond give the 
impression of establishing a conversation that is strongly anchored in a liberal 
Eurocentrism with their preoccupations and in their configuration of alternatives. 
Between these critical authors, the distinctive character of European civilisation is 
used to promote EU peacebuilding and to envisage possible solutions to the current 
problems of the liberal peace system. In other words, sustaining the uniqueness of the 
EU in peacebuilding, they reproduce the discourse of civilisation, generating what can 
be described as an “uncritical critique”. As Wallerstein (1997) argues, many critical 
literatures reproduce tropes of Eurocentrism in their analyses and this is more than 
ever self-evident in EU Studies. 
Through his extensive fieldwork in Bosnia (1999, 2006a, 2010b) David Chandler 
criticizes the high-handed use of “illiberal” power by EU forces engaged in the 
peacebuilding crusade: censorship, manipulation of elections, removal of 
democratically elected officials and other forms of “repression of the democratic rights 
of people who are supposed to be learning about democracy” (Hulsman, 2002: 97). In 
his analysis, Chandler argues (2006a) that such measures created an order in the 
international intervention which derogates norms of sovereignty and self-
determination that were the outcome of decolonisation. 
In a more recent publication, he considers the discursive continuity between 
colonialism and peacebuilding and traces the discursive steps that allowed the racial 
discourse to remain anchored in the international peacebuilding system (2010d), 
highlighting that a historical analysis is a key to understanding the peacebuilding 
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discourses of intervention.  However, whereas Chandler’s first body of research failed 
to engage with the historical continuities that allowed the deployment of an illiberal 
EU peacebuilding, this latest work fails to engage with the specific EU practices and 
discourses through which peacebuilding operates in such international projects of 
improvement.  
An important voice in this debate is Olivia Rutazibwa. In the light of decades of 
unsuccessful state-building and peacebuilding efforts, she decided to investigate the 
feasibility of fewer interventions, by studying the case of EU interventions in Africa 
(2006;2010;2013). Starting from the conceptual framework of EU as an “ethical 
intervener” she described how such values are translated into interventions on African 
soils that have the criteria of inequality, and self-centred intervention, where the 
objective is more into raising the image of the EU rather than achieving peacebuilding 
or state-building goals. In this important study, where the mechanism of Eurocentric 
intervention is clearly spelt out, however, there is no space to engage with European 
history in order to understand the origins of such “EU’s ethical interventions”. 
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Conclusion 
  
The review of the literature conducted in this chapter provides an overview of the 
debate about EU peacebuilding and the colonial legacy.   
In the first part section, it shows the main theories regarding the nature of the EU’s 
identity and power in international relations. It considers that, for decades, in EU 
Studies there has been a consensual belief about the distinctiveness of EU identity as 
an ontologically benign and superior actor. This belief was divulgated by different 
notions of civilian, normative or ethical power Europe. The chapter then engages with 
those scholars that started to connect the idea of civilian/normative/ethical power with 
a civilisational aspect, considering that such normative, value-based vision of the EU 
implied a postulate of superiority that had lots in common with colonial reasoning.  
In the second section, the civilian/civilising debate is put in the context of the EU 
peacebuilding literature, showing the main contribution to this discussion and the 
limitations. 
In making their important contributions to the EU peacebuilding debate, in terms of 
discourses, political relations and ethics, some of these authors demonstrated a 
preoccupation with deconstructing its resonances with imperialism and colonialism. 
However, these notions floated at various points in the debate are never fully explored: 
Diez considers the EU as hegemonic power; Nicholaidis and Fisher Onas propose a 
decentering agenda for the normative power Europe; Merlingen points out the 
normalizing aspects of the CSDP, and Rutazibwa looked at the intervener-centric 
mechanism of EU intervention. None of the authors actually engages in a study of 
what colonial legacies might represent in EU peacebuilding discourse and practices.   
In order to achieve a historical comprehension of the discourses of civilisation 
deployed in EU peacebuilding and to analyse how peacebuilding policymakers deal 
with the colonial legacy of the EU, a broader approach is required. The next chapter 
charts such an approach through discussing how Postcolonial and Decolonial Theory 
are mobilised in order to allow a historical look into the colonial discourse in EU 
peacebuilding policymaking towards DRC. 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical and Methodological  Framework 
 
 
For the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house.  
They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game,  
but they will never enable us to bring about genuine change. 
(Lorde, 2012) 
 
Introduction 
The analysis of the literature in the previous chapter shows that only recently have 
scholars started to understand the historicity of the EU identity and its consequences in 
EU foreign policy. Building on the effort of such scholars to uncover the historicity of 
the EU’s international power and action, this thesis proposes to continue in this 
direction and to explicitly analyse if and how colonial legacy is present in EU 
peacebuilding practices.  
In this sense, the previous chapter set the stage for the engagement of a postcolonial 
and decolonial perspective which is the point of departure of this chapter. Here the 
reflection moves to how a postcolonial and decolonial perspective can aid in 
unmasking colonial legacies in the EU’s construction of peacebuilding practices in 
DRC. 
By answering this question, the theoretical and methodological framework of 
reference for the thesis is explained. I propose a theoretical perspective that relies on 
postcolonial/decolonial theory and a coherent methodological choice that approaches 
the study of colonial discourse by applying Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA).   
The choice of combining the theoretical and methodological framework into one 
chapter is due to the interlinked nature of the two aspects, which is better understood if 
enclosed in the same reasoning.   
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The chapter is divided into three sections. The first one is dedicated to the explanation 
of postcolonial and decolonial theories, considering that both theories offer 
challenging and provocative ways of thinking about the colonial origin of Western 
superiority. By connecting the present to the colonial structure of power, postcolonial 
and decolonial thoughts are engaged in deconstructing dominant accounts and 
showing their historical continuities.   
Arguing for a combination of postcolonial and decolonial perspectives, the section 
further explains what it means to undertake such an approach in the analysis of EU 
peacebuilding policy in DRC.  
The second section is dedicated to the core concept of colonial discourse. Here, the 
postcolonial approach is infused with the Foucauldian/poststructuralist understanding 
of discourse, in order to explain how certain colonial knowledge is produced and 
reproduced towards a system of power and knowledge.   
If the general postcolonial/decolonial theory tells about the vivid colonial 
underpinnings of our present, the concept of colonial discourse allows us to 
understand how colonial power and knowledge has been reproduced along with 
history. It allows us to also unmask the presence of such a legacy today. 
Therefore, the third section presents a methodological framework for the analysis of 
colonial discourses. Despite a plethora of studies on colonial discourses (see Bhabha, 
1984 and 1994; Mohanty, 1988; Said, 1978; Smith, 2012 [1999]; Chrisman & 
Williams, 2015; Parry, 1987; Vidal, 1993 among others) this research identifies a 
certain gap in the way such discourses have been methodologically analysed. It is, 
indeed, very difficult to find in postcolonial and decolonial literature clear 
“methodological tools” that can answer questions such as: How to analyse colonial 
discourses? How to claim that a certain discourse is colonial? How to compare 
colonial discourses over time? How to operationalise a diachronic and synchronic 
comparison of colonial discourses?  
In order to find an answer to such questions, the thesis seeks to make a methodological 
contribution by bridging the theoretical analysis of colonial discourses (Colonial 
Discourse Theory) with discourse analysis, privileging the Discourse-Historical 
Approach (DHA) part of the Critical Discourse Analysis methodology. 
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After showing this methodology, the final section of the chapter is dedicated to the 
methods used in the research: it limits the subjects and objects of analysis, it explains 
the importance of locating the researcher’s positionality and shows the empirical 
sources and ways of gathering data. 
 
1. Bridging Postcolonial and Decolonial Thought 
There are a number of outstanding works outlining the fields of postcolonial and 
decolonial studies as a whole9 and it is not my intention to provide a comprehensive 
overview here, given the variety of contributions that have been written across the 
humanities and social sciences. Instead, I wish simply to pick up on some of the 
defining features and debates that are significant to offer a theory that supports this 
study. 
Postcolonial Studies emerged in the late 1970s as a field of academic study, mostly 
associated with literary studies. While recognizing a common heritage to earlier 
poststructuralist practitioners and anti-colonial political thinkers such as Frantz Fanon, 
Amilcar Cabral, Aimé Césaire, Gandhi and Albert Memmi among others, postcolonial 
theorists brought the debate to a different level.  Homi Bhabha, Edward Said and 
Gayatri Spivak, as the main pathbreakers of Postcolonial Studies, instead of thinking 
of postcolonialism as primarily or exclusively a form of political action in a historical 
defined period, began to use the term also to refer to a mode of theoretical analysis 
(Nichols, 2010:115).  
The birth of postcolonialism was inspired by poststructuralism in the critique of 
Western epistemology and in the theorisation of cultural alterity/difference and 
“otherness” (see Gandhi, 1998: ix). It has also been inspired by materialist 
                                                          
9
 For a better understanding of postcolonial theory, see, among others: Bhabha, H. K. (1994) The 
Location of Culture, London: Routledge; Césaire, A. (1972). Discourse on colonialism. New York: 
Monthly Review Press; Fanon, F. (2006). The wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press.; Guha, R. 
(1997). Dominance without hegemony. History and power in colonial India. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press; Epstein, C. (2014). The postcolonial perspective: an introduction. International 
Theory, 6(2), 294-311; Loomba, A. (1998). Colonialism/postcolonialism. London: Routledge; Said, E. 
(1978). Orientalism. New York: Vintage. Spivak, G. C. (1988). Can the subaltern speak? In C. Nelson, 
ed. & L. Grossberg (Eds.), Marxism and the interpretation of culture pp. (pp. 271–313). London: 
Macmillan. 
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philosophies, such as Marxism, that supplied most of the basis for postcolonial politics 
(ibid.) 
The postcolonial, different from the anti-colonial, has a clear temporal and spatial 
definition.  Time-wise, it does not signify the end of colonialism, but rather it 
accurately reflects both the continuity and persistence of colonizing practices, as well 
as the critical limits and possibilities it has engendered in the present historical 
moment (see Chowdhry and Nair, 2002:11). Klor de Alva, for example, suggests that 
postcoloniality should “signify not so much subjectivity ‘after’ the colonial experience 
as a subjectivity of opposition to imperialising/colonising discourses and practices 
(1995:245).   
In the same manner, postcolonial is not a geographical concept. Indeed, postcolonial 
authors do not refer to the countries that have previously been colonized as the sole 
subject of inquiry.  
On the contrary, postcolonial theory is more interested in the phenomenon of 
colonialism as the moment in which, using Stuart Hall’s words, “different 
temporalities and histories have been irrevocably and violently yoked together” (1996: 
252). And it is exactly due to this violent union of different entities that it is 
impossible to consider postcolonialism as the study of a geographically specific area. 
Indeed, one of the principal values of this theory is to explain how, from the sixteenth 
century onwards, a polycentric system of cultures and histories was turned into a 
monocentric one, with the result of rendering it impossible to “disentangle, 
conceptualise or narrate discrete entities: though that is precisely what the dominant 
Western historiographical tradition has often tried to do” (ibid).   
Hence, postcolonial studies take into account both the colonised and colonising worlds 
with the specific intention of disrupting the old colonising/colonised binary that 
perversely bound together the colonial world,  in order to present a new positive 
conjuncture for a globalised postcolonial word. 
Following Bhambra (2007: 16), we can say that postcolonialism should be understood 
in this temporal and spatial condition as an epistemic marker that allows a reflective 
engagement with the experience of colonisation and its power to shape past and 
current realities. This implies, first of all, a recognition that the world has been 
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decisively shaped by colonialism and that “one cannot even begin to understand the 
contemporary situation if this fact is not acknowledged and explored in all its 
ramifications” (Seth, 2012: 1).  
Postcolonial theory also carries an epistemological objective. It “questions the 
universality of the categories of modern scientific and social thought and of the 
disciplines into which it is divided” (Seth, 2012: 1). The awareness of Eurocentric 
categories that allow us to interpret the world leads postcolonial scholars to argue for a 
deconstruction of categories such as civil society, state, nation, sovereignty, 
individual, subjectivity, development and so on. Indeed, echoing Chakrabarty, the 
current way of knowing the world is the product of a dominant Eurocentric account of 
the reality that in the course of history has tended to marginalize non-European 
narratives (Chakrabarty, 2009).  
Acknowledging other regional and global configurations that are challenging 
European primacy in the international system, postcolonial scholars try to deconstruct 
the “imaginary figure” of Europe, that “remains deeply embedded in cliché and 
shorthand forms” in the majority of international relations and in the social sciences to 
address questions of political modernity as well (Chakrabarty, 2009: 3). By reflecting 
on global historical events and local resistance to universalisation, challenging 
concepts and power-relations that flow from the top-down, from the centre to the 
periphery, postcolonialism is interested in showing why the dominant accounts of the 
international are deficient. Postcolonialism is also concerned with detecting how the 
general conceptualisation of the word has been based on controlled absences and 
elimination of claims by non-European voices.  
Finally, a postcolonial take on is necessary not only to rethink disciplinary categories 
and academic concepts but to apply it in the present reality. In this sense, 
postcolonialism seeks to propose its alternative knowledge into international power 
structures and to change the way people think, the way they behave, to produce more 
just and equitable relations between the different peoples of the world (Young, 2002). 
Very similar to the postcolonial in scope and approach, decolonial scholarship was 
born in Latin America as a political and epistemic project aimed at eliminating the 
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tendency to consider Western European modes of thinking as universal ones (Quijano, 
2000).  
Decolonial authors as Anibal Quijano, Enrique Dussel, Pablo Gonzalez Casanova and 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Santiago Castro Gomez and Water Mignolo believe that 
the fundamental element of modernity is the global condition of “coloniality”: a living 
legacy of colonialism in contemporary societies that outlived formal colonialism and 
became integrated into succeeding social orders.  
Coloniality names the “underlying logic of the foundation and development of 
Western civilisation of which colonialisms have been constitutive” (Mignolo, 
2011:20). Decolonial authors believe that the binomial modernity/coloniality emerged 
with the European invasion and foundation of the Americas and the Caribbean and the 
massive trade of enslaved Africans.  
From these historical events, the so-called “colonial matrix of power” (see Escobar 
and Mignolo, 2013) operates on a series of interconnected heterogeneous historic-
structural nodes, whose legitimacy is anchored in the principles of colonial separation 
(West/East or North/South), in the apparatus of enunciation of such diversity (through 
categories of thought, social actors, and institutions) and the reproduction of such 
hierarchies through the continuity of education.  
Mignolo goes further in this analysis by tracing the stages and transformations of the 
colonial matrix over the past five hundred years, concluding that the logic of 
coloniality went through successive and cumulative stages presented positively in the 
rhetoric of modernity: specifically in the terms salvation, progress, development, 
modernisation and democracy (see Mignolo, 2011).  
As a reaction to the logic of coloniality that generates and reproduces interconnected 
hierarchies, those scholars propose to get out of the mirage of modernity and the trap 
of coloniality through a decolonial approach, which is  “a relentless analytic effort to 
understand, in order to overcome, the logic of coloniality underneath the rhetoric of 
modernity, the structure of management and control that emerged out of the 
transformation of the economy in the Atlantic, and the jump in knowledge that took 
place both in the internal history of Europe and in-between Europe and its colonies” 
(Mignolo, 2011: 11) .  
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As should be ostensible from the preceding discussion, postcolonialism and 
decoloniality have several points in common: both rose out of the contestation of the 
modern order established by European colonialism, both are devoted to changing this 
world order and both are also interested in analysing the relationship between the 
production of knowledge and power (see Bhambra, 2014a). 
Despite that, decolonial and postcolonial scholars have tended to be quite in 
opposition, the former accusing the latter of being a project of transformation limited 
to the academy (see Mignolo 2007: 452). It is true that each theory emerged in 
different socio-historical contexts (Indian in the case of postcolonial theory and Latin 
American in the case of decolonial theory) and carries its specific features, but this 
does not undermine the importance of considering the multiple commonalities of the 
two approaches. 
In her brilliant book “Connected Sociologies”, Bhambra (2014a) puts in 
communication postcolonial and decolonial literature by proposing a connected 
approach that can reveal the radical potential of both traditions “in unsettling and 
reconstituting standard processes of knowledge production” (2014b: 115)  
Both the decolonial and postcolonial approach are indeed aimed at challenging the 
persistence of this Western logic of power which continues to organize the multiple 
heterogeneous global hierarchies in the global present towards forms of domination 
and exploitation, even after colonialism has formally retreated from most of the world.  
For both postcolonial and decolonial theorists, the project of colonisation is a model of 
power at the foundation of the modern experience, of the capitalist paradigm and a 
system of domination structured around the idea of race (see Maldonado-Torres, 
2010).  
Moreover, both literatures argue that the “imaginary” of the modern/colonial world 
arose from the complex articulation of power that suppressed some marginalised 
memories in order to make only the dominant understanding of history emerge.  
In this sense, both a postcolonial and decolonial critique of International Relations 
seeks to deconstruct the modern world and the exercise of the coloniality of power and 
to give voice to marginalised accounts in global history. 
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It is from this meaningful conjunction of decolonial and postcolonial theories that the 
theoretical perspective of this thesis is derived, in the interest of using both the 
postcolonial ‘discursive’ understanding - more inspired by poststructuralist analysis - 
and the useful decolonial framework of coloniality of power. Therefore this thesis will 
engage with this point of conjuction that is already present elsewhere in the literature 
(see Staeger, 2016 for instance) and embrace both scholarships, with the 
understanding that this “connection” (Bhambra, 2014)  provides more tools for a 
radical critique of the present condition.  Moreover, putting together these two lines of 
scholarship has the positive consequence of strengthening the critique, and bolstering 
it against the risk of recurrent fragmentation that is so present in critical academic 
disciplines. In other words: “Which part of the story that belongs together, do we keep 
in telling separately; chopping up in separate bits pieces that have seemingly nothing 
to do with one another?” (Quijano, 2000  as quoted in Rutazibwa, 2019: 166). 
Straddling both scholarly traditions requires this research to embrace stricter 
intellectual resistance to forms of epistemological and material dominance 
disseminated by the colonial order and make them manifest in the specific case 
analysed in the thesis.  
More specifically, the ‘postcolonial’ can be a useful analytical tool for the description 
of incomplete European decolonisation and the dominance of European knowledge 
and discourses, and the ‘decolonial’ could be mobilised as the prescription by 
contemporary anti-colonial scholarship to overcome such postcolonial condition 
(Staeger, 2016). In this sense, the thesis does not find analytical difficulties in 
following those scholars who make use of both concepts together as a way of 
reinforcing the critique and obtaining a stronger set of instruments to analyse the 
object of study (see for instance Rodríguez, Boatcă & Costa, 2016; Samier, 2013). 
It is indeed thanks to the postcolonial and decolonial analysis – their epistemological 
disruptions and analytical interventions - that it is possible to comprehend the colonial 
underpinnings of the EU project, not taking as neutral the EU peacebuilding narratives 
and discourses that the EU is promoting and that EU scholars are producing and 
reproducing. Being committed to this critical scrutiny means wanting to find out if 
there are such legacies in EU peacebuilding policymaking discourses, and ultimately 
to disrupt such discourses. 
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1.2. African Perspectives on Decolonial Epistemology 
 
Zimbabwean historian Ndlovu Gatsheni (2013a) states that African intellectuals have 
found it very difficult to ‘unthink’ the epistemologies created by 
enlightenment/Western intellectuals and to “reproduce itself outside these relations” 
(Quijano 2007: 169), and a “scholarship by analogy” (Ibid.) has pervaded some of the 
influential intellectual works in and on Africa (see also Mamdani 1996 and Zeleza, 
2006).  
The difficulty that some African scholars demonstrate revolves around thinking about 
the African future without mimicking Western epistemology: how to reflect about 
democracy outside of the liberal democracy framework, or how to talk about the 
African public sphere without repeating the notions drawn by Habermas? At the same 
time, it is also about struggling to set themselves free “from the neurosis of 
victimhood inflicted on Africans by a combination of exploitative and demeaning 
processes of the slave trade, imperialism, colonialism and apartheid.”  (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2013a: 28) 
Despite these constraints, a growing body of African scholars use decolonial 
epistemology as a liberatory language and political manifesto for the future for Africa 
(see for instance Ahluwalia, 2001; Keikelame & Swartz , 2019; Mamdani 1996; 
Mhango, 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Nhemachena, Mlambo & Kaundjua, 2016; 
Osaghae, 2006;  Zeleza, 2006). 
For these authors, a decolonial approach - or decolonial-liberationist paradigm as 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni calls it - is a way to enable Africans to re-launch themselves on a 
radical struggle to create a post-imperial and postcolonial future that the post-1945 
decolonisation project failed to achieve (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a; 2013b and 
2013c). 
Osaghae, for instance, believes that a decolonial-liberationist narrative of the African 
should move away from evaluating the African states in conformity with the precepts 
of liberalism, and should be aware of the extent to which emancipating and liberatory 
aspects remained submerged within the complex colonial matrices of power (Osaghae, 
2006). Simialirly, Moyo and Yeros (2007) contended that African nationalism did not 
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manage to completely rise above the core contradictions generated by the colonial 
imprinting, which includes repressive, authoritarian and intolerant tendencies. 
Most of the African decolonial authors share the opinion that Africa has not fully 
succeeded in bringing about full decolonisation, believing that the colonial set-up of 
the state had drastic consequences for the development and reconfiguration of the 
African public sphere and the overall structure of postcolonial political communities. 
Decolonial epistemology and action could work to continue writing the “unfinished 
story of liberation from colonialism, neocolonialism, neo-liberal imperialism and 
hegemonic globalization” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a: 256). 
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2. Colonial Discourses 
 
Central to the postcolonial analysis is the notion of ‘‘colonial discourse’’. This concept 
is influenced by a Foucauldian/poststructuralist understanding of discourse, which no 
longer refers to formal linguistic aspects or a mere system of linguistic signs, but as a 
practice that systematically constructs the subjects and the worlds of which they speak, 
contributing to creating a regime of truth (Foucault, 1971; 1972; 1976). In this sense, 
colonial discourse can be seen as a way in which colonial knowledge is produced and 
reproduced as a “system of knowledge and beliefs about the world within which acts 
of colonization take place” (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin, 1998:42).   
Colonial discourse is produced by an authority possessing the power to make 
pronouncements on an object: the coloniser over the colonized typically, 
acknowledging a certain elasticity of the two terms (see Spivak, 2003). This power is 
exerted in a discursive way, by creating a one-sided discourse. In this way, a discourse 
can also be described as “an institutionalized way of talking that regulates and 
reinforces action and thereby exerts power” (Link, 1983:60 as quoted in Jäger and 
Meyer: 2009) under historically located conditions (see also Foucault, 1971; 1972).   
The colonial discourse is itself performative to the extent that it has a constitutive and 
foundational nature. As Spivak pointed out, discourses are a “way of worlding” (1985: 
243), of appropriating the world through knowledge. The strands of knowledge with 
which we try to describe and understand the world are produced in complex power 
relations in which different actors and institutions work to establish a dominant 
interpretation of "reality", through what Foucault called discursive practices and 
discursive formation.   
It is in regard to the understanding of discourse as an instance of hegemony that Said 
and Spivak look at the question of what kind of truth has been produced within the 
context of European colonialism. Furthermore, they investigate what kind of 
descriptions of the world, people and things have been discursively conveyed as the 
"Other" in the name of the "Orient" and the "gendered subalternised Other" (Diaz-
Bone, Rainer; Bührmann, et al., 2007). 
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The colonial discourse creates the context in which meaning itself is produced, a 
special “regime of truth” is indeed created (Foucault 1971, 1972): this entails the 
creation of an image of the incoming people as colonisers, the indigenous people as 
the legitimate targets of colonisation, and consequently the justification of the 
civilising by the former of the latter. In this sense, colonial discourses both shape and 
reflect everyday colonial experiences; they provide an apparatus of self-restraint for 
colonial subjects. In so doing, colonial discourses work as a justification of colonial 
exploitation: they aim toward imposing grounding principles for perception, thought 
and action in colonial society.  
Colonial discourse masks the power relations between races, cultures, and nations by 
making them seem natural, scientific, and objective. In other words, colonial discourse 
normalises the colonial regimes of truth (Foucault, 1976). Colonial discourse, 
therefore, produces stereotypes from within European prejudices, beliefs, and myths. 
For instance, the myth of the effeminate Bengali male was a centrepiece of European 
discourses from the mid-eighteenth century. Over a period of time, this problematic 
stereotype was treated as an objective description even by natives.  
Stereotypes and representations, over the course of colonial time, have masqueraded 
as philanthropy, civilizing missions or scientific observations.  In this form, they 
enabled Europeans to attain and retain power over the natives. Although it is generated 
within the society and cultures of the colonisers, the colonial discourse also became 
the reality within which the colonized may also come to see themselves (see Ashcroft, 
Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2013). As such, constructions of the hierarchy were pervasive to 
the point of becoming reflexive. 
Kristin Kopp identifies instances of “discursive colonisation” to describe “a 
historically situated process that repositions a specific relationship between self and 
Other into colonial categories” and terms “material colonisation”, involving “various 
forms of economic, political, and/or cultural subjugation of a native population by a 
foreign minority entering their space” (2012:6).  However, taking issue with this rigid 
division of discourse and practice, this thesis rests primarily on identifying a co-
constitutive relationship in the production of meaning and the material process of 
colonisation: discourses are practices that depend on power, but at the same time also 
generate power. Discourses both constitute the individual and the collective. 
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Indeed, it can be said that the subject is a product of discourses that enable the subject 
to determine actions that create materialisations. In fact, discursive practices work in 
both inhibitive and productive ways, implying a play of prescriptions that designate 
both exclusions and choices (Foucault, 1981b). In this sense, colonial discourses are a 
form of violence - actual and symbolic - that normalises, disciplines, differentiates, 
segregates and excludes.  
As it has previously been said that discourses shape and enable social reality, it is safe 
to also say that discourses are a material reality, in their co-constitutive (or 
performative) relation with their material production.  The co-constitutive aspect of 
discourses leads to the awareness that the critique undertaken is also the result of 
discursive processes because it is not situated outside discourse, as this would 
contradict the fundamental assumptions of discourse analysis.  
Thus, every analysis entails the need to take a stand and the analyst must be conscious 
of the discursive production that outcomes of his works could generate. In this sense, 
Foucault talks about “discursive practices” as the process through which a dominant 
reality comes into being towards forms of power and domination (see Foucault, 
1981a).  
Foucault sees discourses as potentially discontinuous across history rather than 
necessarily progressive and cumulative. Indeed, discourse and discourse strands have 
history, present and future (Jäger and Meyer: 51), and in this history, they are not 
always coherent and linear, but they are subjects of changes, ruptures and recurrences. 
History can be conceived as the sum of different epistemes, which are structures 
underlying the production of knowledge in a particular time and place. This is a key 
element in his analysis and critique of official or dominant knowledge that often 
derives the legitimation of its power from a specific historical order. Indeed, Foucault 
undermined philosophical notions of unchanging essences in history, proposing a 
horizon without ontological origin. In his work, notions of madness, social discipline, 
truth and sexuality, are seen as discontinuously constructed along the course of 
history, taking different meanings according to different “epistemes”. This is to say 
that sexuality, discipline or madness do not have a universal origin, but are discourses 
produced historically through the institution of power which is intrinsically linked to 
knowledge (see for instance Foucault, 1977 and 1981a). 
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These concepts shape the individual subject, exposing it to disciplinary norms and 
standards that are historically produced. This process always creates a boundary 
between what is considered right according to the current body of knowledge and what 
is considered abnormal because it challenges the dominant truth. Similarly, Fanon saw 
colonial domination as both an epistemological and ontological system as well as a 
form of structural violence that was much broader than economic exploitation (Fanon, 
1991[1961]). It was civilisational, and racial in its content. Its characteristic forms of 
violence have a peculiar temporal logic reflected in its characteristic frameworks of 
thought, that is exactly the discursive construction of the colonial mind (see Persaud, 
1997). 
Fanon, as other postcolonial/decolonial theorists, sees in colonialism the ontological 
and epistemological essence of Modernity, whereas according to Foucault there is no 
ontology as such, and therefore colonialism represents only an epistemic factor.  
However, both authors had at the heart of their interest the goal of breaking the 
supposed ontological supremacy of Western culture and its episteme by showing the 
contingency of such truths and dismantling the universal validity of Western culture 
and epistemology. We might argue that it is actually the very refusal of ontological 
origins of discourses that opens up spaces with the possibility of disrupting any 
coloniality in European practices. 
What has been discussed previously regarding the Foucauldian/Fanon divergences and 
similarities can resonate in the more general debate about the use and interpretation of 
the work of Foucault in the field of postcolonial studies and the specific use in this 
thesis. Many scholars have been reflecting on the differences, limitations, and 
advantages that post/decolonial approach and Foucauldian lens may bring reciprocity 
to the others (see among others Galceran Huguet, 2012: Legg, 2007 and 2018; 
Mezzadra, Reid and Sammadar, 2013; Nichols, 2010; Willaert, 2013).   
As we have seen in the previous chapter, decolonial authors use it to direct a polemical 
critique to postcolonial theory, accused to be so grounded on poststructuralist studies 
to become a project that only remains internal to European academy. At the same time, 
several scholars within the decolonial approach framework are using Foucauldian 
concepts and one of the main decolonial thinkers, Santiago Castro-Gómez, is in fact 
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promoting the use of Foucauldian genealogy as a method in decolonial researches. 
According to Castro-Gómez, decolonial thinking implements processes of 
reformulation of the colonial history in a similar way as Foucault´s genealogical 
method does on a European frame (Castro-Gómez, 2010). Hence, if the founding 
fathers of postcolonialism have been deeply influenced by Foucault and the decolonial 
scholars cannot avoid the confrontation with the French author, the use of a specific 
Foucauldian methodology in a post/decolonial theory should not be problematic. Yet, 
some tensions remain that must be clarified. As Staeger (2016) puts it, a Foucauldian 
decolonial critique might raise some problematic, as a marriage between a decolonial 
approach and a European methodological paradigm could seem cynical for several 
aspects.  
 
For this thesis, the main interest remains in the notion of discourse, driven by a 
Foucauldian conceptualisation. In particular, the divergences between a notion of 
colonial discourses that emphasise continuities and a notion of Foucault’s 
poststructuralism emphasises discontinuities and disjunctions in systems of meaning 
and regimes of truth across time. 
 
Foucauldian discourse theory allows for an analysis of history through focusing on a 
series of changes and ruptures. However, in this dynamic, each subsequent shift from a 
rupture to another logically entails legacies from the past. Along with discontinuity, 
there is of course continuity, otherwise, there would be no historical need for his 
concept of genealogy or, more drastically, no history at all. 
The specific methodology that is used in this research, the Discourse-Historical 
Approach, perfectly serves the scope of working both on continuities and 
discontinuities, and provides clear guidance on this by interrogating what aspects of 
the discourse change over time and what aspects do not, and making us reflect on the 
reasons for both continuities and discontinuities.  
Looking at these discoursive ruptures helps to identify fragments of history that are 
left behind by the social and political powers. Therefore, by analyzing the legacy of 
the colonial discourse in the present EU peacebuilding policymaking, this research 
recognises that it was from colonialism that a certain discourse of civilisation that is 
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co-constitutive of the European identity originated. This research fully insists on this 
idea.  
Nevertheless, along with the awareness of continuity from colonialism - that 
decolonial authors recognise as coloniality - a Foucauldian study of discourse allows 
recognising the changes and fractures that occurred over the course of history, where 
power-knowledge relations have mutated, and the very subject of power has changed 
(see in this context the rupture between the Belgian coloniser and the ‘European take 
over’ or the different phases in history of bringing peace to Africa, both analysed in 
Chapter Four).  
This is also connected to a second point that I would like to stress.  One of the most 
common criticisms that decolonial theorists address to Foucault is the one regarding 
the supposed inability to escape from the trap of subjectivity. Indeed, as Mezzadra, 
Reid and Sammadar  (2013) assert, Foucault’s thought has been the target ofì criticism 
for apparently describing an increasingly limited horizon of political possibilities and 
provoking disenchantment with the political itself, showing an apparent inability to 
address change.  
Nurturing a certain scepticism towards these arguments, I would argue that the use of 
the concept of discourse inspired by Foucault is, on the contrary, a place where one 
can elaborate on the history of the modern post-colonial world and imagine 
alternatives; in a discursive space created to be able to see discontinuities and ruptures 
over the course of the history. As explained briefly before in this paragraph, the 
concept of discourse as reproductive of reality and the idea of breaking the ontological 
supremacy of Western culture are probably the most influential factors that 
postcolonial theory drawn on by Foucault.  Foucault, therefore, is explicitly mobilised 
in this thesis as a possibility of questioning about discourse and related questions 
about the production of knowledge within colonial power. 
In the worlds of Mezzadra, Reid and Sammadar (2013), in the introduction of their 
book:  
 
This book [...] is dedicated to exploring how we can use his [Foucault’s] 
ideas to recover the vital capacity to think and act politically in a time 
when fundamentally human capacities to think, to know and to act 
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purposively in the world are being pathologized as expressions of the 
hubris and ‘underdevelopment’ of postcolonial peoples. 
 
Therefore, the use of discourse in this research does not contradict the call made by 
postcolonial and decolonial theorist to think otherwise, explored in the previous 
chapter. Foucauldian discourse theory, though often wrongly accused of so doing, 
does not deny the subject, and its space for change.  In a nutshell, Foucault inscribes 
the subject in a complex net of power-knowledge discourses, but this does not prevent 
the subject to put power relation in practice and fabricates it is our life.  
 
In this sense, the importance of using discourse as an interpretative tool lies in what 
Koopman describes as “responsive reconstruction” (2013: 21).  To quote Foucault, the 
task is “to construct another political thought, another political imagination, and teach 
anew the vision of a future” (2005: 185). This task does not seem very dissimilar to 
the goal of ‘thinking otherwise’ of the decolonial scholarship. 
This introductive explanation dedicated to the theorisation of the concept of colonial 
discourse is pivotal for the understanding of the empirical analysis of the thesis, as this 
notion of discourse is the leitmotif of the analysis of EU peacebuilding policymaking 
actions, speeches and documents. In the following, I turn my attention to some of the 
defining features of colonial discourse that are significant elements to take into 
account in the analysis: discursive strategies, ambivalence and hybridity.  
 
2.1 Discursive Strategies 
Discursive strategies are the linguistic and practical tools used to construct a discourse. 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault identified a set of strategies by which a discourse 
constitutes its object (Foucault, 1980) by normalizing certain subjectivities and 
excluding others. According to Smythe (2006), strategies of normalisation and 
exclusion may be recognized as comparing, ranking, classifying, hierarchizing and 
dividing. 
Regarding colonial discourse, a discursive strategy or a “strategy of coloniality” could 
be understood as a way of spreading a colonialist ideology, by reproducing the basic 
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structure of colonial discourse. Such a strategy is linguistically produced by a network 
of interconnected statements, ideas, beliefs, and subject-positions that are 
institutionally grounded and find expression in different colonial practices. 
 According to postcolonial and decolonial scholars, this basic structure of discourse 
that is reproduced in discursive strategy lies in a dualist division of the world. Indeed, 
this is created by the main divide that allows the division of the world into a 
“civilised” colonial identity and an “uncivilised” colonized other.  
Stuart Hall argues that at the same time that the colonial moment produces a coercive 
linking together of different histories within the same temporality, it also constructs 
the main divide between these histories, which we could synthetically consider as the 
birth of the notions of global “North-West” and “South-East” (1996).  
According to Ifversen (1997), civilisation became the structuring principle of world 
history, both its driving force and its end result of this North/West and South/East 
divide. 
This is the awareness that Frantz Fanon’s work powerfully evoked – the force with 
which colonialism was structured through the marking of difference. He argued that 
the violent encounter between coloniser and colonised constituted these categories of 
people as so unlike each other that they appeared to become “two different species”:  
This world divided into compartments, this world cut in two is inhabited 
by two different species. The originality of the colonial context is that 
economic reality, inequality, and the immense difference of ways of life 
never come to mask the human realities. 
(Fanon, 1963:39-40). 
Colonial cultures depended on a series of discursive oppositions constructed between 
the self and the other. The self is identified as the coloniser, white, Christian and 
civilised, whereas the other is identified as the colonised, black, heathen and savage. 
The self-image was used to construct Indigenous peoples of empire through their 
alleged otherness to the “European” self. In other words, they were ordered in a 
hierarchical order of similarity to the European self.  
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Race, culture and language – amongst other markers – were used to codify conformity 
and disconformity from a European “norm” (see also Cleall, 2012).  
Partha Chatterjee has described how the “rule of colonial difference”, that is, how 
“representing the ‘other” as inferior and radically different, and hence incorrigibly 
inferior”, was part of the “strategy for the deployment of the modern forms of 
disciplinary power” (Chatterjee: 1993).    
It was indeed through these and other differences that imperialism was justified and 
rationalised, as the basic assumption behind the difference is that the colonised were 
not able to govern themselves so that colonisers came to help them, as they are by 
nature destined to rule or even morally obliged to do so as a responsibility. 
As John Hobson notes (2007: 94), drawing on Said:  
“Eurocentrism or Orientalism is a discourse that was invented in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by European thinkers as they went 
about constructing European identity [where] Western man was elevated 
to the permanent ‘proactive subject’ of global politics/economics – past, 
present and future – standing at the centre of all things. Conversely, 
Eastern ‘man’ was relegated to the peripheral status of global politics’ 
‘passive object’, languishing on the Other side of an imaginary 
civilisational frontier, stripped of history and dignity. In this Eurocentric 
imaginary, then, the line of civilisational apartheid separates the Western 
heart of light from the Eastern heart of Darkness”. 
The inherent points around which the differences are organised are race and gender: 
all the positive characteristics are manifest in the “white man”, providing the 
foundation on a collective level of the “master race” (see Ziai, 2015). The white man 
thus constitutes what Laclau and Mouffe call the “nodal point” or “dominant signifier” 
of a discourse: the centre which serves as a point of reference for the differences 
according to which identities are being constructed (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 112) or 
the benchmark according to which all other identities are found to be deficient (Ziai, 
2015).  
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The difference between Self and Other is simultaneously being denied and affirmed, in 
an interplay of universalism and essentialism. It is being denied because, in the 
ethnocentric evaluation, the indigenous appears merely as an incomplete image of 
one’s own norm of human existence, which is to be educated and assimilated 
according to this norm. A salient example of this tension between the universal and the 
essential in the present day is argued to be common in liberal cosmopolitan thought 
that claims for the universality of human rights at the same time as it derives only from 
particular Western origins (Bhambra & Shilliam, 2009: 3).  
The strange and unknown Other appears as a deficient version of the Self (Ziai, 2015). 
Yet, despite the civilisation transfer, the colonised will always remain inferior within 
the order of discourse and are unable to fully reach the level of civilisation of the white 
man: the power of differences endlessly remakes itself. Postcolonial critic Homi 
Bhabha refers to this as colonial mimicry: “colonial mimicry is the desire for a 
reformed, recognisable Other, as a subject of difference, that is almost the same, but 
not quite” (1994: 122, emphasis in the original) and in Chatterjee’s analysis, Indians 
and by extension other peoples of empire, would never “catch up”; the “normalizing 
mission” was “destined” never to be fulfilled because “the premise of power was 
preserving itself”. 
Difference is made in multiple ways simultaneously. Difference can be negotiated 
through the institutional structures of the state, internalized in the psyches of 
individuals and of communities, performed in social relations, embodied in 
experiences, relived through memory, articulated through language and “seen” on the 
body. Said describes this process of constructing the Other through opposition as 
“Orientalism”: a way of knowing the other by constructing the other in a relation of 
domination to a unilateral discourse, whereas Spivak refers to this as “worlding”. 
As Stuart Hall argues, relations of difference are usually inflected by power dynamics 
which privilege certain positions and attempt to “fix” this privileged positioning (Hall, 
1996.  
One powerful example of discursive strategies is the metaphor of Africa as the Dark 
Continent, that allowed the control and domination of the African land. The historical 
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persistence and the ideological power of this metaphor were widely studied (see 
Brantlinger, 1985; Cleall, 2012; Jarosz, 1992; London, 1989 among others).  
This metaphor of darkness is connected with the idea of primordial chaos and in 
connection with the European idea of pacifying the dark continent and placating its 
irrational violence. As Patrick Brantlinger (1985) powerfully demonstrated, images of 
Africa “darkened” over the nineteenth century and Africa was increasingly associated 
with dystopian savagery. The myth of the dark continent was so pervasive to the 
extent that by the end of the nineteenth century, politicians, travel writers, explorers, 
missionaries and novelists represented Africa as a part of the world possessed by 
demonic darkness or barbarism, represented above all by slavery, human sacrifice, and 
cannibalism. And of course, it was a European duty to exorcise such darkness. 
According to Mbembe (2001:3): 
“Africa is portrayed as a vast dark cave where every benchmark and 
distinction come together in total confusion, and the rifts of tragic and 
unhappy human history stand revealed; a mixture of the half-created and 
the incomplete, strange signs, compulsive movements, in short a 
bottomless abyss where everything is noise, yawning gaps and primordial 
chaos.” 
It was not simply that Africa was unknown, disordered or chaotic, but the darkness 
was threatening, brutal and carnal; a turbulent and threatening, far from passive, 
colonial space (Cleall, 2012: 123-141) This was the space for Europeans to intervene. 
Solving the chaos and pacifying the country. Bringing peace to the Dark Continent 
was the European mission to civilise and moralise the Africans. 
 
2.2. Ambivalence and Hybridity in Colonial Discourse  
Two fundamental features of colonial discourses are ambivalence and hybridity that 
render the discursive strategies stronger and legitimate. These concepts are herein 
explained and frequently mobilised in the empirical analysis.  
For both Spivak and Bhabha, Orientalist discourses are not monolithic but ruptured 
and hybrid.  For Bhabha, hybridity describes the way in which colonial/imperial 
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discourse is inherently unstable, “split” in its enunciation, so that “in the very practice 
of domination the language of the master becomes hybrid” (Bhabha 1994: 33). Bhabha 
illustrates this instability through an analysis of the “colonial stereotype”, that 
according to him is the main discursive strategy used for the deployment of imperial 
authority (ibid).  
Bhabha shows how these stereotypes — the “noble savage”, the “wily oriental”— are 
meant to be accepted as “fixed” and “natural”; yet they are endlessly and anxiously 
repeated and reconfirmed by the coloniser. Often the stereotypes are also 
contradictory: the colonial subject, Bhabha writes, is “savage (cannibal) and yet the 
most obedient and dignified of servants (the bearer of food); he is the embodiment of 
rampant sexuality and yet innocent as a child; he is mystical, primitive, simple-minded 
and yet the most worldly and accomplished liar” (1994:82) 
Such repetition, such as “double inscription”, for Bhabha, betray the slipperiness and 
ambivalence of colonial discourse and authority (ibid: 108). If such ambivalence in 
discourses is considered spaces for enabling subversion (Bhabha, 1994), it is also 
functional to the very deployment of colonial power.  According to Aničić (2015), the 
ambivalent effect of stereotype is that instead of securing the binary order of 
subjection, it proliferates images that terrorize the coloniser. 
The same logic applies to the colonial identity. The civilised can employ barbaric 
practices while at the same time affirming the construction of the perpetrator’s identity 
as civilised and that of the victims as uncivilised. Such ambivalences are, however, 
designated as entirely rational. The insidiousness of these discourses of difference is 
that they have been shown as natural, in a normalising process that makes the 
stereotypes look resiliently fixed, even in their ambivalence.  
The work of a postcolonial scholar is to try and unravel these threads, to disentangle 
some of the complex processes by which difference was created, maintained and 
naturalised. Interrogating how difference operates discursively, postcolonial and 
decolonial theorists are concerned with investigating the processes through which 
difference was made, remade, ruptured and reaffirmed, and how its constitution 
continued on time.  
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This is the work done in this thesis, where the legacies of colonial thinking in EU 
officials’ policymaking are explored as a discourse where individual statements about 
encounters with “the locals” for example, worked together as an internally coherent 
“regime of truth”, constructing the local as the infantile, childish, lazy “other”. 
Following Bhabha, the research takes colonial discourses to be forked, ambivalent and 
endlessly subject to renegotiation. In the empirical analysis, the study reflects on what 
the ruptures, contradictions and ambiguities that characterise colonial discourses 
meant for the making of difference, and by analysing the master and the subject as 
“mutually constituted” identities, where the former coloniser’s (EU) identity is at stake 
in processes of colonisation as well as those of the former colonized (see Catherine 
Hall, 2002). 
If post-colonial time is the time after colonialism, and colonialism is defined in terms 
of the binary division between the colonisers and the colonised, Stuart Hall is rightly 
asking why is post-colonial time also a time of “difference”? What sort of “difference” 
is this and what are its implications for the forms of politics and for subject formation 
in this late-modern moment (Hall, 1996: 295)? The same reflection drives this thesis. 
To what extent can we indeed claim that the same colonial discourse based on 
differences is still alive in the present and how can we recognize them?  
 
2.3. The Meaningful Absence   
Any colonial discourse, travelling through historical epistemes, is a particular bundle 
of silences. Indeed, as we said, the process of constructing the colonial discourse is 
one of exclusion and marginalisation of certain truths, to the benefit of the dominant 
one.  Colonial discourse is a process in which a dominant story was able to hide a 
marginalised other history through planned and accidental colonial strategies. 
Postcolonial scholars apply the theoretical lens of silence to show how certain 
discourses created a regime of absolutism that ignores the subaltern experiences (see 
Bhambra & Shilliam, 2009).   
Santos (2001,2007), refers in this sense to the “sociology of absences”: the general 
silences around particular experiences and the way in which these silences are actively 
created through particular processes. Such research enables an analysis of what is 
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marginalised, suppressed, and of what has not been allowed to exist in the first place, 
by focussing on the processes that obstruct connections between different struggles, 
and knowledge to demonstrate how the “incompleteness” and “inadequacy” of 
counter-hegemonic forms are produced. 
Santos suggests that hegemonic globalisation overlays an understanding of the global 
upon the world that denies and erases local differences. In contrast, “the universal and 
the global constructed by the sociology of absences, far from denying or eliminating 
the particular and the local, rather encourage them to envision what is beyond them” 
(2001: 191).  
In other words, the sociology of absences argues for understandings of the global to be 
created through the non-linear accretion of local engagements. 
In poststructuralist accounts, Foucault suggested that silence is not only constitutive of 
overall discourse itself but is an agent of power in its own right (Foucault, 1976). 
Indeed, Foucault puts forward the notion that discourse is best conceived as a series of 
discontinuous segments: multiplicity of structures and discursive elements. One of the 
discursive elements is silence, which Foucault identifies as being also an agent of 
power. We can see that: “The makeup of discourse has to be pieced together, with 
things both said and unsaid, with required and with forbidden speech” (Foucault, 
1976: 133). 
In this way, Foucault is recognizing that discourse may be made up of silence and of 
things that remain unsaid. Silence can, therefore, be illustrative of power being 
articulated, or as a means of resistance (see Ward & Winstanley, 2003). According to 
Trouillot (2015: 26), silences enter the process of historical production at four crucial 
moments: the moment of fact creation (the making of sources), the moment of fact 
assembly (the making of archives), the moment of fact retrieval (the making of 
narratives), and the moment of retrospective significance (the making of history in the 
final instance).  
The strategies deployed in this research reflect this variation and try to treat different 
kinds of silences. Firstly, the study focuses on how the colonial history within the EU 
is silenced by the very creator of European history in the moment of fact creation, and 
it is interested in proposing a different history (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4).  
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Then the study also reflects on the silences in the moment of “assembly” (looking at 
the European Archives and memories). Here, the focus is on the narratives about that 
history (within EU officials) and at their reflection about such narratives.  Finally, the 
study is also concerned about the moment of fact retrieval, on how the narrative about 
history is passed on in the present, and this is studied in the thesis by using discourse 
analysis to make certain aspects of historical production and reproduction emerge to 
best expose a certain continuation of power along with the history. 
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3. A Postcolonial Methodology? 
 
As pointed out, postcolonial and decolonial perspectives look at colonial continuities 
embedded not just in the epistemic foundations of the different thematic concerns, but 
also in epistemological practices as consecrated in methods and methodologies. 
 
A decolonising approach to the research implies, therefore, critical engagement in the 
deconstruction of existing methodologies and methods that reproduce the “coloniality 
of knowledge” and reconstruction and/or reinvention of research practice.  Fittingly, 
Tuhiwai Smith considers that decolonisation is hence concerned with having "a more 
critical understanding of the underlying assumptions, motivations and values that 
inform research practices" (2012:1). 
 
In academia, various traditions attempt to offer epistemological lenses that allow for a 
more pluralist and contextualized understanding of the social world. Feminist, anti-
racist and decolonial scholars have focused on developing methods for power sensitive 
research in order to deconstruct what still appears to be a hegemonic and positivist 
research paradigm by putting forward concepts such as positional reflexivity, 
standpoint feminism, situated knowledge or critical whiteness (see for example Smith, 
2012). 
 
While these developments may point to a desirable change to heterodox and critical 
approaches, we can still observe that the ”master’s tools” are the most commonly 
employed and that finding a new methodological engagement appears to be a 
necessary but difficult process. 
 
Methodological reflections of on-going entanglements regarding colonial 
power/knowledge complexes – like the one initiated in the previous section about 
colonial discourse – generally lead to the reflection of decolonial research practice and 
the application of decolonial methods.  In this sense, an important point of reference 
for the decolonising approach to Social Science research has been the International 
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Conference “Beyond the Master’s Tools10” that reflected on postcolonial and 
decolonial approaches to research methodology and methods in the social sciences. 
 
However, such studies are much more focused on the promotion of marginalised 
accounts from a decolonial standpoints, rather than to the analysis of the master 
history and its deconstruction, as is the case with this thesis.  
 
In particular, because the object of the thesis is the study of the “European” self and 
not of the subjective colonised other, the thesis focuses more on conceptualising and 
finding gaps and silences in discourse analysis, rather than the ethnomethodological 
methods of decolonial research and counter-narratives. The claim in the thesis to being 
postcolonial relates to the study of colonial continuity within the “master” subject, 
rather than finding alternative narratives to it. Consequently, the methodology of 
research varies extensively from the more recent postcolonial tools (i.e. auto-
ethnography or action-research) that are starting to be used. 
 
If we take the Steinmetz (2013) argument that “postcolonial studies” is identified 
above all with the claim that colonialism has been as much about Europe and 
Europeans as about the colonized, this thesis is concerned more in analysing the 
colonial legacies in the first of the two poles.  In his preface to Fanon’s Les Damnés de 
la Terre, Sartre writes, “We too, the people of Europe are being decolonised, let us 
look at ourselves if we dare and see what it makes of us”.  In a similar vein, Cesaire in 
Discourse on Colonialism admits:  
 
First we must study how colonization works to decivilize the colonizer, 
to brutalize him in the true sense of the word, to degrade him, to awaken 
him to buried instincts, to covetousness, violence, race hatred, and moral 
relativism;[…] and that at the end of all these treaties that have been 
violated, all these lies that have been propagated, all these punitive 
expeditions that have been tolerated, all these prisoners who have been 
tied up and ‘interrogated’, all these patriots who have been tortured, at 
                                                          
10
 International Conference “Beyond the Master’s Tools: Post- and Decolonial approaches to research 
methodology and methods in the social sciences”. Organised at the University of Kessel the 14-15 
January 2016. 
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the end of all the racial pride that has been encouraged, all the 
boastfulness that has been displayed, a poison has been instilled into the 
veins of Europe and, slowly but surely, the continent proceeds toward 
savagery. 
(Cesaire, 1972: 35) 
 
Thus, postcolonial theorists reveal how colonisers’ culture has been shaped through 
the colonial encounter, and how colonisation impacted the metropolitan countries as 
much as the colonised countries. 
 
Framed in this sense, the thesis strives to rethink how to decolonise the 
epistemological conceptualisation and the research design. However, despite a 
plethora of studies on Colonial Discourses, it is possible to identify a certain gap in 
terms of how to methodologically uncover such discourses. Whilst Discourse Theory 
is very much developed, it has been challenging to find within the literature an answer 
to questions such as: which methodology can be applied to the analysis of colonial 
discourses? How to claim that discourse is colonial? How to compare colonial 
discourses over time? How to operationalize a diachronic and synchronic comparison 
of discourses? 
 
In finding an answer to such questions, and a practical methodology of the analysis of 
colonial discourse, the thesis aims at contributing to the existing literature by 
promoting an innovative combination of colonial discourse theory (as exposed in the 
previous sections) with the  Critical Discourse Analysis - Historical Approach (DHA).  
 
In the following paragraphs, this specific methodological approach is explained and 
operationalised through using the DHA and enriching it with Colonial Discourse 
Theory in order to make it more specific to the need for this research.  
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3.1. Encountering Discourse-Historical Approach 
 
The choice of relying on discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) is intended in order to 
find a more structured methodological tool to Colonial Discourse Theory, based on the 
fact that DHA shares the same understanding of discourse and episteme as the 
postcolonial and decolonial approach.  Indeed, the DHA, as part of Critical Discourse 
Analysis, adheres to the socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory informed by 
poststructuralist accounts.11 
Discourse analysis – “the analysis of the domain of statements…of texts, and of 
utterances” (Fairclough 2003: 123) – is a central method in the assessment of how 
norms are discursively embedded and disseminated, and how arising discourses 
convey the “rules” which “govern” and legitimise Europe’s engagement with former 
colonies. 
Analysis of the peacebuilding discourses enables us to consider how certain 
norms/truths have been disseminated as discursive entities, how they have been 
historically reconfigured in response to EU actors’ shifting interests (Fairclough 2003: 
123). Notably, it allows us to analyse speeches, actions, documents on EU 
peacebuilding policymaking to understand whether there are colonial legacies. In 
particular, this means revealing continuities with the historical European colonial 
narratives on pacifying the Congo, and more generally it entails understanding if the 
body of statements analysed contains the elements of colonial discourse.  
Peacebuilding, in this way, can be assessed in relation to how it “encodes” the colonial 
legacy in the EU-Africa relationship. 
The attention to the role of discourse in the maintenance of power asymmetries within 
North-South relations has a long history. For example, Escobar (1988: 439) uses the 
“Foucauldian toolbox” to critique how “development” discourses have brought 
“problems” into being by constructing certain social issues as falling within the 
legitimate purview of donors. Notably, he examines donor countries’ “discovery” of 
malnutrition in the so-called Third World and their subsequent exercise of power over 
those deemed in need of Western assistance (1988: 439).  
                                                          
11
 For more information about DHA see Aydın-Düzgit, 2013; Reisigl and Wodak, 2009; Wodak, 2001; 
Wodak and Boukala, in press; Wodak and Meyer, 2009. 
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Kothari (2001: 142) also critiques the discourse of “participatory development” and, 
with reference to Foucault, considers participatory narratives as a means of 
entrenching donors’ control over the lives of “the poor”.  
More recently, other important works have been published on this topic. Chandler 
(2010) looks at the interconnected and overlapping policy paradigms through which 
Western engagement and intervention in the colonial and post-colonial state have been 
negotiated and reflected. Langan (2016) adopted a critical discourse analysis of the 
statements and language of the EU–Africa “partnership” and examined how “pro-
poor” discourses have been used to encode legitimating moralities. Finally, Ziai (2013; 
2015) discusses and puts in question the discourse of “development” and it's 
Eurocentric, depoliticising, and authoritarian implications.   
The above-mentioned studies are clearly very important points of reference for my 
study. Admittedly provocative and constructive in their outcome, they, however, might 
not be so helpful in providing a satisfactory explanation of the specific methodology 
used here. 
Acknowledging past use of discourse analysis in the assessment of power asymmetries 
between the developed “North” and the developing “South”, but also witnessing a 
certain lack of reflection on the methodology, this work adopts, therefore, a DHA lens 
to look at the historical continuities and discontinuities of a coloniality of power in EU 
relations with Africa in the peacebuilding sphere.  
The following paragraph is dedicated to the operationalisation of colonial discourse 
within a DHA framework, which will be the main reference for the analysis of the 
study’s data. 
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3.2. Operationalising Colonial Discourse 
The specific feature of DHA is that it analyses the historical dimension of discursive 
actions by exploring the ways in which particular genres of discourse are subject to 
diachronic change or continuity (Wodak et al., 1990; Wodak et al., 1994). In this 
sense, the DHA allows us to look at the historical manifestation of discourses, and 
therefore, it seems the more adequate choice within the spectrum of critical discourse 
analysis given the central research question of this thesis. 
With regard to the way some colonial legacies remained constant yet have been 
discursively rearticulated, Foucault considered the genealogy of history to be 
composed by a process of discontinuities rather than the continuous accumulation of 
discourses. However, he also explained that the evolution of discourses does not 
necessarily jettison former concepts or objects of control (2009 [1969]: 191). Instead, 
forms of continuity can be discerned as certain concepts (or norms) remain identical 
yet find “different systems of dispersion”.  
As the thesis illustrates, this understanding of transformation is important to consider 
with regards to how colonial discourses have remained as fixed components of the 
relationship of Europe and Africa, yet have nevertheless found different modes of 
discursive dispersion in its historical evolution.  
According to Reisigl & Wodak (2001), the operationalisation of a discourse entails a 
social critique which embraces at least three interconnected aspects that we touched 
upon previously in this chapter: 
1. A text or discourse immanent critique that aims at discovering inconsistencies, 
contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text-internal or discourse-
internal structures. This, in the postcolonial case, means the uncovering of the 
ambivalent colonial discourses. 
2. DHA is concerned with the demystifying exposure of the manifest or latent 
possibly persuasive or “manipulative” character of discursive practices, 
understanding communicative or interactional structures of a discursive event 
in a wider frame of social and political relations, processes and circumstances. 
This, at the Postcolonial level, means uncovering the legacy itself of colonial 
discourse and its silencing framework. 
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3. Prognostic critique contributes to the transformation and improvement of 
communication as well as guidelines for avoiding discriminatory discourses. 
This relies on the forward-looking aspect of postcolonial critique, that once the 
western-centric ontology is broken, tends to recreate a postcolonial view. 
 
As a process of analysis, Wodak and Meyer breaks down the DHA in three different 
steps: 
1. Analysing the linguistic manifestations of prejudice in the discourse, embedded 
in the linguistic and social context (for example, newspapers, interviews or 
policy papers on EU peacebuilding) 
2. Confronting the latter texts with other facts and context phenomena (read about 
the EU peacebuilding factsheets; information about development and aid 
programs, etc.) 
3. Contrast the text with historical knowledge. In other words, do not rely on the 
“meta-data” alone but compare it with the historical facts carrying the same 
discourse. (This is the crucial part in which a present linguistic manifestation 
of EU peacebuilding is compared with the historical colonial discourse to 
comprehend if they have the same “prejudice” in common or, more 
specifically, if the present linguistic manifestation carries the features of a 
colonial discourse). 
 
While applying the three steps of this process of analysis described above (analysis of 
the linguistic manifestation, triangulation of the source and contrast of the source with 
the historical knowledge), Wodak (2001) suggests a list of main questions that are a 
useful guide in the analysis of the discourses.  While analysing interviews, texts, 
utterances, actions, such questions have always been the point of reference.  
The list of Wodak’s suggested questions is provided in the following, alongside 
examples from the study. 
• What actors participate in the specific discourse? To answer to this question in 
the context of the thesis, it is important to consider if the actors that 
constructed the colonial discourse are the same, or if there has been a change 
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over the course of history. In this sense, it is important to undertake a reflection 
on the EU as a colonial subject, which will be the aim of the next chapter. But 
more specifically, when looking at every linguistic manifestation about EU 
peacebuilding policymaking it is asked: Who is speaking? What is the 
background of this officer/practitioner/peacebuilder? What is its relationship 
with the recipient of peacebuilding aid? Is she/he in a position of power?  
• What validity claims of truth and normative rightness are explicitly made or 
presupposed in the discourse in question? To answer to this question, the 
analysis looks at the data with the objective of scrutinising if they are carrying 
specific normative assumptions about the EU’s role, or if they reproduce any 
racial prejudice typical of colonial discourses (if they use any colonial strategy 
or if they have the features of a colonial discourse).  
• What contradictions are constructed in the discourse? This question looks at 
the contradiction in a linguistic manifestation that possibly contains prejudices 
that need to be brought to the surface. In the thesis, it means looking at the 
ambiguity of the colonial discourse and to its hybridity, to reveal such 
inconsistencies that form part of the way the colonial order of discourse is 
perpetuated. 
• What aspects of the discourse change over time? What are the reasons for the 
change? What aspects continue over time? This is a crucial question for the 
research, in which in comparing present peacebuilding manifestations with 
historical sources, it is possible to notice if there is a continuity with the 
colonial discourse or not. And within the colonial discourse itself, what are the 
features that remain similar in today’s discourses on peacebuilding and what 
are those that changed?   
• What other discourses does the discourse intersect with and relate to? This 
final question is possibly the most complex, as it requires the disentanglement 
of colonial discourse with other sets of discourses. It might emerge in the case 
of the thesis if coming across intersectionality, where a certain statement 
analysed not only reproduces a colonial discourse, but also a patriarchal one.  
 
By looking at those questions, it is apparent that a salient point to solve is the 
operationalisation of the concept of colonial discourses itself. In response to this 
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question, the research draws from the analysis of Ziai (2015: 33), which recognises 
three major orders of discourses that identify the colonial discourse.  
He considers such features to still be present in the discourse of development; as such 
the basic features of the colonial discourse are not associated solely with the historical 
colonial time. Rather, they might offer a useful “checklist” in the identification of the 
presence of a “coloniality of knowledge” in the present time. These three orders of 
discourse are the basic structure of the discourse, the philosophy of history and social 
technology (Ziai, 2015: 33).  
1. The basic structure of discourse refers to the basic structure of the colonial 
discourse, that divides the world into two opposites: a progressive, superior 
part and a backward, inferior part. 
2. The philosophy of history consists in a concept taken over from 19th century 
evolutionism in social science, and that is the idea of a universal scale of 
development for the whole of humanity, along which the industrialised 
countries of Western Europe and North America are more progressed than the 
non-Western countries. Such an argument sets up non-Western cultures today 
as equivalent to pre-modern Western cultures and points to the West as the lead 
society showing the rest of the world the way forward. 
 
3. The social technology, i.e. the intent to shape the societies in the South (and the 
people therein) according to rational criteria. 
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4. Research Methods 
 
After having provided the theoretical framework of the research, and having translated 
it in a coherent methodology, the remaining part of the chapter is committed to the 
explanation of how this methodology is put in practice in the research methods. The 
following paragraphs intend to explore the role of the researcher and her positionality, 
as well as to delimit the subject of the research area, and finally to provide a 
description of the research methods used to gather the data. 
 
4.1.Positionality 
In this century, a multiplicity of approaches and theories have argued that the 
neutrality of the theorizer can no longer be sustained (see Alcoff, 1991 and Flyvbjerg, 
2001 among others).  Critical theory, psychoanalytic theory, post-structuralism, 
feminist and anti-colonialist theories have all concurred on this point.  
 
Thus, decolonial and postcolonial research ethics demands that we step away from any 
pretence of neutrality, objectivity, and impartiality that have long been prescribed by 
more positivist research methods – but doing so in a way that we can still try to reach 
an intersubjective understanding of the international sphere.  
 
McDowall and Ramos (2018) consider possible tensions that might arise between 
canonical standards of academic writing and the decolonial call to de-link from the 
epistemological assumption of a neutral and detached observational location from 
which the world is interpreted.  These authors, in particular, discuss how the PhD for 
decolonial scholars can be considered a “writing Borderland”, an ambiguous space in-
between writing decolonially and respecting academic standards. 
 
The positionality or location of the speaker and the discursive context are important as 
much as what is said. As a researcher, I, therefore, come with a location – a social 
location and identity – that is impossible to transcend and that needs to be brought to 
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the forefront as a way in which I am historically and socially linked with the areas of 
study (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992)12.  
 
As a white privileged woman, coming from Europe, living in Brussels and working at 
the Institute for European Studies, my view is clearly partial. My whiteness, my 
historical background and my institutional privilege, all place me in a problematic 
power relation that needs to be confronted. I have therefore tried, throughout my 
doctoral research, to confront my position in an active and constant self-reflexive 
process, that acknowledges the particular positionality of my role within the subject of 
inquiry. 
 
Feminist and postcolonial authors gave a clear articulation of the risk of speaking for 
others and the risk of "epistemicide" in an occidental or Eurocentric research agenda. 
In the famous essay “Can the subaltern speak?” (1988), Spivak considers the limits of 
the act of giving voices to the oppressed as a very “savoir” attitude that recalls the 
colonisers’ behaviour. Spivak sees it as a form of epistemic violence that could lead 
the researchers to orientalise the subalterns, being unknowingly complicit in the task 
of imperialism. Indeed, she rhetorically wonders: “Is ‘postcolonialism’ a specifically 
first-world, male, privileged, academic discourse that classifies and surveys the East in 
the same measure as the actual modes of colonial dominance it seeks to dismantle?” 
(Spivak, 1988:285). 
 
This is one of the reasons that made me decide to only aim at portraying the dominant 
reality of donors in peacebuilding policies – namely the EU’s viewpoint – and not to 
pursue ethnographic work in the field. This reflection does not intend dismissing 
ethnographic works “in the field” per se, or to claim that we can only study “people 
like us”. On the contrary, it acknowledges the extreme relevance of such kind of 
works, exactly in consideration of the challenges they provide to researchers’ 
positionality.  In the frame of my research, and in consideration of my experiences and 
interests, I believed that my contribution would have been much more valuable in the 
analysis of the EU. Therefore, the thesis orients itself towards the study of the 
                                                          
12
 This point is often criticised by positivist scholars to the extent that the conclusions drawn from 
the analysis cannot be verified, falsified or tested, thus arguing for a  the lack of external validity 
and reliability of a the social sciences. For an exhaustive reflection on this topic see Flyvbjerg, 
2001 and  Jackson, 2010. 
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dominant, “master” accounts, rather than the counter-narratives of subjugated 
accounts. 
 
4.2. The Subject of Analysis 
As already clarified, the study cannot claim to be postcolonial in the sense of 
reconstructing the voice of those marginalised and oppressed by colonialism and 
neocolonialism, but it is interested in finding elements of colonial discourse that have 
survived in contemporary EU peacebuilding discourse. In so doing, the subject of the 
analysis is the EU as a complex actor, in its historical development.  
Even though I am conscious of the EU’s fragmented condition, different powers of 
member states and their interplay, and being aware that there is even a dispute 
regarding whether the EU represents a meaningful unit of analysis at all and moreover 
in the international domain (see Carta & Morin, 2014), the thesis considers the EU as 
an unified, single entity of analysis.   
Some EU scholars see in this a challenge and an incentive to assume an actor-centred 
approach (White, 1999). By focusing on actors, processes, issues, instruments context 
and actions related to the EU foreign policy system, it becomes possible to 
conceptualise European Foreign Policy as a political system, with inputs from national 
actors and their preferences (in conjunction with domestic politics) and from external 
sources; and with the outputs of foreign policy actions and positions (Ginsberg 
2001:39). Despite its challenging nature, not dissimilar from nation-states, the EU can 
be considered a “collective actor”, which expresses a pluralistic identity, and therefore 
it is possible to study it as a meaningful unit of analysis.  
Moreover, we will see in the next chapter that it is the particular postcolonial 
perspective that allows me to make this claim even stronger. According to the 
postcolonial and decolonial theories, Europe is a meaningful unit of analysis, whose 
identity is firmly marked in the colonial experience.  It is, therefore, the colonial 
experience and the assumptions of normative superiority that have been brought at the 
European level, that constitutes Europe itself.   
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Almost twenty years ago, Diez (1999) was the first to apply discourse analysis to the 
study of the EU. In his research, he argued for the importance of adding the discursive 
dimension to the predominant focus on ideas, interests and institutions in the study of 
EU integration. Since then, numerous authors directed their inquiry to the discursive 
analysis of the EU, applying different methods of the discourse analysis “toolbox” (see 
for example Browning, 2003; Drulák, 2006; Wodak, 2000; Erjavec, 2009 and Teti, 
2012). Regarding the specific field of EU foreign policy, it is worth naming the studies 
of Carta and Morin (2014), Diez (2014), Baker-Beall (2014), Larsen (2004), and 
Rogers (2009), among others.  
The research contributes to this numerous group of inquiries, with the major 
innovation of bringing the element of colonial discourse to the core of the 
investigation, and therefore to provide the bridge between EU Studies and postcolonial 
and decolonial theories, as already discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
4.3 The Sources  
DHA specifically relies on intertextuality – the relationship among different texts – 
and interdiscursivity – the connection among discourses – to establish a dynamic 
relationship between utterances and the context in which they are produced. In this 
sense, DHA explicitly relies on triangulation of different sources, data, methods, 
theories and background information to grasp the context in which discourses are 
embedded. This also allows the researcher to minimize the risk of being biased and to 
“cherry pick” (see Wodak, 2001). Thus, one of the most salient, distinguishing 
features of DHA is its endeavour to work with different approaches, multi-
methodologically and on the basis of a variety of empirical data as well as background 
information (see for example Wodak et al., 1998 and Wodak et al., 1999). 
In investigating historical, organisational and political topics and texts, this approach 
attempts to integrate a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical 
sources and the background of the social and political texts in which discursive 
“events” are embedded. With this objective, the research relies on a variety of 
different methods: interviews, participant-observation, archival research and document 
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analysis. The empirical basis of this thesis is composed of 62 interviews conducted 
from April to December 2015 and from March to August 2016.13  
The targets of my interviews were EU Officials involved at different levels in the EU 
peacebuilding policies in DRC. It included personnel from the European External 
Action Service  (EEAS), from DG DEVCO (Development and Cooperation) of the 
European Commission and from ECHO (Directorate-General for European Civil 
Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations).  Regarding the EEAS, I was able to talk 
with the unit responsible for Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Mediation, the 
Unit for Human Rights Strategy and Policy Implementation, Democracy and Electoral 
Observation, and Development Cooperation Coordination. I also interviewed the Head 
of Division and the staff from Pan-African affairs, as well as the personnel from the 
Central Africa Division. 
It is important to mention the interviews done in the Foreign Policy Instruments 
Service, especially with the unit for the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. 
Regarding the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, I interviewed 
civilian and military personnel responsible for CSDP missions in DRC, which were 
appointed in the unit for Crisis Management and Planning and the Civilian Planning 
and Conduct Capability, as well as former personnel of the former unit for Crisis 
Response and Operation Coordination. Within the DEVCO, I interviewed personnel 
from the Africa-EU Partnership and Peace Facility Unit as well as the Department of 
Geographical Coordination for Central Africa. It has been also important to talk with 
Officers of EU Delegation in Kinshasa.  
The interview process has been particularly torturous and challenging. From the very 
beginning of the empirical research, I realized that I was touching a very 
uncomfortable topic for my interviewees. I started sending interview requests by May 
2015 to all EU Civil Servants dealing with peace-related issues and/or DRC in EEAS, 
the European Commission DG Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) and ECHO, 
                                                          
13
 The interviews performed were all semi-structured, of the average length of one hour.  I used an 
interview questionnaire as a guide, which was based with inquiries linked to my  general research 
question and sub-questions. However, the questions were open enough to avoid leading the 
conversation and give space to the interviewee. (see  Bryman 2008 and Klotz.& Prakash, 2008).  
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referring to the title of my research and to the topic as “A postcolonial analysis of EU 
peacebuilding practices in DRC”.  
From May to August 2015 I got no answer beside those by civil society organisations 
working on peacebuilding. This was really surprising to me, as my expectation was 
that obtaining these interviews would have been quite straightforward as EU civil 
servants tend to consider this as part of their job.  
Nevertheless, the only interviews with EU Officials in that period were the ones I got 
by stopping them during events and conferences. Indeed, in this period I was attending 
workshops, training, events and seminars in Brussels related to EU peacebuilding in 
Africa in order to introduce myself and ask the keynote speakers and attendees from 
the European Commission for interviews. 
In September 2015, I decided to change strategy and declare that my interest was 
generically on “EU peacebuilding in DRC”, without mentioning postcolonialism. 
Answers came very quickly this time.  
However, the problem then reappeared during the interviews. When asking questions 
about EU colonial legacy, the role of Belgium within EU peacebuilding in DRC or the 
relevance of history in the current peacebuilding procedures, most of my interviewees 
became upset, and they did not deny being also annoyed by my questions. This 
reluctance and defensive posture that sometimes was difficult to sustain was hence 
very meaningful for my study, and it is further considered in chapter 5.  
Nevertheless, such results were not enough for my research, but it was the only 
concrete result I got in the first round of interviews. That is why after several months I 
decided to apply for an internship position at the EEAS. This allowed me to work in 
the Division for Central Africa, dealing explicitly with EU-DRC relationship from 
March to August 2016. This traineeship gave me the opportunity to get to know the 
practitioners working on DRC and having time to explain my research to them and 
gradually gain their confidence and trust, allowing me to overcome their reluctance. 
In the EEAS I found a team of truly committed people, generally very motivated and 
passionate about their job. There was a strong commitment to and interest in “making 
97 
 
Africa a better place” and all my former colleagues were working hard to realise a 
positive improvement in DRC’s conflict situation. 
It is thanks to this internship experience that I was able to undertake participant-
observation in the 6 months spent at the EEAS. During this period, I was participating 
in several Conflict Analysis Workshops and in two working groups: Council Working 
Group on Human Rights (COHOM) and Council Working Group on Africa (COAFR). 
Moreover, the possibility of being inside the institution led to a straightforward 
“snowball process” for gathering interviews. 
Finally, I visited the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence in January 
2016 to find relevant historical material on the relationship between the Congo and the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) or the European Economic Community 
(now EU). Parts of these findings are the historical bases of the research. 
Apart from this, I also conducted explorative interviews with civil society 
organisations working on peacebuilding in DRC, of which the most important is the 
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, based in Brussels.  
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Conclusion  
 
This second chapter provides the theoretical and methodological basis of the study of 
colonial legacy in EU peacebuilding policymaking. 
Firstly, it discloses the decolonial and postcolonial perspectives, and it provides an 
innovative dimension in the conceptualisation of the connections among the two 
theories. Thanks to postcolonial and decolonial theory, it is possible to comprehend 
the constitutive role that colonialism had in the definition of the history of modernity 
and the global present. These theories represent powerful tools in the analysis of EU 
colonial legacy. 
Subsequently, the chapter unfolds the central concept of colonial discourses taken 
from postcolonial studies and informed by a Foucauldian understanding. This is 
particularly relevant as a core concept of the thesis. Indeed, it is through the analysis 
of discourses that the research aims at discovering the actual reproduction of colonial 
power/knowledge within EU peacebuilding policymaking.   
In order to allow the empirical analysis of EU discourses in peacebuilding 
policymaking and the assessment of the presence of any colonial legacy, the chapter 
then translates the theoretical perspective into a methodological framework. Doing so, 
it aims at contributing to the analysis of discourses by providing a combination of 
Colonial Discourse Theory and Discourse-Historical Approach (one of the typologies 
of Critical Discourse Analysis). 
Finally, the chapter defines how the methodology has been further translated into 
methods, and how the analysis of discourses has been applied to the different 
techniques of data gathering employed in the research: document analysis, archival 
research, interviews and participant observation.  
Having set the theoretical and methodological basis for the research, and having 
introduced the postcolonial and decolonial readings, it is now time to direct the 
analysis to a fundamental aspect of the study: the relationship between the EU and 
colonialism. And the next historical chapter is devoted to it.  
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Chapter Three 
 
The EU’s Colonial History:   
A Contested Memory? 
 
 
“As in our own lives, some things we want to remember,  
some things we prefer to forget.” 
(House of European History. Pocket guide of the Permanent Exhibition) 
 
 
Introduction 
It might seem quite redundant to evoke the need to look back at European history to 
ascertain answers to some of the EU’s current issues and problems. What could be 
more challenging in this claim is that depending on which kind of history we consider 
as European, we might come up with different interpretations of the past that would 
consequently modify our perception of present EU actions. 
In the first chapter, we saw how EU Studies and EU Peacebuilding Studies tended to 
merely engage with the history of the EU from its integration onwards, without 
considering what happened before and the historical past of its member states as a 
constitutive element to understand the present EU external relations.  
Stressing the limits of such an approach, the second chapter proposed the engagement 
with Postcolonial and Decolonial Studies in order to allow a historical perspective on 
EU identity and to better understand its current relationship with its former colonies. 
Such an approach, it was argued, would also allow scrutiny in the empirical research 
of the legacy of colonialism in the EU’s peacebuilding policies in the DRC. 
100 
 
Indeed, my argument in the previous chapters is predicated on the recognition that any 
understanding of the EU’s international condition must grapple with the historical 
reality of European imperialism and colonialism.  
However, if the main interest of this thesis is to look at the EU’s colonial past, a step 
back is needed to unfold a core issue: why should the EU be concerned about its 
colonial legacies in DRC? How can I assert that colonial memory must be an EU 
preoccupation in dealing with DRC when it is clear that the Portuguese and then 
Belgians occupied the Congo and not all Europeans?  
These main questions open up a series of broad yet crucial interrogations: is 
colonialism an EU matter or is it only a concern of the single former colonial powers? 
How can we claim that colonialism was a European phenomenon –and consequently 
an EU concern - when only some of the European states, even if the majority, had 
colonies?  
The problem of connecting the EU with colonialism reveals several nodal points to 
dissolve: First of all, the matrix of all the questions lays in a fundamental perception 
about the history and collective memory.  How can we claim that the current EU 
Officers should take into account a memory that is not “their own memory”?  
Even when the historical continuities are unquestionable, we cannot just assume a 
simple correlation between historical events and their relevance for the generations 
that inherit them through history (Trouillot, 2015: 16).  
 In this sense, Trouillot (2015) mobilises the examples of the “discovery” of the New 
World: Neither Europe as we now know it, nor whiteness as we now experience it, 
existed as such in 1492. Trouillot explains that both are constitutive of this 
retrospective entity we now call the West. In this case, as in many others, the 
collective subjects who supposedly remember did not exist as such at the time of the 
events they claim to remember, or they are supposed to remember. How is it possible 
therefore to find such legacy if the subject in question did not exist in the colonial 
time? 
Trouillot responds to this dilemma by showing that the constitution of a subject goes 
hand in hand with the continuous creation and recreation of the past. As such, those 
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new subjects do not succeed in the past, but they are its contemporaries and they carry 
such a legacy.  
The historical relevance of an event in its conterminous subjects does not proceed 
directly from the original impact of an event, or its mode of inscription, or even the 
continuity of that inscription, but from the continuous reproduction of such history in 
the subjects that “inherits” these events.   
The same could be said for the case of the EU: As Bechev (2015) observes, the EU 
now includes Cyprus and Malta which were British colonial possessions until the 
1960s, while many of the new Eastern European members had an imperial satellite 
status vis-à-vis the Soviet Union no more than two decades ago.  
This means that the EU not only carries the legacy of imperial rule, but also those of 
many former colonies.  How it is possible though to consider a colonial legacy in a 
body that is composed of former colonial powers and former colonies? 
This third chapter engages with such questions in order to build the foundation for the 
core thesis. In doing so, it recognizes that the literature on European colonialism 
tended to highlight the specificities of each imperial configuration, sometimes 
comparing, some others just analysing the single empires (see for instance Jeronimo 
and Pinto, 2015; Healy and Dal Lago, 2014 among others). Contrary, here a 
postcolonial perspective is evoked, one that calls for a global history of colonialism to 
be taken into account, in the attempt to configure the European history of colonialism 
as a whole.  
What follows is dedicated to showing that both the colonial and the decolonising 
moment were crucial to the determination of the EU’s identity, and therefore they have 
to be taken into consideration when engaging in the analysis of the EU relationship 
with European former colonies.  
Quite ambitiously for the limited space allowed, this chapter passes through salient 
moments of the past to show that European history was profoundly influenced by the 
relationship of domination with the “others”.  
Doing so, this chapter is divided into three main sections.  The first section gives an 
account of the birth of the EU, showing that European integration itself was deeply 
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entangled with colonial aspirations.  In the second section of the chapter the 
argumentation shifts from history to memory: if colonialism is a European past, can 
we say that it must form part of the EU memory? 
By answering this question, in the final section I consider the case of the House of the 
European Union, a recently inaugurated museum in the heart of Brussels adjacent to 
the European Parliament,  which provides an account of colonialism as a European 
phenomenon, and therefore offers an important precedent to the way the EU 
institutions look at colonialism.     
 
1. Europe in the Colonial Mirror: Why is Colonialism a European 
issue? 
 
1.1 The Birth of Europe 
According to Delanty, Europe is more than an idea and identity, it is also a 
geopolitical reality, a central characteristic of which was the process in which the core 
penetrated into the periphery to produce a powerful system of control and dependency 
(1995). In other words, it was colonialism and conquest that unified Europe and not 
peace and solidarity (Ibid.). 
If from a geographical point of view that is easily understandable, it becomes much 
more complex when we consider ideas and identity. How much did the colonial 
enterprises, the expansion, the enslavement and the constitution of empires do to build 
European minds, aspirations, material greed, and to strengthen a sense of Europe being 
one region, one civilisation?  Several historians have attempted to address this 
question over the last decades. 
One of the most relevant was Chabod, who asserts that it is thanks to “geographic 
discoveries”14 that Europe started to create its very moral and political features as 
opposed to the non-European other. Thus, Chabod illustrates that the very idea of 
European civilisation was gradually elaborated in the 15
th
 centuries as opposed to the 
“barbaric” and “savage” indigenous cultures outside European borders. This drastic 
                                                          
14
 I maintain this term to quote the author, although it entails a clear Eurocentric bias. 
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divide between primitivism and civilisation was further unfolded in the 16
th
 century. 
Here, the general “outside” started to take different features (the Chinese, the 
Japanese, the “Orient” and the “Americans” started to be associated with specific 
moral characteristics) in a way functional to delineate and exalt the idea of Europe.  
Quijano argues that during the same period in which European colonial domination 
was consolidating, the cultural complex known as “European modernity/rationality” 
was being constituted (2010: 25). This intersubjective universe created by the colonial 
power was elaborated as a universal paradigm of knowledge and of the relations 
between humanity and the rest of the world. The decisive weight of coloniality in the 
construction of Europe and the European paradigm of rationality is, according to 
Quijano, at the base of contemporary thinking and also one of the reasons for the crisis 
of this cultural complex. 
In the same way, the famous historian, Victor Kiernan, in a significant article written 
back in 1980, tried to grasp how much colonialism could be considered a European 
phenomenon.  He shows that centuries of exploitation of the outer world, instead of 
leading to a new multicultural dimension, created the effect of emphasizing the greater 
gap between the European community of ideas and everything non-European (see 
Kiernan, 1980:39). 
Likewise, Hargreaves echoes Kiernan in sustaining that the racial division at the centre 
of colonial life undoubtedly helped to give Europeans an immediate sense of 
distinctiveness vis-à-vis native peoples (1982). Thus, the contrast between white and 
coloured skins, which corresponded to a sharp political division between rulers and 
ruled was one of the factors contributing to the relatively high degree of unity felt by 
Europeans.  
Furthermore, Kiernan also suggests that, even if difficult to grasp, there was always a 
cosmopolitan element in colonial enterprises that could define them as a European 
phenomenon. This leads him to claim that since the start of European imperialism 
there was a Europeanisation of domination. Indeed, even though all the early empires 
were strictly dominated by their own masters, there was a European shared sense of 
power engendered by the successes of any of them as well as in the pool of material 
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wealth - bullion, spices, and then tobacco, sugar, cotton - that the colonies produced 
(Kiernan, 1980:42).  
Colonial enterprises became more and more Europeanized over the course of the 
centuries: “Foreigners wormed their way into the Seville trade with Spanish America, 
Marranos or Crypto-Jews had a big hand in the trade of East and West Indies, 
including the slave trade, Jews exiled in Amsterdam came to control a quarter of the 
shares of the Netherlands East India company. Numerous Germans and others worked 
for the Dutch in Indonesia. Huguenot exiles in London were active in the English East 
India Company and its soldiers and civilians in India included a heavy sprinkling of 
foreign names.” (ibid: 42).  
Altogether, those exchanges contributed to the formation of European consciousness 
of itself, a sort of calm self-complacency that forged the so-called cosmopolitan spirit 
of 18th century Europe. A spirit of European cooperation for European domination. 
No better example of this can be found than the Berlin Conference of 1884. On that 
occasion, fourteen signatory European states attended the conference that formalized 
the so-called “scramble for Africa” and eliminated or overrode most existing forms of 
African autonomy and self-governance.  
Such European states sat around a table to regulate the partition of Africa in order to 
avoid warring amongst themselves over Africa: they succeeded in keeping peace in 
Europe to the detriment of African peace
15
.  
Kiernan gives proof of this “peaceful coalition” by quoting the speech of an ex-
Governor-General of Egypt, Lord Cromer in the House of Lords, on February 6, 1908 
: “It is an opening of a new phase of European imperialism in which all the major 
colonizing nations would come together in order to check those nationalist and 
‘seditious’ forces unleashed by the recent victory of yellow Japan over white Russia in 
the Far East.” (Kiernan, 1980: 45).  
Again, it is the idea of European civilisation in contrast to the outside barbarian world 
that enabled a sense of commonality and a shared view among European thinking, an 
                                                          
15
 The Chapter Four will explore further the Europeanisation of Africa colonisation,  in the context of 
the historical deployment of peace discourse in EU-African relationship.  
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idea that Europe was progressing through the future while the rest was remaining in 
the darkness.  
The messianic call for European powers to enlighten such darkness was surely 
different in every country. Every European empire found its own ideological 
justification to bring civilisation and fostered it with specific colonial discourses. 
European identity was therefore nursed with these ideas. 
After Kipling’s call to intervene in the Orient to restore such “degenerated culture” 
from the lost sense of civilisation, the idea was soon spread that Europe had as its 
historical mission to civilise the world (see Kipling, 1899). All societies started to be 
ranked by references to western values posing as universal norms. Colonialism was 
considered all over Europe as a way of improving barbarians through the contact with 
European masters, and slavery was even considered a means of salvation of Africa 
since it would introduce Africans to Christianity and civilisation (see Delanty, 1995 
and Hammond and Jablow, 1977 p.23).  
These ideals of European civilisation constituted a narrative that permeated incisively 
European beliefs. In 1933, Eugene Guernier, asserted in his book “L’Afrique: Champ 
d’expansion de l’Europe” that “today’s colonization is the synthesis of a moral and 
highly civilizing endeavour: the gradual elevation of the standing of life of the non-
developed races and the no less human endeavour to continuously maintain or even 
improve the conditions of life of an industrious Europe” (Guerin, 1933 as quoted in 
Hansen and Jonsson, 2014). 
 
1.2. The Two World Wars and the Eurafrica Project 
The World Wars are usually considered to be European conflicts that expanded into a 
global war, but it is also relevant to see that those are events that brought the “conflict 
of global imperialism into global war” (Hansen and Jonsson, 2014: 17). In fact, the 
two major European wars saw large numbers of soldiers from the colonies fighting on 
both sides, and it was during this horrific experience that European societies were put 
in direct contact with the colonised societies. For instance, during World War I, France 
recruited 220,000 workers from its empire (Algeria, Indochina, Morocco, Tunisia and 
Madagascar) as well as from China to work behind the lines. In total, roughly one 
106 
 
million soldiers born in the colonies fought on the French and British sides in World 
War I (Nelson, 1970). These direct contacts dramatically affected the perception 
Europeans had of their colonies and vice versa.  
The main consequence was that Europeans could no longer entertain the myth of their 
so-called “superiority” in the eyes of those “natives” who fought side by side with 
Europeans. Even more, foreign soldiers felt betrayed after the breaking of the promises 
made to justify massive recruitment. Indeed, the fourteen-point plan of Woodrow 
Wilson, which guaranteed independence and territorial sovereignty to some European 
States did not apply to Europe’s overseas colonies16. 
This contributed to exposing the contradiction between the ideas of national autonomy 
and the realities of colonial dominance. European leaders were aware that this global 
conflict opened Pandora’s box of self-determination and anti-colonial feelings, yet 
they did not alter their beliefs. For instance, when Stresemann at Locarno echoed 
Briand’s sentiment that good Frenchmen Germans or Britons should also be good 
Europeans, he deplored the millions of dead of the Great War, as well as  the fact that 
this war had “jeopardized the ascendancy in the world to which Europe was entitled by 
temperament and tradition” (Kiernan, 1980: 46).  
Being afraid of losing their overseas possessions and following the pan-European 
ideology that blossomed during the interwar period, the European powers constructed 
a plan to promote a renewed form of colonialism: the Eurafrica Project. In other terms, 
the promotion of a European integration that would also coordinate joint exploitation 
of Africa. Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson describe this forgotten yet fundamental part 
of history in their revealing book “Eurafrica”. They show the plans designed to create 
a new geopolitical sphere of a united Europe that was imagined sustainable and 
prosperous thanks to the incorporation and joint exploitation of Africa.  
This new form of colonialism, considered the antidote to the pan-African movement, 
would have not been governed by nationalistic greed but by the true ideals of 
European civilisation. Indeed, in the years of the Eurafrica project (the 1920s to 
1950s), the geopolitical need was still justified by the racial underpinning of the 
                                                          
16
 See also E.Manela (2009) The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins 
of Anticolonial Nationalism, oxford University Press: Oxford. 
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“negro’s salvation”: there was a general widespread agreement that Europe was meant 
to conquer and colonize in the name of human values and solidarity.  
For instance, the French prime minister Sarraut, during the 1930s, proposed 
“Eurafrican cooperation” envisaging a thorough Europeanisation of colonial Africa. 
Such a proposal was transformed into political initiatives through the League of 
Nations, the International Labour Organization as well as the bilateral and trilateral 
collaboration among European powers in order to forge what for a period was almost 
an official foreign policy doctrine. A doctrine that aimed to save the old continent 
from over-population, economic crisis and anticolonial movements.  
According to Hansen and Jonsson, Eurafrica remained a salient and viable goal even 
after World War II, providing post-war European integration with a purpose and role 
in the global geopolitical setting that emerged after 1945. Indeed, in the aftermath of 
the war, Eurafrica gained actual political impact as part of the driving forces towards 
European Unity.  
 
1.3. Decolonisation and European Integration  
After the second world war, a strong anti-colonial sentiment re-emerged. As a 
response, European colonial powers reacted jointly to stem the tide of independence 
movements. Anti-colonial uprisings were often sedated by forceful collaborative 
actions among colonial powers: Britain’s military intervention in Indochina and in 
Dutch Indonesia gives us a clear example of such a European colonial alliance.  
Despite eventually surrendering to the pressure for decolonisation, European powers 
desperately tried to keep their possessions and, if necessary, to “share their benefits” 
as joint European possessions. What is not often shown in classical EU historiography, 
is that during the Conference of Le Hague, on the 8 May 1948, Eurafrican tenet was 
strongly proclaimed.  
Most of the countries supported the idea of creating a common administration of 
European colonies for the collective benefit of a war-torn Western Europe. This 
created opposition from those countries, such as France, that were more reluctant to 
share their own overseas domain. For example, Georges Le Brun Kéris, a member of 
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the Assembly of the French Union, emphasises to the members of the Political 
Committee at the Congress of Europe in The Hague the need to establish Europe while 
allowing each State with colonial responsibilities the freedom to ensure the political, 
social and cultural progress of the citizens living in its overseas territories, without 
being pushed through a “Europeanisation” of the colonial responsibilities: 
“However, we do not believe, unlike what appears to be being said in 
support of the report, we do not believe that it can be a positive thing or a 
good thing to attempt to combine together, or, if you like, to attempt to 
determine people’s political, social and cultural progress through joint 
pressure. This seems to me, on the contrary, to fall essentially to each one 
of us according to our individual genius, and it even depends on the very 
genius of our civilisations that we can undertake this task. This seems to 
me to be par excellence the political progress, the social progress and the 
cultural progress that is specific to each of our countries and it is why we 
have taken the liberty of proposing this amendment, particularly given that 
political evolution is something we are very familiar with. It is extremely 
difficult for us to understand each other’s domestic political structures and 
our domestic political behaviour. But the text, as it seems to have emerged 
from the report, does not really seem to leave any doors open to what is 
specific to us in social and cultural terms, within our unions, within our 
countries, within our mainlands and the territories linked to them”. 
                                                                  (CVCE, 2017a; Emphasis added) 
Despite Georges Le Brun Kéris concern, the committees at the Congress of Europe in 
The Hague agreed on the Europeanisation of the colonies and on their position as 
“dependant” territories.  On 10 May 1948, the Dutch liberal daily newspaper Nieuwe 
Rotterdamse Courant summarises the work of the committees at Congress, explaining 
that the common view was that European countries  must “adopt as its core priority the 
improvement of the economic, political social and cultural conditions in the dependent 
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and associated overseas territories and the maintenance of the links between these 
areas and the European countries”.  (Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 1948) 17  
The final resolution of The Hague Congress reflects this viewpoint, promoting the 
Europeanisation of the colonies – named from that moment onward as the associated 
overseas territories -  of the member states adhering to the European project.  
“The Congress declares that the Union or Federation must assist in 
assuring the economic, political and cultural advancement of the 
populations of the overseas territories associated with it, without prejudice 
to the special ties which now link these territories to European countries.” 
           (Congress of Europe, 1948)
18
 
Subtly but constantly, the message of “keeping African’s possessions” is therefore 
read in documents of that time. In the message that concluded the Congress Plenary, it 
was stated that: 
 “Together with the overseas people associated with our destinies, we can 
tomorrow build the greatest political formation and the greatest economic 
unit”  
                                                             (Mowbray, 2003: 1. Emphasis added)  
Internationalisation of the colonies and cooperation overseas started to become the 
most common preoccupation of Europe at the beginning of its integration process. 
Avoiding the international call for decolonisation, European leaders were setting the 
basis for a long term joint exploitation of the colonies.  
Thus, colonial cooperation in Africa become one of the defining priorities of the newly 
integrated Europe.  From that perspective, Africa was no longer a project of colonial 
                                                          
17
 "De politieke commissie is bijkans gereed" in Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant (10 
mei1948).CVCE. Full text available at: CVCE, "De politieke commissie is bijkans gereed" in 
Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant. 
https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/the_political_committee_is_almost_ready_from_the_nieuwe_rotterd
amse_courant_10_may_1948-en-f8a922b5-a23e-4260-b477-65f1ef097770.html 
 
18
Political Resolution (The Hague Congress, 7-10 May 1948). Full text available at: 
https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/political_resolution_of_the_hague_congress_7_10_may_1948-en-
15869906-97dd-4c54-ad85-a19f2115728b.html 
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metropoles, but a project for Europe as a whole, including the nations without colonies 
(see Hansen and Johnson, 2014).  
The push for a Europeanisation of Africa’s colonies came mostly from those European 
countries without colonial possessions, whereas the European colonial powers were 
more sceptic in sharing the management of the colonies with the other European 
countries. 
In this respect, Pasture reminds us that proponents of European investment in Africa 
claimed support from, in particular, German and Scandinavian resources of capital and 
manpower. For Germany, the association with the Overseas Territories constituted an 
asset in itself whereas Belgium, adopted a cautious tone, as it feared intrusion of 
European institutions into its sovereignty and had no intention of having other 
European countries “benefit” from its colonial riches. (2015: 189)  
When the Treaty of Rome decreed the formation of the European Economic 
Community in 1957, European powers had to rescale their imperial ambition to fit 
with the irreversible decolonial momentum. However, the Treaty found an 
arrangement that formally allowed Europeans to posit their interest in Africa despite 
the decolonial requests: European colonies became the Association of Overseas 
Countries, as they were associated to the Common Market (with the exception of 
Algeria that was included in the Common Market). This allowed special cooperation 
and aid regimes to the Overseas Countries, but at the same time, it was a way for 
Europe to never step out from the role of patron and indeed to prolong domination. 
Not surprisingly, these territories were not involved in the debate regarding their 
association with the EEC. 
As has been noted (Pasture, 2015), in the Council of Europe Europeans diverged on 
almost everything but not on the need to exploit African resources and they 
constructed development policies to maintain the link that would have allowed them 
free access to raw materials, energies and foodstuff and space, but also strategic 
geopolitical bases.  
The economic reason behind this was not hidden and besides this, it underpinned a 
clear tension:  a peaceful united Europe was about to rise again over the exploitation 
of Africa. And such contradiction emerged in several speeches. For instance, the 
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Strasbourg Plan stated that: “We must also if free Europe is to be made viable, jointly 
exploit the riches of the African continent” (Secretariat General Council of Europe, 
1952 as quoted in Hansen and Jonsson, 2014: 114). Whereas the Schuman Declaration 
remarked that: “With increased resources, Europe will be able to pursue the 
achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African 
continent” (Schuman Declaration, 1950). 
Both sentences are based on a sharp colonial dualism: free Europe, pacified and 
developed was allowed to exploit African riches in order to “save” Africa. In other 
words, the setting of European development and peacebuilding policies went hand in 
hand with a process of common exploitation of Africa’s resource. 
This point was also extensively demonstrated by Veronique Dimier in her book 
“Recycling Empires”, which studies European development policy in Africa from the 
beginning of the EEC in 1958 until the present day. Drawing on historical neo-
institutionalist theory, she gives an illuminating example of the longue durée of the 
colonial structure by analysing how colonial practices became the basis for the 
creation of the EU’s development programs. She argues that a French ex-colonial 
administrator led the Directorate General for Development (DG8) and “recycled” 
colonial practices in Brussels, thus creating an institution that for a long time 
maintained a “colonial identity” based on opaque, patriarchal and anti-bureaucratic 
systems.  
As we will see in chapter four more specifically, the idea of development and bringing 
peace seemed a refreshing way of keeping the African continent under European 
authority. Not surprisingly, the idea of creating a European Development Fund was 
French; they requested that the other European powers finance development 
instruments for Africa in order to maintain some influence there, and they obtained the 
creation of the European Development Fund in exchange for the opening of its African 
market to Europe.  
As mentioned, the Association of Overseas Countries, as well as the new European 
Development Fund for Africa were decided on unilaterally; no discussion with the 
emergent political elite of the territories was established at a time when these 
territories were supposed to be granted more political autonomy and power (see Lister, 
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1988 and Dimier, 2015). No wonder that this new Association was seen by many 
Africans and their allies as a new “Pacte colonial” which would allow former colonial 
powers, frustrated by years of absence in Africa, (namely Germany) to come back and 
exploit it economically under the flag of the EEC (Moreux, 1952b, p. 2785 as quoted 
in Dimier, 2015: 15).  
African leaders started feeling clear that the new integrated Europe was trying to 
internationalize colonial abuse with a new, up-to-date system. A move that Aimé 
Césaire seems to have anticipated in his Discourse on Colonialism in 1950 (see 
Césaire, 2000) and that several anticolonial authors remarked upon in their 
anticolonial calls against the European coloniser rather than against a singular nation-
state: 
Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder 
men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their own 
streets, in all the corners of the globe. For centuries they have stifled 
almost the whole of humanity in the name of a so-called spiritual 
experience. Look at them today swaying between atomic and spiritual 
disintegration. And yet it may be said that Europe has been successful in as 
much as everything that she has attempted has succeeded. Europe 
undertook the leadership of the world with ardour, cynicism and violence. 
Look at how the shadow of her palaces stretches out ever farther! …Come, 
then, comrades, the European game has finally ended; we must find 
something different. We today can do everything, so long as we do not 
imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up 
with Europe. 
                                                                                                                     
(Fanon, 1968: 251–2) 
In the eyes of the American sociologist, Susan Sontag, it was quite significant that the 
Europeans’ choice of the road to integration coincided with the crumbling of 
colonialist and imperial structures. On examining the European policy of France and 
Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, she said that it was not difficult to observe attempts 
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to gain ascendancy within the continent once the world ascendancy seemed to have 
been irretrievably lost.  
Sontag points out that while the importance of Europe in world politics has waned, 
there has been a growing tendency to speak of the Europeanisation of Europe rather 
than of the whole world (Sontag, 1989).  Contrary to Sontag’s assertion, however, 
what this historical detour has shown is that the integration process has always been 
connected to the attempt to includee colonies in the new integrated Europe.  
The integration process, therefore, did not happen because of the crumbling of colonial 
structure, but it happened in the hope of keeping such structure. All the steps made 
during the decolonial years merely attempted to adjust European aspirations in Africa 
to the new inevitable reality of independence.  
 
2. Conceptualising the EU’s Colonial Heritage 
The success of anti-colonial struggles prevented the creation of a West European 
colonial monolith that would have meant joint exploitation of Africa to the benefit of 
the union of the most powerful West European imperial states. Instead, the European 
Community and then the European Union undertook a series of steps that moved the 
two continents away from colonial exploitation.  
A series of EU-Africa agreements rooted on the idea of peace and development have 
been signed since and this will be widely considered in a dedicated section of the 
thesis (Chapter 6). 
However, this does not prevent us to remember what the foregoing arguments 
indicate:  the birth, expansion and integration of Europe is deeply related to the 
colonial project. Colonialism, as has been shown,  is a European phenomenon and it is 
at the basis of EU integration. Thus, it is fair to ask, to what extent such history is of 
significance for the contemporary EU? This question is pivotal in the context of this 
thesis, as it reveals the sense of  the whole investigation: it is the European dimension 
of colonialism that renders it an inescapable memory for the EU and that moves this 
study into the research of the legacies in the EU present and in its peacebuilding 
relations with one of the formerly colonised countries. 
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By trying to answer this question, it is of great help to draw on Böröcz and Sarkar’s 
illuminating article, “What is the EU?” (2003).  The authors study the external features 
of the EU in order to comprehend what the EU identity is about. In doing so, they 
evoke fundamental aspects of the EU: the states that constituted the EU before the big 
enlargement to East Europe were the same states that had exercised imperial rule over 
nearly half of the inhabitable surface of the globe outside Europe just two to three 
generations ago (Böröcz and Sarkar, 2003: 160).   
According to Böröcz and Sarkar, the consequences of such affirmation are at least 
threefold. Firstly, this is a reminder that the EU is the historic heir to those states that 
have literally carved up the rest of the world for centuries. As Michel Foucher (2001: 
160) points out, approximately 60 per cent of the borders outside of Europe have not 
been drawn by the states adjoining them today; they have been indeed drawn by 
European colonisers. This, as Böröcz and Sarkar (2003: 163) reminds us, also applies 
to Central and Eastern European borderlines, drafted by West European imperial 
powers as part of the dissolution and reorganisation of various local empires.  
Secondly, the subjugation and exploitation of actors, processes and structural 
conditions outside Europe by Western European states is reflected in the current EU 
reliance on external actors, processes and structures. Indeed, Böröcz and Sarkar 
explain that the colonial past works both as a system of path dependence that limits 
actors’ ability to take new directions - and as an institutional component of global 
hegemony, “a storehouse of inherited socio-cultural patterns of thinking about, and 
behaviour concerning, ‘Europe’, the rest of the world and that very distinction” (2003: 
163).  
Thirdly, Böröcz and Sarkar also point to the importance of imperial-colonial ties in the 
early emergence of some West European states to a position of global power, stressing 
that the advantageous position the societies of Western Europe enjoy in the world 
economy today derives from colonial history. This position of economic advantage 
and international power is a defining aspect of the EU’s daily reality, as well as a key 
reason for its attractiveness to applicants for full membership and the main driver of 
foreign aid and peacebuilding missions. Thus, “ the EU shares and pools in its member 
states’ colonial loot, and the applicants are now asking for a share” (ibid).  Finally, I 
would add to this list of crucial factors that link the Union with its colonial past, an 
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important, often underestimated aspect: there are still territories that are not 
decolonized under the influence of the EU. Hence, there are two groups of territories 
that are connected to the EU even if they are located in remote parts of the globe. 
Firstly, the so-called “Outermost regions of the EU”: The French overseas departments 
of Martinique, Mayotte, Guadeloupe, French Guiana and Réunion; the French 
overseas community of Saint-Martin, the Portuguese autonomous regions of Madeira 
and the Azores and the Spanish autonomous community of the Canary Islands and the 
Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla
19
.  
Secondly, there are still 25 non-sovereign “Overseas Countries and Territories”: a 
variegated group of countries that did not end up as sovereign states during the thrust 
for decolonisation and whose EU responsibility is enshrined in the Treaties. Indeed, 
although not part of the EU, most inhabitants of OCT’s countries have EU 
citizenship
20
.  Though small and remote, those countries have great geopolitical 
significance. Given that we are talking about “non-European domains” under EU 
control, it is evident that the very existence of these territories is fundamentally in 
contradiction with the EU’s dominant self-understanding of a free community of 
states. It is clear, therefore, that the EU has not come to terms with the historical as 
well as the current relationship between Europe and colonialism.  
Such considerations raise several concerns regarding the way the EU is managing its 
colonial heritage, as well as its “colonial present”. If it is true that so far the European 
colonial history has not been examined in a rigorous fashion, we must also stress that 
in recent years there has been an incentive from the European Parliament to “forge” 
the history of the EU and in this effort, surprisingly, colonialism takes its part.  
                                                          
19
 Thought Ceuta and Melilla are not officially considered as ORs, they are fully incorporated in the EU. 
20
 For more information about OCT’s courtiers you might look at Nissen and Gad, (eds.),( 
2012)European Integration and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games: The EU Overseas Countries and 
Territories ,London: Routlege. 
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3. Politics of Colonial Remembrance 
 
3.1. What is the European Memory? 
In chapter one, it has been noticed that for decades EU Studies have refused to include 
colonialism in their analysis. However, as explained above,  colonialism is central to 
the definition of Europe and to European integration as well.  
Therefore, it is legitimate to wonder why such an important part of European history 
has not been considered by EU scholars. In addition to what has been exposed in 
chapter one, about the connection of EU theorists with EU practitioners, and the 
specific Eurocentric features of the EU Studies discipline itself, it is also important to 
notice that a process of memory selection has excluded colonialism from being an 
EU’s epistemological concern.  
The study of this process of memory selection has resonant relevance for the thesis, as 
it has an implication in the way the study of colonial legacy in EU peacebuilding 
policymaking is  accepted or refused in the discipline, and also in the way the study 
itself might reveal blind spots that have not been taken into account before. 
According to Calligaro (2015), the process of European integration went in parallel 
with the process of building a European memory by selecting and choosing which 
kind of past the EU wanted to have. Similarly, Ifversen (2010) talks about the creation 
of a European myth as a narrative that legitimizes a community and its principal 
driving forces. He sees the EU as being created by a tripartite myth of European 
foundation organized around three moments: breakdown, rebirth and progress.  The 
breakdown of the two world wars, the rebirth rising from the ashes of the conflict 
through integration, and the steady progress to the future to new heights of well-being 
and prosperity. It is interesting in this framework to consider what is the role of 
colonialism in this myth and if it has a place at all. 
For Calligaro, the creation of a myth and memory is a top-down approach intended to 
carve out and legitimise only some aspects of the history that the EU would keep as 
European memory.  
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Therefore, emergent European institutions acted as “memory entrepreneurs” in order 
to institutionally produce memories. One of these examples of past-engineering and 
past selecting can be seen in the way in which the EU is appropriating the memory of 
political crimes and human rights abuses.  It is certain that critiques of Nazism and the 
Holocaust are regarded as a key element in the reconstruction of Europe after the 
Second World War. 
Yet, as already noticed by other scholars (Bhambra, 2009 et al), this critique of 
oppression and domination does not usually extend to the contemporaneous other 
forms of oppression and domination that involved European states with other parts of 
the world. Colonial brutalities were never raised to the level of “Holocaust” as 
constituting the EU’s memory. 
The process of “memory selection” to forge a European identity included the horrors 
perpetrated within its borders but excluded the horrors perpetrated outside those 
borders. This gives us a certain conception of Europe which might be partial and 
misleading if it does not also include the part that it failed to acknowledge. For 
instance, the critique of Nazism and Holocaust tends to show a pacified Europe after 
the Second World War, devoted to civic and political liberties, which is not 
completely true if we consider the elided colonial abuses that continued also after the 
Second World War; the Algerian War of Independence, the Mau Mau rebellions 
against British imperial rule, and the “Congo Crisis” (Wagner, 2005). 
If we use Chakrabarty’s lexicon, we might say that such mechanisms of exclusion in 
the EU official narrative are ways to make minority histories’ become subaltern pasts 
(2000, 100).  
In other words, the European colonial past, which is a story of submission and 
exclusion of a dominated group from political discourses, becomes also marginal as a 
memory because it is not functional to the present image of the EU. It is to say that, 
whereas the memory of Nazism and Holocaust helped to build the idea of a reunited 
and pacified Europe, the memory of colonialism was too thorny to be used as a 
symbolic representation and furthermore, it could have damaged the very narrative of 
liberal integration of civilian states that surrounded the birth of the EU. 
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In this respect, Calligaro (2015) noted that common European historical facts are not 
retrieved in order to produce a deep elaboration of the past, a shared view on common 
accounts. On the contrary, she believes that the EU is embedded in a “presentist 
regime” of historicity, in which all historical facts become only functional as 
occasions for commemoration without necessary elaborating and deeply reflecting on 
the history. Therefore, histories that are not functional to the present representation of 
the EU tend to be left aside. 
 
3.2. The House of European History 
No other place can symbolize the construction of a European memory better than the 
House of European History (HEH). The Museum, inaugurated on 6 May 2017,  is 
located in Brussels, close to the European institutions, and is the realisation of an idea 
launched in 2007 by the president of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering, 
with the idea to “create a locus for history and for the future where the concept of the 
European idea can continue to grow” (Pöttering, 2007) . The Museum itself was 
created by a board of international experts that worked together with, and under the 
supervision, of the EP's Directorate-General for Communication.  
From the perspective of the thesis’ research objectives, the HEH is a fascinating place 
in which to understand the official construction of the historical narrative about 
colonisation and Europe. Indeed, it is the place where, for the first time, colonial 
history has been institutionalised at the European level.  
It is argued that an investigation of how colonial history is passed on in the Museum, 
what is forgotten and what is added on, with particular attention to hidden histories 
and the reasons why they are missing, can shed light on the way the European 
Parliament wants to institutionalise the colonial memory at the European level.  
The first important aspect to be noticed in the analysis of the museum is that in both 
the conceptual basis’ documents and in the exhibition itself there is given relatively 
ample space to the colonial issue
21
.  
                                                          
21
 In order to analyse how the colonial memory is framed in the HEH, I have been studying the 
“conceptual basis” document of 2008, in its revised and final version of 2013, and in the actual 
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Despite the first conceptual basis of the museum describing colonialism in a generally 
positive tone
22
 (see also Settle, 2015) by giving an image of colonialism as functional 
to the European grandeur and eliding considerations on the people living in the 
colonised regions, the document “Building a house of European History”, created in 
2013, seems to move away from such Eurocentric biases and to include also the 
“darker side of colonialism”23.  
This idea has been further developed in the exhibition itself. While asking what is 
Europe and what binds the continent together, the exhibition considers the main 
driving forces that shaped Europe and the main aspects of European heritage: 
democracy, humanism, civil rights, nationalism but also colonialism and the slave 
trade. Regarding colonialism, the exhibition displays an 18
th
-century African icon that 
depicts the white man, whereas the audio associated with the object explains that: 
Many in Europe believed it was their natural destiny as members of a 
superior race, to assume control of others. Colonised were nearly never 
invited to express their opinion. European colonial powers grew 
fantastically wealthy but inflicted misery, inequality and racism on the 
people they had colonised. In the 20
th
 century, they either relinquished the 
colonies entirely or were forced to give them up as the colonies demanded 
freedom and self-determination. Europeans often have seen their role in 
the world as of bringers of civilisation. But do the other people have the 
same view? 
(Audio guide, Permanent Exhibition, 2017) 
                                                                                                                                                                       
exhibition. Moreover, I have been interviewing curators (both academics and MPs) to understand the 
process that led them to the definition of the official position regarding colonialism. 
22
 In the first conceptual basis document there is a clear Eurocentric bias in the way the colonial process 
was illustrated.: “The phenomenon of colonisation demonstrates the importance of one of the key 
driving forces in European history. [ . . . ] Migration pushed people to explore new parts of the world 
and to develop a powerful military culture in order to occupy and maintain colonies” (Committee of 
Experts, 2008:11) Or again in a next passage: “The economic development of Europe partly stemmed 
from the benefits obtained from the colonies in Africa and Asia” and that “Great Britain’s ‘colonial 
administration was considered exemplary” (ibid:14). As Veronika Settle (2015) shows, this view seems 
to erase the subjectivity of colonized countries creating the effect of reproducing the colonialist view 
that there were largely unpopulated territories waiting to be explored by the Europeans.    
23
 We can read: “There was no more obvious gauge of progress, in the eyes of the European elite, than 
the expansion of European colonial power. The sheer scale of imperial expansion bolstered the self-
held European sense of superiority compared to the rest of the world. Nationalism and the vision of 
European civilisation were permeated by racist and social Darwinist ideas. Before World War I, 
Europe was at the peak of its global power.” (European Parliament 2013, 33)  
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Here, colonialism is finally associated with the colonised denied experiences of 
exploitation and there is a reflection on the moral justification of such violence. 
Furthermore, references to colonialism continue in the space dedicated to Imperialism 
in the 19th century: the memory of a globally dominant Europe and of the industrial 
revolution is associated with remembering the economic exploitation of colonies and 
the human rights abuses. Moreover, echoes of colonialism are evoked in the area 
dedicated to World War I.  A gigantic photo of soldiers is displayed: it shows a 
European soldier side by side with Asiatic and African ones
24
. The choice of showing 
World War I as a conflict in which the entire colonial world was mobilised, is a 
welcoming step towards a more realistic understanding that moves away from the 
canonised accounts. 
In synthesis, the HEH tells us that we must consider colonialism as part of a European 
shared past. That provides a really important basis for this research as it explains that 
the European Parliament decided to institutionalise and spread the vision that 
colonialism was integral to European history and therefore part of the EU memory.  
However, what seemed a promising introduction for a complete reconsideration of 
colonial history, ends up being a great disappointment in the rest of the exhibition.  
After mentioning colonialism again in the room dedicated to the Second World War, 
there is no relevant mention to it in the rest of the exhibition.  
Unlike the final arrangement of the exhibition, the conceptual basis of 2008 was 
referring to the decolonial momentum after 1945
25
, and to the relationship between 
decolonisation and European Integration by remarking that: 
                                                          
24
The explanation states “Soldiers recruited from the overseas colonies of Great Britain and France 
added a global dimension to the war and increased cultural interaction in Europe. Britain recruited 
827.000 men from India, while the French armies included more than 500.000 troops from countries 
such as Algeria and Senegal”.  
25
  We can read: “Despite these political changes, the European colonial powers were determined to 
regain the control over their dependent territories in Africa and Asia which in many cases had been lost 
as a result of the war. Armed conflicts quickly broke out, for example in Dutch Indonesia or French 
Indochina, some of which were to continue for the next two decades”   (Committee of Experts, 2008:19)  
and again “Following the debacle suffered by Great Britain and France in the Suez crisis in autumn 
1956, the pace of decolonisation increased once again. In the colonies, national liberation movements 
turned to armed force in order to overthrow the 'white man's rule'”  
(Committee of Experts, 2008: 20). 
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The political influence enjoyed by the European powers at world level was 
diminishing day by day. One reaction to this loss of influence was the 
decision to establish the European Economic Community (EEC), which 
was formally ratified on 25 March 1957 in Rome. In organisational and 
legal terms, the EEC was the precursor of the current European Union. 
                                                                 (Committee of Experts, 2008:19)   
 
This extract is particularly relevant in showing the discourse of a disappointed and 
weak Europe who, having lost “its colonies”, reorients its energies to the internal 
integration process This discourse has been discussed in the previous paragraph and 
dismantled by showing evidence of the attempts to create a Eurafrican project. 
However, in the final version of the Museum, there is no track of such discourse. The 
exhibition is focused on reproducing another discourse: the one that presents the birth 
of the European Union as an international peace project. Indeed, ample space is 
dedicated to displaying documents, photos and materials about the end of World War 
II, the rise of Communist dictatorships, the post-war economic crisis and the 
blossoming of an idea of peace through the Declaration of Human Rights and the 
process of European Integration.  
According to what is depicted, World War II, acting as a catharsis, led to the creation 
of the Declaration of Human Rights and “formed the basis for building a new Europe” 
(Committee of Experts, 2008: 18).   
The museum, indeed, shows the classical myth of the European historiographical 
discourse considered by Ifversen (2010), which represents the EU as rising from the 
ashes of total chaos, vowing to never again repeat the mistakes of the past. A “classic” 
discourse that is structured around “the triple foundation of breakdown, rebirth and 
progress” (see also Huistra, Molema, Wirt, 2014:132).  
In this narrative of peace in unity, there is obviously no space for the decolonial story, 
one that would clearly show the contradiction of such a simplified account. One that, 
as I mentioned before, could explain that the rebirth of Europe after WWII was not a 
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global renaissance but was designed to help Europe rise once again over the 
exploitation of Africa; a peace project built on the oppression of non-pacified others.  
In fact, as demonstrated in the previous sections of this chapter, the very European 
institutions that were created at the beginning of the European integration process 
were highly involved in the process of turning old colonial dominance into a new 
system of dominance based on bureaucratic assistance and economic exploitation. 
In summing up the analysis of the HEH, it can be argued that it represents an 
important source to understand the linkage between the EU and the colonial legacy. 
Indeed, the EP’s effort of creating a museum that reflects on  European shared pasts 
resulted in a wide reconsideration of colonial history. Most importantly, it shows that a 
rising interest from the EU is growing in bringing the colonial memory to the surface, 
and starting dealing with it as a global European question.   
However, the most blatant shortcoming is the fact that such a historical account is not 
completely narrated. Rather, its account abruptly ends before the creation of European 
integration, not giving any signs of reception of what could be a linkage with the 
present. Perhaps, it might be suggested, to ensure that the liberating and peace-based 
nature of the European success story is not suffocated or tarnished in any way.  
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Conclusions 
 
By engaging with the history of Europe, several confirmations emerge as a 
fundamental basis for the setting of this thesis. In the first place, I have shown that 
European history is not neutral, but a process of selection and omissions, which brings 
to the surface only those memories that are functional to the present status quo. The 
logical consequence that arises in this explanation is that the European colonial 
memory has been for a long time forgotten and hidden behind the single empires’ 
histories. 
Nonetheless, the EU has made a considerable effort to include colonial memory in its 
heritage. Most importantly, this chapter demonstrates that colonialism is considered a 
European phenomenon not only by historians but also by the European Parliament. 
The example of the House of European History indeed shows that a top-down effort of 
forging EU history did not escape from putting a sensible emphasis on colonialism as 
a European joint memory. 
However, the argument also enables us to reflect on the fact that colonialism is 
depicted in a way that does not allow a complete rethink of the phenomenon as a part 
of the EU itself, but only as a remote memory of the imperial past, which has nothing 
to do with the present EU project.  
Undoubtedly, this historical detour provokes a number of questions on the relationship 
between the EU and its colonial heritage. If we stated that there is a shared European 
colonial past and that the European Parliament is institutionalising this past as a 
European collective memory, this research asks whether the EU addresses such a past, 
or takes it into account in everyday EU policies? Are there legacies of this past in the 
way the EU is relating to former colonies? Are there other EU Institutions dealing with 
former colonies responding to the Parliament’s “institutionalisation” of colonial 
memory? 
Uncomfortable and potentially divisive as they are, such questions must be openly 
debated rather than swept under the carpet. And that is what this thesis is about, 
mobilising the specific case of the production of peacebuilding policies in DRC.  
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Thus,  as we move on through the thesis, the leitmotif of colonial obliviousness is 
relaunched. We will see that despite the Parliament’s input of reflecting on 
colonialism, there is no echo of that within the broader EU institutional structure.  
More specifically, the empirical chapters that follow will reveal and interrogate  (in 
particular chapter six) the different ways in which the idea of a colonial legacy is 
received and articulated by practitioners that deal with the construction of EU 
peacebuilding policies in DRC.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Bringing Peace to Africa 
 
 
 
Introduction  
In the previous chapter, it has been claimed that colonialism was a European 
phenomenon, integral to European history and to the formation of the EU. It has also 
been revealed how the European Parliament is engaged in framing the colonial 
memory as an EU legacy in the context of the House of European History. 
 In this fourth chapter, the emphasis remains on memory and historical continuities 
from Europe to the EU, but it is more specifically focused on one of the pivotal 
concepts of the thesis: of the idea of “peace” and the discourse of bringing peace to 
Africa.  
As we saw in the previous chapter, the official historiography of the EU allocates a 
crucial role to the notion of “peace”. It is commonly said that the EU has been 
historically conceived as a peace project with the aim of ending the division produced 
from two world wars that divided the continent into opposing fronts (see Tocci, 2008 
and 2011; Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler, 2009; Natorsky, 2001 among others). 
The pacification of the continent after the Second World War is seen as the central 
myth that allowed the birth of the EU (Ifversen, 2010). 
Similarly, in 2012, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to 
the EU because of its role in helping to transform “most of Europe from a continent of 
war to a continent of peace” (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2012). This indicates that 
the EU’s raison d'être is to be a peace project ending centuries of warfare in Europe 
and that peace has fundamentally shaped its external mission.  
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Indeed, the internal dimension of peace was historically mirrored in an external 
dimension of bringing peace outside of European borders. The same observation made 
in chapter one relating to the internal and external dimension of normative power 
Europe (see Manners, 2001 and Keene, 2003) could be considered also for the concept 
of peace. Europeans found it necessary to civilise themselves by pacifying the country 
after the Second World War, but this process of civilisation and internal struggle for 
peace was also accompanied by a long historical process in which Europe used the 
discourse to bring peace outside its borders. 
The European integration served as a pacified regional forum to fortify the mission of 
exporting European values to the outside world.  What is interesting to notice, is the 
tension among this internal and external vision. For example, Hansen (2002) and 
Bhambra (2009) reflect on the fact that the myth of “pax Europea” to describe the 
birth of the EU, was only made possible by obscuring the history of the colonial 
periphery and to depict colonialism as a real peace mission.  For example, the authors 
notice that at the time of the Schuman Declaration in the 1950s, the British Army was 
oppressing the Mau – Mau uprising and the French Army was fighting both in the 
Algerian War of independence and in the “dirty war” in Indochina (Blanchard, 
Lemaire, and Bancel, 2014). While constructing the myth of a peaceful Europe, the 
coexistence of colonialism is disregarded as another history, or rather, is justified by 
the same discourse of bringing peace abroad. 
As already remarked in the introduction of this thesis, the significance of the notion of 
peace for the internal and external history of the EU is one of the main reasons that 
brought me to select the policies of EU peacebuilding as a case study. Indeed, it is 
extremely interesting to examine whether this historical emphasis on building 
internal/external peace had an impact on the peacebuilding policies in the 
contemporary context. Has the historical legacy of Europe’s image as a peace 
ambassador impacted on contemporary EU peacebuilding policies? To what extent is 
this linked with the justification of bringing peace as a colonial discourse? 
As we will broadly see in the next chapter, peacebuilding is frequently seen as a 
relatively new set of instruments that allows the EU to engage in conflict-prone 
countries. However, it is the intention of this thesis to show, despite the use of 
technical tools to solve conflicts, that the moral discourse of bringing peace is not new. 
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Europe has been using it frequently with respect to the African continent in particular. 
More precisely, the objective of this chapter is to prove that EU peacebuilding 
practices in Africa, despite being considered mainly as technical instruments, are 
embedded in a moral discourse that is very similar to the one created in colonial time 
and that continued also after decolonisation.  
In this context, this chapter shows the discursive conditions that allowed the creation 
of contemporary EU peacebuilding policies in DRC, which is the objective of the 
empirical analysis of the thesis.  
In this sense, this chapter can be seen as a genealogy that reconstructs continuities and 
discontinuities in the narrative of bringing peace to Africa, from European integration 
until the present days.  
In such a genealogy, “bringing peace to Africa” is considered a narrative structure: a 
way to organise the genealogy of colonial discourses through histories as well as its 
present symbolic order (see Keller, 2005).  
To this end, the chapter is divided into two sections.  Section one provides an 
overview of how the newly integrated Europe was able to make a paradigmatic shift in 
the relationships with Africa after decolonisation. In the second section, the study 
reveals the moment in which development policy in Africa moved from apolitical 
intervention to more political involvement, in which the peace issue gained prominent 
importance.  
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1. Bringing Peace after the Empires: Discursive Shifts During 
European Integration and Decolonisation 
As mentioned in chapter two, one of the discursive strategies used to support the 
colonial discourse was the one about pacifying the dark continent, exorcising the 
chaotic and violent darkness by bringing order, morality and civilised institutions and 
beliefs.  This moral justification of colonialism was so pervasive to the point that 
Bates argues that the imperial peace is still commonly viewed as one of Europe’s 
principal contributions to Africa’s development, offering a respite from the misery of 
warfare and slavery (2013: 424).   
Decolonisation and contemporary European integration provided an important 
discursive shift in European-Africa relationships. Even though political and economic 
entanglements endured, the formal reacquisition of independence represented a 
moment of profound realignment. The changing social and political setting caused a 
re-articulation of the discourses of bringing peace to the dark barbaric savage.  
After World War II the right to self-determination and the existence of universal 
human rights came to be increasingly accepted. Formal refusal of racism become a 
justification for colonial expansion in the international community. This imposed a 
change of discourse in European colonial possessions.  The superiority of the white 
man, that - as it has been exhaustively explained in chapter two – was the nodal point 
of the colonial discourse, could not be accepted anymore as the justification of the 
colonial expansion. 
If race could not be considered anymore as the ultimate signifier of colonialism, 
inequalities of the international sphere were not overcome and Europe had to find 
another apology to keep its overseas possessions. 
Chandler (2010) considers that in the aftermath of  World War II the colonial 
discourse was kept alive by a replacement of the concept of race by the concept of 
culture. Cultural differences were given the same determining weight as earlier 
distinctions of the race on the basis that cultures were separate, homogeneous and with 
their own paths of development (Malik, 1996: 149–177).  The hold of the past over the 
present enabled a moral rather than a racial critique of the capacity of the colonial (and 
post-colonial) Other (Chandler 2010: 373).  
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This shift of discourse allowed the European powers to keep the colonial possessions 
and resist the decolonising wave.  
The European intrusion in African affairs did not stop after decolonisation and 
European integration did not mean the separation from the bonds with former 
colonies, but a new way of keeping such links, that required new discursive 
justifications. 
The shift of discourse, was essential for the newly integrated Europe to leave behind 
the race arguments and project itself as a new moral actor, whose progress and 
development were the key features to justify intrusion in the African continent.  
Several authors confirm that in the EEC the “moral preoccupation” for Africa 
remained fixed component, yet it found different ways of developing its discursive 
strategies in its historical evolution (see Langan, 2016 and Ziai, 2015).  In the same 
vein, the “peace argument” was used to maintain the relationship before and after the 
decolonisation even if the European Community was war-torn itself. 
In an excellent book that analyses the history of Europe, Patrick Pasture ponders how it 
was possible that once the European Community gave up its colonial ambitions it was 
immediately able to adopt a discourse of peace and progress in Africa; a discourse that 
was unspoiled by its colonial past (Pasture, 2015: 191). The answer – as alluded to 
more generally in chapter 3 - can be systematised in three main parts: 
Firstly, the transition from a colonial empire to ‘Europe the fair’ (ibid.) was possible 
by silencing the racism and the violence of the imperial crusades whilst leaving their 
moral justification alive. Indeed, remarkably swiftly, colonialism vanished from 
European memory: virtually all representations, textbooks and overviews on European 
integration and the Foreign Relations of the EU remain silent on it (Ibid.). The 
Historical Museum of European History, analysed in the previous chapter, provides 
the same reproduction of this erasure: from the disposal of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the decolonisation process, there is no mention any more about 
the colonial legacies, whereas the newly integrated Europe continues to embrace the 
moral role of guide for the “Third World”. 
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This erasure has been long portrayed in EU Studies (see chapter one) and by the 
European Official voices. Indeed, as Huber pinpointed, the academic disinterest for the 
colonial question could be put in parallel to the silence of political contemporaries 
(2013)
26
. 
 A clear separation from Europe to the European Community was created. And this 
separation was really persistent. For example, EU Commissioner at the time, Claude 
Cheysson, some 30 years after European integration was launched, emblematically 
remarked: 
“The Community is weak, it has no weapon, it has no aircraft, it has no 
submarine, it’s completely inapt to exercise any domination. This in 
many ways is a great asset to deal in the Third World, to discuss with the 
Third World. The European Community is young, it has no past”. 
                                       (Claude Cheysson, 1981 as quoted in M. Lister, 1988)  
However, at the same time the moral ambition that justified colonialism remained very 
deeply anchored to the idea of Europe.  As Ziai (2015), Langan (2016), Pasture (2015) 
Huber (2013) and others point out, the humanitarian project of saving, civilizing, 
pacifying seemed to continue after decolonisation and was used for the purpose of 
creating development and an assistance programme for Africa that would allow the 
economic linkage between Europe and Africa to continue.   
In the sixties, political speeches were referring to the European Economic Community 
using moral discourses of responsibility and solidarity for African countries (see 
Huber, 2013: 42) reinforcing the “missionary identity” that came intact after 
decolonisation. 
Secondly, the European humanitarian ethos was also so deeply internalised by the 
colonised countries, that even after centuries of racism and violence, formerly 
colonised countries believed in the ultimate role of a peaceable Europe and in the 
                                                          
26
  There are, however, rare cases where, during the sixties, European practitctioners have commented 
on the changes arrecated by the decolonisation . For instance, Albert Coppé, European Comissioner that  
led an interim High Authority in the European Coal and Steel Community in 1967 declared that, as the 
Copernican revolution needed time to show the Science that the World is not at the centre of the 
Universe, it will need time and patience to show that Europe is not at the centre of the world”. (HAEC, 
1964:7) 
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advantage of having the European Community as a peacebuilder agent in their 
countries. This process is what Fanon called the “lactification” of consciousness 
(Fanon, 1970: iv and Wirth, 2006); as a result of centuries of colonisation, the blacks 
(but in more general terms the colonial subjects) assimilated the myths of inferiority 
and incapability of leading their own socio-political reforms without the help from the 
former colonial countries. In other words, this “epidermalization of inferiority” 
(Enberg, 2011) was internalised so much that Africans moved towards a mindset in 
which they believed that they could only be “saved” by a peace process led by the 
Europeans.  
Thirdly, as Pasture also noticed, the end of World War II and the European integration 
were used by the EC to progressively introduce the peace argument to interfere in the 
non-European area. Peace was functional to European Community self-definition as it 
described well the myth of the redeemed war-torn countries that raised from the ashes 
and created peace integration. But at the same time, it also served as a way of 
maintaining relationships with former colonies. It is to say that, once reached the 
internal pacification, the EC could replicate its model outside its borders.  
The same point is also made by Keene when describing the historical features of 
normative power, considering that once the internal peace project had been 
successfully completed, Europe assumed its new institutional forms, and could return 
to its mission of exporting these values to the outside world (Keene, 2013: 953). The 
most vivid example of this is the Schuman declaration, in which an agreement about 
coal and steel production became a symbol of the possibility of spreading peace in the 
world: 
The contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to 
civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In 
taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united 
Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A 
united Europe was not achieved and we had war. 
or 
This production will be offered to the world as a whole without distinction 
or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living standards and to 
132 
 
promoting peaceful achievements. With increased resources, Europe will 
be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the 
development of the African continent.                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                           (Schuman, 1950) 
From Schuman’s portrayal of Europe as a benevolent protagonist in Africa, discourses 
of solidarity not only provided a pillar upon which continuing relations with Africa 
could be legitimized but also established an ethical purpose upon which the European 
project could be discursively removed from past horrors. These aspects contributed to 
the continuation of European interest and preoccupation in African peace affairs and 
backed the progressive raising of the idea of European peacebuilding in Africa.  In the 
following sections, we chart the evolution of such discourses in the different EU 
African agreements. 
 
2. Peace Argument in EU-Africa Agreements: From Apolitical 
Development to Peace/Development Nexus 
Even before decolonisation, Europe’s development assistance to Africa became 
established as a constitutive part of the European project.   
As African colonies moved towards independence, countries of Europe wanted to find 
a way of associating their former colonies with the new structures of the Community 
while also safeguarding their historical links with their empires, but in a way that was 
perceived apolitical and far from colonial. The main preoccupation of European 
countries after decolonisation was to provide development tools to Africa as an 
exchange to keep the economic interest of European countries alive, while not being 
perceived as neo-colonial (see ERD, 2009 and CVCE, 2017). 
Development policies became the best solution to this political and economic interest.  
Thereby, development was discursively introduced to legitimise ties in a post-colonial 
period and the idea of responsibility and duty for the African former-colonies became 
central to the European project. Europe’s development assistance to Africa implanted 
colonial discourse into a new technical instrument, where European’s role and 
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responsibility toward Africans did not change that much. (see Langan, 2015 and Ziai, 
2015). 
The final two points of the Treaty of Rome of 1957, clearly state that the EEC intends: 
[…] to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries 
and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, in accordance 
with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations” and that it is 
resolved “by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace 
and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their 
ideal to join in their efforts. 
(Treaty of Rome, 1957) 
 
Those two points indicate clearly the connection between the intention of “strengthen 
peace and liberty” internally and the pursuit of “development of their prosperity” 
externally.   
This point has been further touched by Jean Monnet, when in the preface of 
Duroselle’s essay “L’idée d’Europe dans l’histoire” mentions European states, uniting 
their peoples in the United States of Europe, will bring an internal peace which could 
be the beginning of the organisation of peace in the world
27
 . 
When in the early 1960s, most of the overseas countries and territories (OCTs) 
associated with the European Community gained independence,  this created a need to 
re-examine the nature of the association agreement annexed to the 1957 Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community and to create a convention negotiated 
together with the newly independent states in order to enshrine these major changes. 
Reflection on how to adapt the association of the OCTs was led in particular by the 
EEC Commission’s Directorate-General for Overseas Countries (DG VIII), the  
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 Original quote : « Ainsi les nations d’Europe […] unissant leurs peuples dans les Etats-Unis d’Europe 
[…] donneront à tous les hommes cette zone de paix qui pourrait être le commencement de 
l’organisation de la paix dans le monde. Full text available at : 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/100books/es/detail.html?id=23 
134 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Movement and the European Parliamentary Assembly, and especially by 
two parliamentarians, Jean Duvieusart from Belgium and Alain Peyrefitte from 
France.  
On the initiative of the Parliamentary Assembly, a Euro-African conference was held 
in Strasbourg from 19 to 24 June 1961, attended by MPs from both continents. A total 
of 18 African states, all French-speaking except Somalia, expressed their desire to 
negotiate a new association agreement with the EEC to consolidate their privileged 
position with regard to the Community (CVCE, 2016). 
 Official negotiations between the EEC Member States and the associated states began 
on 6 December 1961 in Paris and culminated in the signing of the Yaoundé 
Convention on 20 July 1963.   
In the final Report of the European Parliamentary Assembly  about the organisation of 
a Conference about the issues of Africa and Europe, we read: 
The Parliamentary Assembly reminds the desire of seeing the 
relationship with Overseas Territories associated to the Community 
becoming more and more multilateral and egalitarian, knowing the rapid 
evolution that should bring this population to a more prosperity and 
freedom , and underlying the important role that the European 
 
Figure 1. Report by the European Parliamentary 
Assembly on the holding of a governmental 
conference on issues concerning Africa and 
Europe (March 1960) . Source: HAEU. 
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Community in the effort to promote the Associated Overseas Countries 
in their effort to peace and freedom […]. 
                                                (European Parliamentary Assembly, 1960) 
In the Report, we still see the emphasis on the European interest in bringing peace in 
Africa. However, after the ratification of the Yaoundè Convention and until the early 
years of the Lomé Convention, the European Community decided to pursue a policy 
that Marjorie Lister describes as ‘discreet entente’: an unequal, political relationship 
that was officially portrayed as non-political “a policy that tried not to look like a 
policy” (Lister, 1997:19).  
Indeed, the European Community stopped considering the peace and conflict situation 
of African States as something to be included in its official objectives. For almost two 
decades the European Community decided not to interfere directly in African conflicts 
as it was preoccupied in showing any interest in African internal politics that could 
give rise to neo-colonial allegations (see Dimier, 2014; Huber, 2013; Langan, 2016 
and Rutzaibwa, 2015). 
This extract of an interview with Umberto Stefani, Chief Adviser in DG VIII in charge 
of negotiation with ACP from 1977 to 1986, reveals a lucid awareness of the EEC 
fears of being considered colonial: 
From Europe, they feared disguised colonization. They still had the prints 
of the old ... So they had to choose between freedom in uncertainty and 
security in servitude. That was their feeling. In November 1959, on my 
return, I made a rather long note in which I said that Africa was a continent 
by itself, and not an extension of Europe as we believe. The reports had to 
change. I suggested an association council but as, initially, one had to 
negotiate and contract and not carry gifts, sporadic presents perhaps 
desired and sometimes hurtful […]. 
                                                        (HAEU, 2004, INT 761, author’s own translation)28 
                                                          
28
  « Histoire interne de la Commission européenne 1958-1973 » Entretien avec M. Umberto STEFANI 
par Michel Dumoulin et Julie Cailleau à Bruxelles le 26 janvier 2004  (26.01.2004). HAEU, INT 761. 
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As Dimier and Lister show, this core idea of respect for the independence of “the 
Overseas partners” and of EEC political neutrality in practice reinforced the EC 
relationship with African elites. Not interfering in peace and conflict affairs, according 
to Dimier, meant engaging in “dangerous liaisons” (Dimier, 2014) with infamous 
dictators such as Idi Amin, Bokassa and Mobutu.  This “apolitical” stand was often 
criticised by the Parliament when complaining about the Commission’s total absence 
of reaction on human rights abuses and on the propagation of conflicts on African soil 
(ibid.).  
Only in 1977 did the ECC start to impose the first sanctions by suspending assistance 
to Uganda and then Equatorial Guinea. But the ECC was reluctant in taking measures 
to stop human rights violations and the escalation of conflicts in Africa, being aware 
that it would have contradicted the fundamental principle of non-interference in the 
African internal affairs (see Dimier, 2014: 113).  Slowly and steadily, however, the 
concept of development became broader, the connection between economic 
development and peacebuilding became mainstream and Europe’s interest in being 
involved in conflict resolution in Africa grew. 
Despite the European attempt to include a linking of aid provision to human rights 
even as early as the negotiations for Lomé II, this was strongly refuted by the ACP 
group (see Hurt, 2003). The inclusion of human rights into Lomé III was an ACP 
demand “directed against the EEC states that were in a close economic (and political 
in some cases) embrace with the Apartheid regime of South Africa” (Greenidge 1999, 
p.116). For this reason, the EEC insisted that it should be relegated to an annexe rather 
than being incorporated in the body of the text. (see also Raffer, 2001).  
It was only in Lome IV that the reference to human rights entered in the text of the 
Convention and with Lome IV bis (1995) that the legal framework for sanctions was 
established. This metamorphosis reflects several trends, already noted by other authors 
(see Merlingen and Ostrauskaité, 2006). First, post-colonial violence and war became 
much more widespread and visible (and the Balkan effect in European imagination 
was strong), the intellectual and political hegemony of the Western “liberal peace 
model” became greatly strengthened after the end of the Cold War, and Rwanda 
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tragedies
29
, more than any other, clearly demonstrated to both development and 
humanitarian actors that economic development even if implemented successfully, 
could lead to disaster if conflict dynamics were not understood (see Uvin, 2002 and 
McCandless, Karbo, 2011: 32 but also Duffield, 2001). 
Chandler (2010:376) identifies that a discourse of culture operated as a delimiting 
framework for peacebuilding intervention in the 1990s. A good example of this he 
mobilises Kaldor’s idea of new wars as irrational, driven by private interest and 
politically illegitimate (Kaldor, 1999). This conception of conflicts in the third world 
as irrational – that has a clear colonial derivation – served as a legitimation for 
intervention.  The irrational conflicts are due to moral and cultural backwardness that 
legitimised European intervention a and discursively repositioned the European rights 
as a peace ambassador. 
 It is indeed in this period that we witness a blossoming of documents that point to the 
fact that there cannot be sustainable development in situations of pervasive and 
chronic insecurity and hence the root causes of conflict have to be addressed before 
self-sustained development can take place (cf. Commission 1996; OECD 1997).  
This galvanized the creation of the “new humanitarian consensus” (Merlingen & 
Ostrauskaité 2006:50). This was underpinned by the belief that there is a link between 
human rights and peace, especially with reference to ethnicity and identity-based wars, 
“human rights and humanitarian violations lie at the heart of many conflicts” (SG/HR 
& Commission, 2000:8) 
The official portrayal of the EU–ACP relationship as economic, and hence non-
political, changed definitely in 1995 with Lomé IV This became the first development 
agreement to incorporate a human rights clause as a “the fundamental” part the of 
cooperation (article 5).   
Here, the emphasis is put on the promotion of human rights, democracy and good 
governance; strengthening of the position of women; the protection of the 
environment; decentralised cooperation. The translation to involvement in African 
                                                          
29
 In the annual report 1994 “The year of the Rwanda tragedy” , the European Community 
Humanitarian Office concludes “conflict prevention is increasingly seen as imperative if there is to be 
any reduction in the scale and depth of the human misery caused by war”. (ECHO, 1994: 24) 
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peace and conflict issue started being seen in explicit mention to the emergency 
support in casa e of displacement due to conflict or a natural disaster (art.255.2).  
The Mid-term review of the Lomè IV that took place in 1994-1995, in the context of 
major economic and political changes both in ACP countries and  Europe, introduced 
clearly the respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law as 
essential elements of the Convention. A clear consequence of this is the start of the 
conditionality clause: and the possibility of suspending aid to ACP countries in cases 
of grave violation of agreed values and principles.  
The emphasis on human rights and the use of conditionality set the basis for the rebirth 
of the discourse of “bringing peace to Africa”. Lomè IV served as a framework for the 
EU to focus more directly on the issue of peacebuilding in Africa. 
 It is not accidental that also in 1995 the EU Council adopted the Conclusion on 
Preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa,  which explains 
the role of the EU in taking part in Development Cooperation with the objective to 
strengthen peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution. Following this 
conclusion the  EC published the communication to the Council “The European Union 
and the Issue of the Conflicts in Africa: Peacebuilding, Conflict prevention and 
Beyond” in which we read the moral justification of the EU’s intervention in 
peacebuilding: 
The European Union is heavily concerned by the issue of conflicts in 
Africa. This is not only because the international discussion necessitates an 
adequate response of the Union, not merely because of the moral 
obligation to reduce human suffering, nor simply the obligation to use its 
resources in the most meaningful way. For the European Union, the 
existence of violent conflicts in Africa is increasingly challenging the 
achievement of its declared policy goals. Fostering peace, stability, 
democracy and human rights under the conditions of conflicts is a nearly 
impossible task. 
(EC, 1996. Emphasis added) 
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Here we can see that the EU’s concern about conflicts in Africa is justified by a moral 
obligation. It seems that it is again the white man’s burden that is imposing on the EU 
an obligation to take action after two decades of pause.  The EU is called again to act 
as a peace ambassador due to its messianic duty. 
The growing interest in African conflicts started being institutionalised in the Cotonou 
Agreement that followed the Lomè Conventions. Vanished the fear of being 
considered neo-colonial which meant excluding political involvement, in this broad 
agreement -a partnership between the EU and 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Countries (ACP) - politics is set at the centre of the EU-ACP relationship.  
Several scholars correctly argued that with the exception of their common colonial 
history, the ACP countries are very diverse geographical and cultural areas, kept 
together by the EU regime of foreign aid policies(see Haastrup, 2013: 792).  
Largely comprising the former colonies of France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK, 
the ACP group is considered by some to be a colonial construct. Beyond a shared 
history of colonialism, there is little that binds the group except for climate change and 
some aspects of development. Certainly, the peace and security challenges faced by 
Caribbean and Pacific countries are very different from those confronting Africa. 
Some EU member states, the Netherlands and Germany in particular, would like to see 
an overhaul of the ACP system. The coercive ability of the EU to bind together the 
ACP countries has been further explained by one of my interviewees who points:  
It is not a mystery that behind Cotonou there is France willingness to 
keep the old empire together. From Haiti to Vietnam and Gabon: what is 
the common trend if not having been part of the colonial empire? But we 
need this framework, as much anachronistic as it might seem, because it 
is our frame of action in the word.                                                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                          (Int. 1)       
In the Cotonou Agreement, peacebuilding assumed a fundamental role, being the first 
preoccupation of the political pillar – one of the 5 pillars that compose the Agreement. 
Poverty alleviation, aid concessions, solidarity, equality between ‘partners’, and 
European benevolence are reaffirmed, but after the Cotonou Agreement development 
was inevitably linked to peace.  
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An important component of the Cotonou Agreement is the so-called political dialogue 
focusing on issues of mutual concern and carried out by the parties in conformity with 
policies “to promote peace and to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts” (Art. 
8). Art. 11, dealing with peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution, 
obliges the parties to “pursue an active, comprehensive and integrated policy of peace-
building and conflict prevention and resolution within the framework of the 
Partnership” and stipulates that this policy “shall be based on the principle of 
ownership,” and provide support for “mediation, negotiation and reconciliation 
efforts.” Finally, “in situations of violent conflict, the Parties shall take all suitable 
action to prevent an intensification of violence, to limit its territorial spread, and to 
facilitate a peaceful settlement of the existing disputes” (Cotonou Agreement, 2000). 
The points raised in Cotonou were further underlined in the EU Council Conclusions 
on Security and Development of November 2007, which stipulated that the nexus 
between development and security should inform EU strategies and policies. The 
second revision of the Cotonou Agreement also recognised the interdependence 
between security and development, stating that without peace and security there can be 
no sustainable development. (see APF, 2013).  
The European Development Fund (EDF) that channels development assistance under 
the Cotonou Agreement started financing peace-related programs and from 2003 the 
EDF also finances the African Peace Facility (APF), which provides political backing 
and substantial funding to the African Union's and African Regional Economic 
Communities' efforts in the area of peace and security in three inter-linked priorities: 
Enhanced dialogue on challenges to peace and security, Operationalization of the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and Support to Peace Support 
Operations (PSOs) in Africa. (Ibid.) 
The Cotonou Agreement became the overall umbrella also for a comprehensive 
‘‘continent-to-continent’’ dialogue on peace and security. In 2000, the Cairo EU–
Africa Summit set in motion a structured EU-Africa political dialogue, which was 
reinforced by the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa, the first attempt to establish a single 
framework for continental engagement. These first steps were mainly characterized by 
unilateral European efforts to design a credible approach to African development and 
security challenges, without the effective involvement of African actors. This severely 
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undermined the pursuit of a frank and cooperative political dialogue, reaffirming a 
traditional and unequal donor-recipient relationship and fuelling African mistrust of 
proposed actions (Pirozzi, 2010).  
On the European side, addressing the instability of the African continent represented 
more and more a major concern for several reasons: instability could undermine trade 
and the economic relationship with the EU and also because of the fear of its possible 
repercussions in terms of illegal immigration,  arms trafficking, terrorism and 
organised crime.  
What followed, was a Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) which was launched at the 
Africa–EU Summit in Lisbon in 2007. This long-term strategic partnership set the 
comprehensive framework within which specific strategies had to be put in place, and 
the first objective (out of 4 areas) is peace and security.  The thematic partnership on 
“peace and security”, whose three top priorities are enhanced dialogue on peace and 
security challenges, operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA), and adequate funding for Africa-led peace support operations. 
The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) was billed as a ‘people-centred partnership’, and 
greeted with enthusiasm by civil society organisations. The JAES promoted the idea of 
moving the relationship between Africa and the European Union (EU) beyond a 
donor-recipient framework, towards long-term cooperation on jointly identified 
mutual and complementary interests
30
.  
                                                          
30
 The JEAS represent the final point of a discursive shift of language which moved from identifying 
Africa as dependent, to a progressive narrative of equality and partnership, to a final turn to the 
importance of African ownership of his peace processes. Even if the Yaoundé I convention recognized 
the Overseas Terriotories as equal to the EEC, many authors identified that this cooperation was 
considered as " rendez-vous between giver and receiver " (EEC, 1963: 9) where imbalance in discourses 
were still present in the power dynamics between the two parties.  If Yaoundè gave rise to narratives of 
‘sovereign equality’, from Lomè the focus is on the idea of “partnership”, Indeed, ‘the spirit of Lomé’ 
became shorthand for the normative dimensions of the Europe–Africa relationship, embedding norms of 
solidarity, equality, concern for ‘the poor’, and an equitable North–South partnership, in a way  to 
portray an egalitarian post-colonial partnership.  Despite the emphasis of ‘partnership’ there have long 
been those who have questioned this. Lomé was also seen to foster dependency through its claimed 
effects on African unity or prospects for pan-African regionalism. Shaw (1986) argued that the 
maintenance of ‘vertical’ ties to Europe inhibited the forging of ‘horizontal’ ones in Africa. Galtung 
supports this argument pinpointing the ‘structural imperialism’ of the Lomé regime, which, he argued, 
forced a regional (and unequal) division of labour through the preponderance of ‘vertical’ ties to Europe 
(Galtung 1976). Thus, while Lomé may have allowed the development of ‘local capitalism’, it could not 
be anything but a ‘trap’, diverting the ACP from their attempts to develop self-reliance (ibid).The 
Cotonou Agreements took the same emphasis of partnership that was in the Lomè Conventions. 
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While promoting the novelties of the Joint Strategy, the JAES explicitly mentions the 
power asymmetries of the previous conventions, and the idea of overcoming these and 
“to move away from a traditional relationship and forge a real partnership 
characterized by equality and the pursuit of common objectives” or “To promote more 
accurate images of each other, in place of those that are dominated by inherited 
negative stereotypes and that ignore the overwhelmingly positive developments on the 
two continents.” (JEAS, 2007) 
The JAES is based on principles of ownership, as well as partnership and solidarity. 
Since 2007 the principle of African ownership has started being presented as a way to 
overcome EU-Africa imbalance of power. Its main assumption is that it is primarily 
the responsibility of Africans themselves to handle their internal affairs, following the 
motto “African solutions to African problems31.” Local ownership is asserted on many 
occasions in the JEAS, even though it remains unclear what this shift entails exactly 
since the concept is never clearly defined. “EU support provided will apply the 
principle of African and local ownership and should follow African agendas” (JEAS, 
2007 art 32:8) “combining strong African ownership of programme design and 
implementation with provisions for strategic and political EU level involvement” 
(JEAS, 2007 art 33:8). 
What is clear, however, is that African ownership does not indicate a European 
disengagement from the African continent.  On the contrary, we have seen that the 
progressive idea of African ownership goes hand in hand with the previously 
underlined EU tendency of gaining more and more “control” on African political 
processes. Emblematic in this sense is the case of EU intervention in African conflict 
management.  
As Rutazibwa has also pointed to elsewhere (2015), the current EU position towards 
African peacebuilding seems riven in two apparently opposed trends: A progressive 
interference in all domestic African affairs that touched also the peace and conflict 
issue and a contemporary shift of terminologies (from parties to partnership, equality 
and sovereignty) that arrived to stress the importance of African ownership over their 
                                                          
31
 With this regard, it must anyways be noticed that the concept of African ownership is an old one, 
employed also in colonial time. For example, the Belgian ministry of Colonies in 1940 said “ Of course 
we consult with indigenous population and we let them decide about their own future. We know already 
that Belgium will win all its trials” (HAEU, PHS, 84:4) 
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own peace policies. In a similar vein, Rayroux and Wilén (2014) observed the 
following paradoxical development:  mounting intrusion in domestic African 
sovereignty in peace affairs was increasingly accompanied by firm declarations from 
the donors about the need for national ownership of peacebuilding programs and 
policies. The authors pinpoint that the EU is compelled to find a delicate equilibrium 
between promoting an “ill-defined concept of ownership while retaining direct 
involvement in Africa”. (Rayroux and Wilén 2014:24). Controversially, it seems that 
the principle of ownership, instead of promoting a disengagement, provides the EU 
with a renewed legitimacy to retain a strong role in the building of peace in Africa.  
 
3. Contextualising the Debate in the Broader EU-African Literature 
 
What we have seen so far in this chapter is the trajectory of the idea of bringing peace 
to Africa, from the collapse of the Empire to the present day. Throughout this duration 
of time, the EU and African Countries have failed to break the long-standing power 
asymmetry. This inherent tension has been reflected in the body of academic literature 
dealing with the relationship with Africa, the ACP, and the EU, and this thesis has 
already presented some of the prominent academic works that touch on the 
problematic dimensions of the relationship. Kotsopoulos and Mattheis (2018: 446) add 
to this asymmetry and important dimension. They reflect on the fact that the 
persistence of unevenness in EU-Africa relations is also reproduced at the level of 
scholarship. When looking at the literature on EU-Africa relations, there is indeed a 
relative underrepresentation of studies from Africa. With great and welcome 
exceptions, including works by Adebajo, Babarinde, and Oloruntoba among others, 
there is still a disproportion between the number of journal articles concerning EU-
Africa written by European and by Africa-based scholars; and this is even higher when 
we consider how much the African perspective is underrepresented in academic 
curricula and debates. With this premise in mind, it is also Kotsopoulos and Mattheis 
(2018: 446) who tried to provide a contextualisation for the study of relations between 
the European Union and Africa by identifying seven major trends and drivers that 
have characterised the literature surrounding the relationship: colonial legacy, 
meanings of partnership, asymmetry, market liberalisation, politicisation, regional 
actorness, and the changing global order. 
144 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, it has been explained that norms regarding Europe’s essential task and 
ethical responsibility to facilitate Africa’s peace have long been embedded in the 
relationship with Africa. Indeed, the chapter demonstrated how the discourse of 
bringing peace to Africa evolved over the course of history.  
It has been considered how the discourse changed gradually as an effect of European 
Integration and decolonisation leading to the image of “Europe the fair” with respect 
to Africa. 
Further, it has been examined how the EU progressively decided to pursue a policy of 
non-involvement in African politics, in order not to be considered neo-colonial and to 
pursue its objective of maintaining the economic relationship with Africa through 
development.  
Finally, the chapter shows how in the 1990s the notion of bringing peace to Africa 
regained space, and the EU recommenced involvement in African peace and security 
issues while at the same time supporting such interest through the same moral 
responsibility narrative. 
The fact that Europe’s moral responsibility for Africa was never put in question, and 
that the colonial discourse of bringing peace was never challenged by the Europeans, 
not even after decolonisation,  brings a relevant consideration for the thesis.  
Indeed, it shows that EU peacebuilding operates in a paradigm in which the European 
role has always been the one of carrying responsibility for African peace. Despite the 
different historical moments that allowed or not the intrusion into African conflict 
solutions, the ideologies for intervention –be it race, culture or ownership – 
reproduced constantly an asymmetric relationship.  
In the next chapter, we will see how this historical relationship relating to “bringing 
peace to Africa” provided a framework for the analysis of EU peacebuilding policies 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
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Chapter  Five 
 
 EU Peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
 
   
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, an overview was provided of how the European discourse of 
bringing peace to Africa developed from European integration, to show what has been 
the critical junctures in the creation of continuities and discontinuities. 
Considering the framework of EU-African agreements on peace and security, 
mentioned in the last chapter, in this chapter space is given to the explanation of EU 
peacebuilding instruments that are employed in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
This chapter is relevant in its provision of the context of the empirical analysis of the 
thesis that is rooted in the study of EU peacebuilding policymaking discourse towards 
DRC, with the intention to see how the colonial legacy is considered and if colonial 
discourses influence and shape EU peacebuilding policies. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first one introduces the concept of 
international peacebuilding, the second one focuses on the specific features of EU 
peacebuilding and the final one provides an overview of EU peacebuilding practices in 
DRC.  
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1. Defining Peacebuilding 
 
Peacebuilding is a fuzzy term per se. The word ‘peacebuilding’ does not have a  
translation in most languages other than English, despite it being a substantial area of 
policy and operations for a number of international actors. Thus, the notion of 
peacebuilding remains one that is notoriously difficult to pin down (see also Duke and 
Courtier, 2009) in terms of not only meaning but also differentiation from other 
similar and linked terms such as conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation, 
peace-making, and state-building etc. 
 
 As we saw in chapter one, peacebuilding is commonly understood as a broad range of 
activities to solidify peace in conflict-prone and post-conflict countries and avoid the 
relapse into violent wars (Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009). It implies the effort to 
render those countries in conformity with “the international system’s prevailing 
standards of domestic governance” (Paris, 2002: 638) which Oliver Richmond defined 
as democratisation, economic liberalisation, neoliberal development, human rights and 
the rule of law (2007).   
 
Some have argued that peacebuilding should address basic human needs, which when 
threatened can cause conflict: social stability, internal security, economic 
opportunities, a reasonable standard of living, and recognition of identity. Cockell 
(2000) adds that another common feature in peacebuilding is the emphasis on assisting 
societies in their capacity to resolve conflicts without violence.  
 
Civil society has become, indeed, the most common interlocutor of external 
peacebuilding support, with the accent often being on strengthening the role of civil 
society in the stable governance of the polity. This growing role led Chandler (2010) 
to consider that the civil society paradigm is the most silent feature of the liberal peace 
discourse. 
 
 As we have seen in the historical perspective of EU-Africa, it is also important to 
consider the link between peacebuilding and development. From a broad perspective, 
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peacebuilding ranges from prevention via crisis management to post-crisis activities. 
Within this spectrum, several concepts are discussed and instruments are applied.   
 
This explains the multiple dimensions of peacebuilding, that can take different forms: 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants into civilian 
society, (DDR) rebuilding governmental, economic and civil society institutions,  
strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local 
police, and judicial and penal reform); transitional justice and improving respect for 
human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing 
abuses that triggered conflict; providing technical assistance for democratic 
development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and 
promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques, as well as engagement in 
immediate post-conflict security needs. 
 
The current debate refers to the term “liberal peace” or “liberal peacebuilding” to 
name the dominant framework currently applied to post-Cold War policies and 
practices of post-conflict intervention. Indeed, it is argued that after the Cold-War a 
progressive alignment has been found towards what is considered in the literature as 
the “peacebuilding consensus” (Richmond, 2004). In chapter one we have broadly 
touched upon the academic debate around the concept of peacebuilding and its 
possible postcolonial interpretations. Building on the existing academic debates and 
definitions the scope of this section is to explain what the specific EU peacebuilding 
framework consists of.  
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2. The EU Peacebuilding Framework   
 
Whilst peacebuilding is central to EU external policy, it is not spelt out in a clear 
policy statement what this means. The absence of a peacebuilding strategy per se 
suggests that it is easiest to think of peacebuilding as a framework, since it links 
together different threads, from conflict prevention, crisis management, peacemaking 
and post-conflict stabilisation.  Moreover, the lack of definition also suggests that 
peacebuilding is still a matter of debate between European actors that focus on 
different aspects of peace but who have overlapping competencies in conflict 
resolution. 
According to Martinelli (2006,) conflict prevention and crisis management are key 
objectives in the EU’s search for international security, which is based on the 
assumption that development is conditioned by peace and stability and on the 
recognition that peace, security and development are inherently connected and 
compounded by the imperative of good governance.  The EU’s overall approach to 
peacebuilding rests on the key notions outlined by the United Nations in its various 
documents: An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992), the Millennium 
Development Goals (UN,2000), In larger freedom: towards development, security and 
human rights for all (UN, 2005) and the High Level Panel Report on Threats, 
Challenges, and Change (Annan, 2004). According to Björkdahl, Richmond and 
Kappler (2009), in this sense, the EU complies with the general promotion of the 
liberal peace through the application of these principles and a long term approach to 
building a peace that includes neoliberal aspects promoted by the International 
Financial Institutions.  
In addition, the EU emphasises the promotion of democracy, human rights and 
strengthening civil society through dialogue in the fulfilment of what has been 
commonly perceived as its civilian power (ibid.). Indeed, the current EU 
peacebuilding approach is the result of evolving policy practices and not of a 
preconceived general policy: the EU adopted a mosaic of documents on specific 
priorities that later were incorporated into EU activities (Natorski, 2011).  
This series of EU policy documents conceptualising the principles, objectives and 
methods of addressing peacebuilding demands, underpinned the development of many 
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policy tools employed under different conditions of conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding
32
. However, the EU approach differs from the UN approach to 
peacebuilding on a specific point: the EU has frequently depicted itself as a value-led 
power. Thus, it puts emphasis on being a moral actor that undertakes peacebuilding 
activities in order to promote its unique values in the world. Indeed, as we also noticed 
in the literature review on EU Studies, there is a strong ideational dimension in EU 
foreign policy, both self-proclaimed and postulated in academic circles. This has been 
evident in the discursive emphasis to promote its missions, as shown above, but also in 
the practices in the ground. Dorly Castañeda-Lefevre (2012) in this sense considers the 
differences between EU and US’peacebuilding programmes in Colombia, stating that 
in the creation of its ‘Peace Laboratories’ the EU is able to able to propose an original 
approach to peace-building based on security, development, and democracy. 
Peacebuilding as such is the perfect ground in which the EU can promote “its 
values”33.  In chapter one, we identified a moral attitude in the EU’s international 
relations, which was encapsulated by scholars in concepts such as civilian 
power/normative power/ethical power Europe, among others. 
This ideational dimension, a “values-inspired philosophy” (Richmond et al., 2011: 
456-7), clearly dictates its relations with the rest of the world – a phenomenon that 
Carl Bildt has named the “European conscience”.  According to this notion, the Union 
is morally compelled to defend its values whenever they are compromised and 
especially in cases of large-scale human rights violations (Bildt, 2008: 48).  
The idea of  EU as “a community of values” (ibid.) has been explained in the first 
chapter, where it has also been shown that some scholars have started to link the 
                                                          
32
 The main legal framework for those policy documents are the Communication on Conflict Prevention 
(European Commission 2001) and the EU Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conflicts or so-
called “Gothenburg Programme”32 (Council of the European Union 2001) and recently Joint 
communication  on “The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crisis” (JOIN, 2013). 
In addition to these general policy guidelines, the EU also adopted a whole series of specific policy 
documents guiding its peacebuilding-related policies: electoral assistance and observation; governance 
and state institutions; children and gender issues in the context of conflicts; Small Arms and Light 
Weapons; Security Sector Reform; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; state fragility; 
security-development nexus; and mediation. (see Natorski, 2011) 
 
33 EU Values are defined by the Treaty of the EU as “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities” (TEU, 2012:17). As former Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn has put it, 
“Geography sets the frame, but fundamentally it is values that make the borders of Europe” (2005: 2). 
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civilian/normative/ethical dimensions of the EU’s identity with the civilising ethos of 
the European colonialism.   
With this regard, in the previous chapter, the example of the genealogy of the 
discourse of bringing peace to Africa has been provided, showing that the EU’s 
interest for conflict resolution in the African continent came from the uncontested 
discourse of colonialism, that has never been put into question even after 
decolonisation.  Here we can see how EU peacebuilding documents still contain moral 
discourses on the supremacy of European values in the international sphere as a basis 
that legitimised interventions. 
Documents about EU peacebuilding reveal a value-based thread through the discursive 
representations of the EU’s involvement in external actions.  
Indeed, to respond to the ambition of being a peace project and a “force for good” 
(Solana, 2003), the European Commission and Council developed a multitude of 
approaches and instruments in which we can see the ideational dimension. The incipit 
of the document on Conflict Prevention (2001) for example, gives space to the myth of 
European peaceful integration able to diffuse its peace model abroad: 
The EU is in itself a peace project and a supremely successful one. It has 
underpinned the reconciliation and peaceful development of Western 
Europe over the last half-century, helping to consolidate democracy and to 
assure prosperity. Through the process of enlargement, through the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, through its development co-
operation and its external assistance programmes, the EU now seeks to 
project stability also beyond its own borders.                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                 (EC, 2001:5) 
The strength and attraction of the EU model evidenced by the on-going 
enlargement process. In offering the prospect of European integration, the 
EU has already helped the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in their 
struggle to become stable democracies and functioning market economies. 
This has been a driving force to move from division to unity.                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                 (EC, 2001:7) 
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Those are the years of the normative power Europe instilled in the process of 
enlargement and in the EU involvement in the Kosovo war as a way to “extend this 
community of peace” (EC, 2001: annex).  In a similar vein, the EU Programme on the 
Prevention of Violent Conflicts puts emphasis on the “moral responsibility” of EU 
success, to prevent conflicts by spreading its values: 
The international community has a political and moral responsibility to act 
to avoid the human suffering and the destruction of resources caused by 
violent conflicts.  The  European Union is a successful example of conflict 
prevention, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, 
justice and solidarity, economic prosperity and sustainable development. 
The  process  of  enlargement  will  extend  this  community  of  peace  and  
progress  to  a  wider circle of European states;   and, 
 In line with the fundamental values of the EU, the highest political priority 
will be given to improving the effectiveness and coherence of its external 
action in the field of conflict prevention.                                                                                                                                   
                                                        (Council,2001:2. Emphasis added) 
As discussed in chapter one, the EU progressively moved away from depicting itself 
as a normative power to a more realistic approach. This is mirrored by a decline of 
emphasis on values and a more pragmatic orientation to the peacebuilding issue.  
A decade after the Communication from The Commission on Conflict Prevention 
(European Commission 2001), the EU revived its commitment to peacebuilding and 
conflict prevention through a series of policies like the Council Conclusions on 
Conflict Prevention and the Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises. 
Those documents are an example of this shift of the EU foreign policy.  
The EU has a vital interest to prevent, prepare for, respond to, address and 
help recovery from conflicts, crises and other security threats outside its 
borders – this is a permanent task and responsibility, already recognised in 
both the European Security Strategy and the EU Internal Security Strategy. 
This is the case not only because the EU is widely considered as an 
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example of peace and stability in its neighbourhood and in other parts of 
the world, but also because it is in the EU's global interest. 
(EC, 2013) 
Here it is clear that the EU still talks about its permanent task and responsibility to 
prevent conflicts, and still portrays itself as an “example of peace”. However, together 
with the normative discourse, there is also a more pragmatic discourse that emerges, 
related to the “EU vital interest to prevent” and the “EU’s global interest”.  
This pragmatic turn was followed by the concept of “principled pragmatism” 
announced in the EU Global Strategy on the European Union's Foreign And Security 
Policy (EUGS, 2016), and that has been widely considered in the first chapter.  
Here it is worth noticing that the EU peacebuilding practices changed according to the 
changing discourse: large-scale military interventions and initiatives undertaken over 
the past decade in theatres as diverse as Afghanistan, Bosnia and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo gave way to more long-term post-conflict reconstruction and a 
comprehensive approach that attempts to align civil and military instruments.  
 However, the pragmatic turn and the rescaling of ambition in peacebuilding practices, 
does not mean that the EU is giving up on the idea of having its “own values” and to 
be willing to normatively spread those in peacebuilding policies.  The EUGS 
represents more an admission of EU’s limits in shaping the outside world based on its 
normative principles, rather than a rethinking of the principles itself (see EUGS, 
2016).   
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3. EU Peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
In this part of the chapter, the EU Peacebuilding framework in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo will be analysed. Moving from the general framework of the EU 
involvement in peace and conflict in Africa that was underlined in the previous 
chapter, and having also explained what EU peacebuilding consists of and what its 
normative underpinning is, the thesis now turns to the specific case study.  
Before going into details about the technical aspects of EU Peacebuilding in DRC, a 
brief historical overview of the “peace narrative” in Belgian Congo is provided.  
This will frame the study of EU involvement in conflict resolution in DRC, which is 
the objective of the last section of this Chapter. 
 
3.1 Brief History of Pacifying the Congo  
 
     i. Peace Narrative in Belgian Congo 
It was not until 1867 that the Congo was explored by Europeans. Setting out from 
Zanzibar, Henry Morton Stanley, a British-born American journalist took a wide 
detour overland until the Congo estuary. During his well-known “voyage” in the 
Congo, Stanley was sending dispatches to the Daily Telegraph, in which he expressed 
“the enthusiastic energy with which we rushed through the lands of the cannibals” 
(The Telegraph, 1874: 215)
.
   
 
Indeed, Europeans got to know the Congo by Stanley’s dispatches in which he gave an 
idea of Africans as cannibals, violent, warlike savages, totally opposed to his attitude 
as clever and rational peace-searcher: 
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The savages seemed to think that we had no resource left but to surrender 
and be eaten at their leisure. Again and again, were we compelled to 
repulse the furious charges that they made to drive us over the Falls; or, 
 
Down the natives came, fast and furious, but in magnificent style […] 
We had, however, no time even to breathe a short prayer or to think of 
indulging in a sentimental farewell to the murderous cannibalistic world 
in which we found ourselves. The enemy, in full confidence of victory, 
was on us, and the big monster as it shot past us launched a spear – the 
first. We waited no longer; they had clearly come to fight. The cruel 
faces, the loudly triumphant drums, the deafening horns, the launched 
spear, the swaying bodies, all proved it; and every gun in our little fleet 
angrily gave a response to our foes. 
                                                 (The Telegraph, 1877. Emphasis added) 
 
 
 
 Figure 2.  Stanley in Africa.  Source: The Daily Telegraph 
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The picture of the dark violent continent circulated around Europe and it was 
emphasised in writings, illustration (see Figure 2), poems and journals. This depiction 
of the dark Congo was complemented by the narrative of Stanley’s peaceful goals. 
Such narratives were very powerful and soon spread even outside European borders. 
For example, in an article of the South Australian Weekly Chronicle, we read: 
“Stanley’s business on the Congo was “to peacefully conquer and subdue 
it [the Congo], to remould it in harmony with modern ideas into national 
states, within whose limits the European merchant shall go hand in hand 
with the dark  African trader, and justice and law and order shall prevail, 
and murder and lawlessness and the cruel barter of slaves shall forever 
cease”. 
                          (South Australian Weekly Chronicle, 1885. Emphasis added) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Extract of an 
article about Congo on 
Stanley’s peaceful conquest. 
Source: South Australian 
Weekly Chronicle, 1885.  
  
Stanley was glorified across Europe, and once back from Africa, his aspirations of 
commercial exploitation of Africa, in the goal of "pour the civilisation of Europe into 
the barbarism of Africa" (Stanley, [1909], 2011: 333) met with the desire of King 
Leopold II of Belgium whose ambition was to have a colony for his country.  
Through a series of bilateral treaties at the time of the Berlin Conference (1884 – 85), 
the United States, Germany, Britain, and other powers recognized Leopold’s control of 
the Congo Free State –(État Indépendant du Congo).  
Recognition led to occupation and exploitation. The result was a notorious abusive, 
violent regime
34
 fuelled by redundant propaganda. In this sense, Mattew Stanard 
                                                          
34 Literature on violence in the Congo Free State is extensive. For an introduction, see Slade, R. M. (1962). 
King Leopold's Congo. Oxford University Press; Slade, R. M. (1962). King Leopold's Congo: Aspects of the 
development of race relations in the Congo Independent State. New York, Oxford UP;  Roes, A. (2010). Towards 
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explains clearly that King Leopold II managed to maintain his domain in Congo 
thanks to a rigid separation from colony to metropole: from one side he was pursuing a 
massacre in order to pillage the Congo and reap maximum profit for the metropole and 
on the other hand he was spreading propaganda of his humanist crusade in Congo with 
the intent of suffocating the voices about his cruelties that started to be raised around 
Europe
35
.  
And in this propaganda, the narrative of “bringing peace” was one of the most 
persistent. The International African Association, then the International Association of 
the Congo were two scientific and philanthropic associations used to justify the 
ambitions in the Congo by Leopold II before the creation of the Congo Free State.  
In their declarations we can see that peace and development objectives were justifying 
colonial ambitions: to suppress the slave trade in Equatorial Africa, to unite the native 
tribes, to modernize the peoples of the Congo River, to bring morality and an 
understanding of sin to the natives and to advance the economy of the region (see 
Stanard, 2012).  
For example, one of the main themes that Leopold II used is the fight against the 
“Arab enslavement”. From 1888, Leopold II launched a call to bring peace to the 
Congo, by freeing the area from the Arab slave traders. This humanitarian pledge was 
brought to the Berlin Conference to end slavery (Edgerton, 2002).  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
a history of mass violence in the Etat Indépendant du Congo, 1885–1908. South African Historical Journal, 
62(4), 634-670; Viaene, V (2008) "King Leopold's Imperialism and the Origins of the Belgian Colonial Party, 
1860–1905”In The Journal of Modern History. 80:4, 741-790 
 
35 This separation from Belgium to Congo remained a dominant feature in the colonial setting. For example 
Belgians refused entreaties from their allies to use Congolese troops on other fronts because of long-
standing fears that exposing Africans to outside elements would weaken colonial control. Belgian had a 
desperate fear, lasting into the 1950s, that travel to Europe would undermine white prestige by bringing 
Congolese into contact with poor or less educated whites, or introduce Africans to dangerous ideas such as 
communism (Fogarty and Jarboe, 2014:31) 
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The war against the Swahili-Arab economic and political power was presented as a 
Christian anti-slavery crusade to bring peace to the people.  The Congo Arab war, 
fought between 1892 and 1894, gave a strong ideological benefit to the Belgian 
colonisation: it transformed the fight for Congo into a sacred and moral obligation of 
King Leopold.  
This passage has been widely shown by the exhibition “Notre Congo/Onze Kongo” 
about Belgian propaganda in Congo, that took place from the 23
rd
 September to the 
17
th
 December 2016 in Brussels. In the exhibition, the Belgian propaganda in Congo 
and the main ideological underpinnings of the propaganda are demonstrated.  
By the turn of the 20th century, however, the violence used against the Congolese and 
a ruthless system of economic exploitation provoked international pressure on the 
Belgian government that led them to the decision to take official control of the 
country, moving the Congo from being a personal possession of the King to becoming 
the “Belgian Congo” in 1908.  
Belgium administered the Congo as a colony until independence in 1960.  In Figure 4 
we see how a newspaper of the time explains that the Colonial Exhibition in Brussels 
in 1910 was considered a way of promoting colonisation for peace and by means of 
customs, sanctioned by Christian morals.  
One of the main narratives that come with this historical period is the one that shows 
that the Belgian government had to take over the colony, as “reluctant imperialist” (see 
Fogarty & Jarboe, 2014).  In an editorial of the journal Round Table, dated 1960, we 
read “Belgium was a reluctant colonizer, taking over the Congo from Leopold II's 
personal rule in 1908 only when it became inevitable” (1960: 39). 
Figure 4. Leopold II peace 
propaganda on Congo. 
Source: Clarence and 
Richmond Examiner, 1910. 
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This augmented the perception of Belgians as positive, benevolent masters, who had to 
intervene in the Congo to save it, and therefore were never interested in being a 
colonial power. This is in part due to the atrocities committed by Leopold II but 
mostly formed through the steady diffusion of propaganda. Stanard (2012) argued 
against the long-held belief that Belgians were merely reluctant imperialists and 
demonstrates that in fact many Belgians readily embraced imperialistic propaganda. 
Indeed, if we take a closer look at the discourses of the epoch, we see that there is not 
such a profound separation from the narrative during Leopold rule and the one 
sustained by Belgian’s administration in Congo.  
As Bobineau also wrote, the emphasis on the humanitarian aspect reached its height 
shortly after the death of Leopold II and in the 1910s Belgian historians gradually 
began to glorify the deceased king in order to justify the purchase of the colony prior 
to the first stirrings of anti-colonial sentiment in Belgium. Similarly, in Belgian 
schools, the image of the imperial, but benevolent philanthropist, who had brought 
civilisation to the Congo, was imparted (De Heusch 2002: 19). This image fulfilled its 
purpose as it led to the positive conservation of the image of Leopold II, especially by 
the Belgian state. (Bobineau, 2017)  
It is important to note here that the civilising ethos was present during the different 
phases of colonisation, while at the same time,  there has never been a regret 
communicated for the violence in the Congo Free State period.
36
 While Belgians 
continued glorifying Leopold II, the international blame for Belgians crimes in Congo 
decreased sharply from WWI. Indeed, the massacre of the war and the “Rape of 
                                                          
36
 We can see that even in the late 1940, there was a consideration of Leopold II as a hero, and a 
continuity rather than a discontinuity between the two colonial periods. Indeed, Alber De 
Vleeschauwer, Belgian Minister of Colonies, declared to the BBC that: 
“It might be interesting for you to know how this immense African territory become Belgian and how 
Belgium executed his civilizing task (oeuvre civilisatrice) and what are the results of around seventy 
years of occupation. We owe our Congo to the Genius of our great King Leopold II. The great King 
found the occasion to realize his goal already explicated in 1862: finding for Belgium in this unknown 
region a population to civilize, to conduct to the progress in all possible way, to give to all Belgium the 
chance to prove that we also are a colonizing country. […] The envoys of Leopold II penetrate into 
Africa, sign treaties with the native chiefs, occupy and pacify the regions. Indeed, he [Leopold II] 
completely pacified the country, sometimes recurring to arms: especially against the slave driver Arabs, 
the Madhists, and others. The Belgian military leaders who led these last campaigns for civilization 
have not all died. What a men, what a heroes! For us, to colonize it is to serve, it is to civilize. We do 
not regard the Colony as a private property in which the owner can do what he wants following his 
interests. Colonization means for us "burden of souls": to lead these peoples to every sort of progress.” 
(HAEU, PHS-83: 1-2 author’s own translation)  
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Belgium” transformed the people associated with Leopold II's atrocities into victims – 
even saviours of civilisation (Fogarty and Jarboe, 2014).  
The barbarities suffered by Belgians eclipsed Leopold's violent legacy in central 
Africa. Belgians were, therefore, portraying themselves as the small innocent state 
only defending itself with peaceful intentions. The unintended consequences of the 
civilising mission in Africa, even the deaths of Africans, paled in comparison to the 
wicked destruction of Louvain and the torture and killing of European women and 
children. For more than four years the Rape of Belgium was on-going and close to the 
rest of Europe, making the loss of African life at the hands of Leopold's agents seem 
very far away, in both time and space. as a legitimate practitioner of the civilising 
mission (ibid).  
However, the “violent Belgian domination” did not stop with Leopold II.  For 
example, in 1918, a decree promoted heavy sanctions for “any disrespectful act or 
word committed or uttered towards a European agent of public authority in his 
presence” (Young, 1994: 252).  
Frequently, public forces were “pacifying areas” during Congolese revolts. This was 
the case in relation to the Sankuru revolt in 1920– 21 and in the suppression of a 
Pende revolt in Kwilu in 1931 when Belgians killed more than 400 people. (Fogarty 
and Jarboe, 2014).  
Justified by benevolent means, a whole system of segregation was maintained until 
decolonisation: Congolese were denied the right of land ownership, were unauthorized 
to be present in European quarters in the evening, nor view any films not approved by 
a rigorous censor. Print media were also subject to careful control (ibid.). Not only the 
segregation worked to separate while colonizer by black colonized, but colonisation 
also changed the social patterns of pre-colonial Congo in many ways.  Mortnesen 
(2013) argued that the legitimacy of traditional leadership was seriously undermined 
as the appointment of chiefs by the colonial power eradicated the mandate of the 
ancestral line linking the clan chief to past leaders. This created tensions with no 
conflict resolution mechanisms for solving them, because the clan chief no longer held 
the mandate of authority.  Second, colonialism separated the public and the private 
sphere. The majority of properties came to be held by the colonial power, with only 
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some redistributed privately in contracts. The end of the communal property decreased 
the legitimacy of local authorities.  Moreover, the growth of private property and the 
access to favours of the colonisers led to the growth of inequality in power: regional 
leaders accumulated more wealth and began to rule over those who did not have 
access to land or to the favours of the colonisers. 
The severe gap between society and the state was felt in all areas – politically, 
socially, historically and ethnically – and caused friction requiring the use of great 
amounts of violence by the state to enforce its dominance in order to force the people 
to work involuntarily, to insert a new illegitimate leadership, while not wasting money 
on health care and acceptable work condition. (Mortnesen, 2013) 
From the end of the Second World War until the late 1950s, a more violent system of 
domination was substituted to the prevalence of a system that was called the "Pax 
Belgica": a system of maintaining the imperial peace in Congo by a mix of 
paternalism and violence (see CEC, 2003: 39) Belgians hesitated in opening up the old 
system of ancient paternalism, even when – after the WWII - growing discontent was 
spreading in the African continent and touched the Congo. The colonial government 
continued to pursue its old policy of “civilizing by strictly limited stages” (The Round 
Table, 1960). For instance, no high education was guaranteed to Congolese, and only 
basic education was admitted for the Congolese, in order to maintain a dominated 
country that had no pretentions of ambitions or (see Yates, 1981) 
The comprehensive paternalism of colonial state ideology is well reflected in a I946 
memorandum by the copper mining corporation, Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga: 
 The coloniser must never lose sight of the fact that the Negroes have the 
souls of children, souls which mould themselves to the methods of the 
educator; they watch, listen, feel and imitate. The Europeans must, in all 
circumstances, show himself as chief without weakness, good-willed 
without familiarity, active in method and especially just in the punishment 
of misbehaviour, as in the reward of the good deed.                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                              (Mouttoulle, 1946) 
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Figure 5. Cover of the memorandum ‘Politique Sociale de 
L’Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga pour sa Main-d’œuvre 
Indigene’(Mouttoulle, 1946) 
 
 
 
Belgian propaganda successfully produced a vision of the Congolese as primitive, 
violent and war-torn, while the Belgians simultaneously defined themselves as 
advanced, peaceable, and rational. Indeed, the civilising effort (mainly undertaken by 
the Christian missions) went hand in hand with the colonial private and public 
exploitation of Congolese resources.  
Another important characteristic of Belgian domination was the peculiar colonial 
power structure, that resulted in an alliance of state, church, and large corporations. 
This trinity was “not only a virtually seamless web”, writes Crawford Young, “but 
each component, in its area of activity, was without peer in Africa in the magnitude of 
its impact” (2015: 10).  
This close interconnection between economic development and civilizing mission 
remained a constant feature until independence. It is in this context that the Governor-
General, Pierre Ryckmans, expressing the paternalistic ideology underpinning colonial 
policy used the expression dominate to serve (“dominer pour servir”) 
(Vanderlinden,1994 and CEC, 2003).  
The Pax Belgica composed of paternalism and violence remained the driving policy in 
Congo and colonialists paid no or very little attention to the full emancipation of the 
Congolese. In an article of The Time we can see the description of such paternalistic 
colonisation: 
In the Congo, paternalism means bread but no votes, good government 
but no opposition; the best Negro housing in Africa but no real freedom 
of movement. "The emphasis is on economics," says Governor Pétillon. 
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"The fascination of becoming a skilled worker handling precision 
machinery drives out of the Negro's mind the need for politics. 
                                                                              (The Time, 1955) 
The propagation of a feeling of control and legitimacy seems to have worked such that 
Van Bilsen’s 1955 proposal for the emancipation of the Congo within thirty years 
became a scandal, many considering the time frame utterly unrealistic (Stanard, 
2011:62). Indeed, giving the independence to Congo was often see in the Belgian 
propaganda as a way of abandoning the Congolese to their fate. For instance, in 1960 
the journal Round Table, published an article with the title “The Congolese Vacuum: 
Independence in a Hurry”, stressing that the rushed decolonisation was going to 
constitute a problem for the Congolese, not being ready to self-governing themselves. 
In the article we read:  
The decision [to give independence to Congo] was a gamble in which the 
determination to avoid an Algerian situation and to retain African goodwill, 
and to preserve investments, seems to have outweighed the need to provide the 
territory with at least some educated local men in the higher branches of the 
administration and in essential services. The assumption that the Congolese 
would be content, after independence, to let Belgians stay in all the top posts 
was both a grave misunderstanding of the nature of African nationalism and a 
hopeful over-estimate of the maturity of the Congolese political leaders. The 
gamble was a failure. (1960: 43) 
Indeed, Belgians were not ready to let the Congo go. Only two years before the 
independence, Belgium hosted the Brussels World’s Fair. Here, Belgian displayed a 
Congolese village as the world’s last “human zoo” (see Lagae 2007). 
 The Belgian Congo section’s village indigène continued a long practice of 
dehumanizing Africans at universal exhibitions by displaying them in a ‘primitive’ 
state to be observed by fair visitors.  Belgians buttressed a racialised and primitive 
image of Congolese, believing that it would have helped to legitimise their presence in 
the country for a long time. Presenting them as backwards and uncivilised, fencing the 
around 500 Congolese within the palisade of the fake-village, the Belgians wanted to 
163 
 
show that there was still place for their civilising mission on the African soil. And 
ultimately, for their role in maintaining the peace in the “dark continent”. 
Even in the aftermath of independence, it seems that peace arguments are still vivid in 
the idea of Belgian intervention in the Congo. For example, in this excerpt found in 
the JFK Archives about the political crisis in the country after the independence we 
read: 
[…] the intervention of the Belgian metropolitan troops was justified by 
the total inability of Congolese authorities to ensure respect of 
fundamental rules which must be observed in any civilized community and 
by the Belgian Government’s sacred duty to take measures required by 
morality and by public international law.
37
 
                                                         (JFK Archives: JFKPOF-114-015) 
Belgian Army’s intervention in 1961, at the very early start of what has been defined 
as the Congo Crisis (1960-1965) was justified by their “sacred duty”. Even after 
decolonisation, Belgians felt morally responsible to act for the Congolese, to allow the 
respect of moral principles and fundamental rules whose Congolese were not 
considered as capable of. 
Since the independence of Congo, Belgium has not significantly reflected on their role 
as and memory of being a coloniser, causing some scholars to talk about a “taboo” 
(Van den Braembussche, 2002). Bonineau (2017) building upon the theoretical 
framework of the Flemish historian Antoon Van den Braembussche (2002), 
considered four different strategies that Belgians used to cope with the trauma of 
losing the Congo and to avoid dealing with the colonial memory: 
 1. An ideological falsification of history, based on a distortion and denial of historical 
facts by official institutions or by the representation of some facts as a fictional 
invention of opponents.  In extreme cases, this strategy led to history-distorting 
consequences in the collective remembrance and also in academic publications. 
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 Congo: Analytical chronology, 25 January 1961, available at https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-
Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-114-015.aspx 
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 2. A cognitive strategy, which is based on a new interpretation of incriminating 
historical facts, that are constituted by a  discrepancy between the current identity and 
historical knowledge  
3.  The subconscious repression strategy and simultaneous rejection of historical facts, 
of which each is based on collective fears and thus may negatively affect a possible 
identity formation. 
4. A mythical strategy, where historical facts are transformed into a myth, an identity-
forming, emotionally charged and only partially verifiable narrative of the past. 
 
ii. European Take Over 
Prior to Congolese independence, the newly integrated Europe started a series of 
negotiations to establish a relationship with the Congo.  
In December 1956, the Belgian Delegation to the Val Duchesse negotiations drafted a 
note outlining the position of the Belgian Congo and Rwanda-Urundi regarding the 
possibility of the overseas countries and territories participating in the future European 
Economic Community (CVCE, 2018)
38
.   
In this negotiation, of course, Congo did not have a say, and Belgians decided their 
accession to the EEC without consulting Congolese’s opinions.  
After the Treaty of Rome, dialogues started on how to maintain economic linkages 
with the Congo in view of creating plausible independence from Belgium.  
In a conference in 1959 (figure 6) on Congolese economic development in the 
framework of the European Common Market,  it is possible to retrace the main 
discourses that emerged in the previous section about the genealogy of the 
EEC/African relationship. It is, indeed, possible to retrace a presence of the Eurafrican 
ideology, an emphasis on the importance of preserving Congolese peace and 
development with European direct support to Congo and the indirect backing of 
Belgian rules in the colony.  
                                                          
38
 Full document accessible at: 
https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/note_on_the_belgian_congo_and_the_proposal_for_a_european_com
mon_market_brussels_december_1956-en-7132f3d0-649e-45df-80f5-bcfcafd8d2d9.html 
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For instance, we can read that: 
“It is a solidarity pact the one that was enacted by signing the Congo’s 
Association agreement to the European Economic Community. So far, 
those who work for Congo’s economics and social improvement will find 
associates not only in Belgium but also in the other countries of the EEC.” 
or 
 “This confrontation is fundamental as the EEC is entering in its first phase 
of activity in Africa. Relationship of Europe with the young African 
population is one of the biggest problems nowadays, and we will not save 
any effort in order to develop all the young African states in peace and 
prosperity and in order to establish solidarity in Eurafrican relationships”. 
                                                    (HAEU, LECE-3016: 45-49 author’s own translation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In these early years of European Integration, in concomitance with the last years of 
colonial Congo, the EEC found itself in the position of justifying colonialism in the 
DRC several times. For example, in one extract of the Assembly of the Western 
European Union we read: 
Figure 6. Book cover of the “Journèe d’Etude” of 
Congo’s economic development in ECC common 
market. Source: HAEU LECE-3016: 45-49. 
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The difficulty of the situation is increased in that the West finds itself in 
the unbelievable position of having to justify itself. Under accusation 
from all sides, it is forced to retreat and, its opponents not being satisfied 
with this, it is pursued in the hope that it will beg for mercy. France has 
Algeria, Belgium the Congo, the Federal Republic of Germany Berlin 
and the United States have Cuba as well as their coloured population. 
Soon everything inherited from the past will be criminal; the West will 
no longer have to seek a raison d'etre, it will no longer exist.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                     (AEI, 1961) 
After decolonisation, the EEC was first and foremost worried about the possible loss 
of economic interests in DRC, especially in the area of Katanga
39
. As Young explicitly 
declared, Europeans were indeed perfectly content with their business in Congo under 
Belgian management and started being afraid of Lumumba nationalism and the 
socialist position as a potential threat to European interests in the country. Young 
considers that these were the major causes that brought European countries not to 
support the new-elected president and to encourage the fragmentation of the newly 
independent government. (Young, 1994: 252). 
A Parliamentary Commission of 2001 declared that the Belgian government was 
morally responsible for the circumstances leading to the death of Lumumba, and stated 
that: 
It was hard for the government to justify a laissez-faire attitude regarding 
the tens of thousands of Europeans in the Congo and it was also worried 
about the financial and economic losses the Congo crisis could cause. The 
stakes were high for the European financial groups in the Congo. 
                                              (Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry, 2001)   
After the assassination of Lumumba, the EEC decided to prioritise its economic 
interests in Congo and to maintain an apparent apolitical approach,  despite evident 
political pressure in the country due to Mobutu’s coup d'état and the assumption of 
personal control of the country.  
                                                          
39
 For an analysis on the European interests in Congo in the time of decolonisation see: Kent, 2015 
& 2017 and O'Malley, 2018. 
167 
 
Indeed, the European approach to Congo was following the general approach 
explained in the previous chapter: With the idea of not being mistaken for a neo-
colonial actor, the moral responsibility of the EEC towards Congo was projected in the 
economic sphere of development, limiting itself to assistance and development 
programs, while not interfering in the internal affairs of the country.  
As it has been explained in the previous chapter, non-interference did not mean a 
whole rethink of the importance of Congolese’s self-determination.   
 Even in the technical jargon of the EDF that followed in the decades after the 
independence, the rhetoric of moral duty to help Congolese, their incapacity and 
backwardness was part of the lexicon, and of the justification of development policies. 
Moreover, many architects of such development plans were former Belgian Ministers 
of Colonies employed in the new DG VIII, the development department inside the EC. 
 Exemplary in this sense was the influence of the former Minister of colonies, Pierre 
Wigny, who sensibly contributed to the creation of the ECC and in particular to the 
construction of development plans in DRC (see HAEU, INT 095). In this sense, the 
research done by Veronique Dimier on the “recycling” of French colonial ministers in 
DG VIII could be applied also to the Congolese case.  
 
3.2. The EU’s Involvement in Conflict Resolution  in the Democratic Repubic of 
Congo 
As it has been explained in the previous chapter, when referring to the EU-Africa 
relationship, the EU’s interest in African peace and conflict began to regain 
importance at the end of the 1980s. 
Peace and conflict turn into the centre of interest with the tragedy of Rwanda and the 
accelerator of the bloody ‘war of liberation’ (1996-1997) and the ‘Congo War’ (1998-
2002) that ravaged the Democratic Republic of Congo
40
.  
                                                          
40
 The Congo  crises  are  rooted  in  a  complex  interplay  of  local,  national  and  regional dynamics.   
Centuries of exploitation and colonialism, followed by decades of patrimonial    rule    and    economic    
mismanagement caused a deep political crisis and the near collapse of the Mobutu regime. In the eastern 
parts of the country, unresolved local issues of citizenship and land access added additional layers to the 
crisis and  triggered  a  first  round  of  armed  mobilisation.  A  mass  exodus  into  the  DRC  (then 
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It is in these circumstances that the EU started associating the discourse of peace and 
human rights to that of development. In that period, the two trends indicated in the 
previous chapter are merged: a progressive interference in the DRC peace issue and a 
contemporary affirmation of the importance of its ownership of peace decisions.  
Since then, the EU has strived to pursue a comprehensive approach to the crisis in the 
DRC and has tried to be a dominant peace and security agent in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. (see Autesserre, 2010; Davis, 2015; Eriksen, 2009;  Froitzheim, 
Söderbaum & Taylor, 2011; Gegout, 2005; Hoebeke, Carette, & Vlassenroot, 2007; 
Martin, 2007;  Youngs, 2006). 
In DRC, all EU’s crisis management and conflict prevention instruments have been 
engaged at one time or another. This has made some observers consider that the DRC 
has proven something of a test case for the EU development of peacebuilding 
instruments and that this conflict has become ‘a laboratory for EU crisis management’ 
(Knutsen, 2009: 456). 
Indeed, the EU deployed a multiplicity of civilian capabilities and tested its new 
military dimension of the evolving European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).  
This combination of civilian and military approach, allowed the EU to maintain the 
discourse of ‘civilian power’, permitting the EU to present these new capabilities as a 
‘holistic’ approach to security. In DRC, the EU wanted to show its equilibrium 
between the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ components of the embryonic European security policy 
(Rathje, 2007) and using its outcome as ‘lessons learnt’ in the field of crisis 
management and post-conflict peacebuilding, that would have allowed the EU to 
improve its action (ibid.). 
In the early 90s’, a consequence of the introduction of the human right clause in the 
Lomé Convention, the EU decided to suspend the cooperation with the DRC from 
1992 to 2002 justifying it for the lack of progress in the political democratisation 
                                                                                                                                                                       
called Zaire) of Burundian and Rwandan Hutu refugees as a result of the Burundian civil war in 1993 
and the Rwandan genocide, intensified instability in eastern Congo. In 1996, the presence of the former 
Rwandan army (ex-FAR) and militias in these refugee camps and  of  Ugandan  rebel  movements  in  
the  DRC  triggered  an  armed  intervention  of neighboring countries Uganda and Rwanda and the 
creation of a regional coalition. This coalition ousted Mobutu from power in May 1997. After the new 
Congolese president Kabila expelled his former Ugandan and Rwandan military allies in 1998, a second 
war broke out which would soon result in a high level of military fragmentation in the east. (Arnould & 
Vlassenroot, 2016). For a comprehensive history of Congo see: Gondola, C. D. (2002). The history of 
Congo. Greenwood Publishing Group. 
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process, the high degree of corruption, economic mismanagement and differences 
between EU Member States’ policies towards the country. During this period, the EU 
maintained an active presence through humanitarian aid funded by DG Humanitarian 
Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO).  
From 1996 to 2011, there was an EU Special Envoy (later, Special Representative or 
EUSR) for the Great Lakes region. Aldo Ajello and his successor, Roeland van de 
Geer, were both active in peace negotiations in the region.  
In 2002, a fundamental breakthrough was reached in the Congolese peace process and 
the peace negotiation efforts resulted in the Pretoria All Inclusive Political Agreement 
signed on 17 December 2002 between the different Congolese warring factions and 
political actors. When the global accord brought the conflicts to a formal end and 
established a transitional government to guide in the Third Republic, the EU resumed 
its development cooperation fund to support the reconstruction of the country.  
Further negotiations based on the Pretoria agreement paved the way for the “transition 
period”, which took off on 30 June 2003. Following this, a transitional government 
was installed that was based on power sharing between the main warring parties.  This 
government faced the arduous task of unifying the national territory, establishing a 
new legal and institutional framework, rebuilding state authority, preparing for general 
elections, and reforming the security sector. Several internationally supported 
initiatives were set up to support the peace process and promote regional stability 
(Hoebeke, Carette, & Vlassenroot, 2007). 
Most notably, an International Committee to facilitate the transition period, the 
“Comité international de l’accompagnement de la transition” (CIAT), was created 
with the objective of assisting and supervising the transition process and the 
transitional government. The CIAT comprised representatives in the DRC of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council as well as Angola, Belgium, Canada, 
Gabon, South Africa, Zambia, the European Union, and MONUC.  
Despite being considered only as an “accompanying” organ, CIAT managed to occupy 
an important political position and this created tension with the transitional 
government who became increasingly sensitive to issues related to its sovereignty 
(Hoebeke,  Carette,  & Vlassenroot, 2007). The CIAT period has been compared to a 
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protectorate by some observers (see De Goede & Van Der Borgh, 2008 and Rayroux 
& Wilén, 2014).   
The EU gave financial support for the constitutional referendum in 2005, that marked 
the end of the CIAT period and the arrival of the new government. Although CIAT 
ended, tensions between the government and the EU have continued regarding 
questions of sovereignty and ownership (see De Goede, 2012).  
The EU has also mobilised its resources to support the electoral processes in 2006 and 
2011, through funding support for the organisation and security of the elections and by 
deploying substantial election observation missions ( see EC, 2008 and 2013). 
Since 2003, the EU mobilized also the military instrument, along with the civilian 
ones, deploying the first CSDP intervention outside of Europe and setting important 
precedents for the development of future EU engagements in Africa.  
Overall five different CSDP interventions have been undertaken since 2003, mainly 
focusing on supporting security sector reform in the DRC: ARTEMIS
41
, EUFOR DR 
Congo
42
, EUPOLKinshasa and EUPOL DR Congo
43
, EUSEC DR Congo
44
. The EU 
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 EU ARTEMIS was the EU’s first ever CSDP mission outside of its immediate neighborhood. It was 
deployed from 12 June to 1 September 2013 in Bunia. Its mandate was to contribute to the stabilisation 
of security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, as well as to protect 
Bunia airport, IDP camps and, if necessary, civilian populations and UN and humanitarian personnel 
(UN resolution 1484). After 1 September, Artemis was relieved by the newly reinforced UN Ituri 
brigade. 
42
 In 2006, the EU deployed a second military mission, EUFOR DR Congo, from 12 June to 30 
November. Its mandate was to assist the Congolese police and army and the UN mission (MONUC) in 
securing the elections. Its role was to support the UN ‘in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in 
fulfilling its mandate’, secure Kinshasa airport, contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent 
threat of physical violence, and to carry out evacuation operations (UN resolution 1671). In contrast to 
Artemis, which was fully deployed in theatre, EUFOR DR Congo only had a small advance force 
deployed on the ground in Kinshasa.  
43
 The two EUPOL missions were aimed at strengthening the Congolese police forces. EUPOL 
Kinshasa, in operation from April 2005 to December 2006, was established to provide support to the 
newly created Integrated Police Unit that was tasked with securing the transition institutions and the 
elections. In addition, the mission provided assistance for the organisation of a census of the national 
police (Police Nationale Congolaise, PNC) and for training provisions. It was followed by the EUPOL 
DR Congo mission, in operation from July 2007 to December 2014, which was given a broader 
mandate to support the police reform process through the delivery of training and assistance in the 
conceptualisation of the police reform process. 
44
 EUSEC DR Congo was set up in June 2005 to provide advice and assistance to the Congolese 
authorities responsible for security sector reform. While its initial mandate was to support the army 
integration process (the 2003 peace agreement provided for the constitution of a new national army 
through the integration of combatants from the rebel groups into the Kabila loyalist army), EUSEC’s 
key contributions have been the creation of a new chain of payment to reduce embezzlement of 
soldier’s salaries, the modernisation of military administration and human resource management, and 
the rehabilitation of armories. 
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has recently phased out the EUSEC mission and its work has continued through a 
project funded by the European Development Fund.  
All these missions make the DRC the recipient of the largest number of EU CSDP 
missions in one single country.   
Furthermore. the EU supports UN resolution 2211 concerning the renewal of the 
mandate of the UN mission, MONUSCO and in 2013 was international partners of the 
Peace Security and Cooperation framework. This is an agreement that contains 
specific commitments on the part of the DRC, regional countries and the international 
community. 
EU’s engagement in reconstruction has been focused on different areas as the 
reconstruction of the health sector, infrastructure rehabilitation, and improved 
governance or ‘politico-institutional reconstruction’ (through support for the transition 
process, the reinforcement of state institutions, the justice and security sectors, public 
finances, and the decentralisation process).  
Moreover, the EU has mobilized a variety of development, democracy promotion, and 
humanitarian assistance instruments in support of its conflict management and 
stabilisation objectives in the DRC. For example, through its European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights, the EU has furthermore supported projects, 
implemented by civil society partners, to promote the rule of law, human rights 
protections, and political participation. Projects have included support for torture 
victims, independent local media, civic education, citizen participation in local 
governance, and the fight against impunity (EIDHR, 2011).  
As a response to the long emergency situation in the DRC, the also EU disbursed 
extensive direct humanitarian assistance. This assistance has been primarily geared 
towards support for Internally Displaced Persons and refugees (including refugees 
from neighbouring countries), and responding to acute malnutrition crises and 
epidemics throughout the country. The EU also operates a humanitarian air service, 
ECHO Flight, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to remote areas 
where road infrastructures are either unavailable or unsafe.  
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EU’s financial and political engagement in the DRC has grown exponentially every 
year.  To give an example, between 2002 and 2013, European Development Fund 
(EDF) budgets increased from €120 million to €726 million (€901 million if thematic 
budget lines such as the Stability Fund, Food Facility, and environment are also 
included) (EC, 2013).  The envelope for 2014-2020 (11th EDF)  package is one of the 
largest in the world (EEAS, 2018). Besides this, funds come also through the 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). In July 2017, an additional €5 million was 
released for emergency aid to victims of violence in the conflict (ibid.) 
Finally, the EU sustains a political dialogue, which allows the EU and the DRC to 
discuss subjects of shared interest, in particular, the preservation of political space and 
respect for human rights. 
However, despite the EU and international assistance, conflict and political violence 
persist, above all in eastern DRC 
45
.   
According to Stearns and Vogel (2015) different approaches to stabilisation and peace 
of the Congolese government and the international community, including 
demobilisation, security sector and institutional reform, have had meagre results.  
While EU policies in the DRC have played a significant role in testing and developing 
the EU’s crisis management capabilities, some authors consider its positive 
contribution to improving conditions on the ground in the DRC to be less evident 
(Piccolino, 2010).  
                                                          
45
 Whilst  a  large  number  of  militia  combatants  were  either demobilized or integrated in the newly 
created Congolese army, their departure from their  strongholds  in  many  areas  created  a  security  
void, whereas other groups  resisted  reintegration  and  remained operational  in  their  previous  areas  
of  control.  The slow pace of the integration process, the lack of attention to local unresolved  land-
access  disputes,  the  citizenship  issue, military or economic influence, competition over the control  of  
mineral  exploitation  and  trading  networks,  the  nature  of  the  state  and  the lack of progress in 
political reform and decentralisation, and regional power politics all explain  the  continued  violence  in  
the  Kivu  provinces  after  the  start  of  the  transition process. (Arnould & Vlassenroot, 2016). 
Such violence has taken place  mainly in the Kivu and Ituri provinces that have been the scene of 
fighting for over two decades. More violent clashes also erupted in the last years between in the Bukavu 
and Gatumba, Tanganyika, Kanyabayonga and Kasaï region . Despite the fact that formal elections 
should have taken pace in 2016, President Kabila announced that they would be pushed back to late 
2018. In the last two years, since conflict erupted in August 2016 in the previously peaceful Kasaï 
region, there has been a sharp increase in the number of internally displaced people across the country, 
continuing violence and political tensions.  
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Even more, peace efforts have generally been an additional opportunity to revive or 
reinforce existing armed structures, and have set in motion new claims to political, 
military, and economic power (Arnould & Vlassenroot, 2016). Badly designed 
strategies to deal with armed groups have even added new layers of conflict, as ‘the 
strategy of  power-sharing  and  institution building  in  the  DRC  has  slowly  but  
steadily  become  constitutive  of  a  dialectic  of structural  violence  and  privatized  
governance  that  forms  an  essential  impediment  to genuine  change’  (Vlassenroot  
&  Raeymaekers,  2009:  484).  
Criticism of EU peacebuilding has been widely discussed by African authors (see for 
example Abbas and Ndeda, 2009;  Baregu, 2011; Ndiaye, 2009; Zondi, 2017). 
Between September 2007 and February 2008, Kibasomba and Lombe carried out a 
field survey on local initiative and perception on conflict resolution in Kivu, published 
in the Journal of International Development. The findings shows that people in South 
and North Kivu perceive the that international actors had the same responsibility for 
obstructing peace in DRC than neighbouring countries (Rwanda), scoring at the 
highest level of responsibility (around 20%) whereas the DRC government and 
politicians score at the 10% of responsibility and the FARDC only at the 5% 
(Kibasomba & Lombe, 2008). This perspective is quite different from to the EU’s 
understanding of the major conflict causes and obstacles to peace in Eastern DRC. 
Copious African literature agrees with the fact that EU approaches fail to be successful 
because its main assumptions about DRC are fallacious. For instance, Bussy and Gallo 
argue that peacebuilding instruments in the DRC are based on the assumption that the 
lack of a strong liberal state is the primary reason why conflict persists in the area, and 
that the source of this assumption lies in the dominant view of international relations 
since the Enlightenment, the foundation of the Westphalian state system, and the 
evolution of the liberal peace paradigm that followed. In contrast, they argue that this 
kind of peacebuilding will only lead to top-down approaches that are not shared by 
Congolese community organisations and local NGOs. 
Several examples can serve this point. For example, whereas several African 
anthropologists and historians contend that the conflict in the Great Lakes can be 
explained by the political manipulation of ethnic mythology, specifically the ethnic or 
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pseudo-racial distinctions between “Bantu” and “Nilotic” peoples (see Malkki, 1995; 
Karbo & Mutisi, 2012), the EU has not been really engaged in working on this aspect.  
Beyond the singluar case of the EU, Autesserre argues that international peacebuilding 
actors in the DRC tend to appropriate three narratives on the reason and solution of the 
conflict and eclipse the numerous alternative framings of the situation (2012). These 
narratives focus on a primary cause of violence: illegal exploitation of mineral 
resources; with the main consequence being sexual abuse of women and girls; and a 
central solution, that is the same above mentioned by Bussy and Gallo, extending state 
authority. Such simple narratives are necessary as they provide straightforward 
explanations for the violence, suggest possible solutions to it, and are easily 
understandable by foreign audiences. Autesserre demonstrates that the focus on these 
narratives shows the divergence between peacebuilders and local approaches. Many 
other authors consider the gap between the EU and the local vision on peacebuilding 
(see for instance Autesserre, 2010 and 2012; Bussy & Gallo, 2016; Froitzheim, 2011; 
Murithi, 2007; Trefon, 2004; Wilen, 2014). 
In this context, seems very appropriate to refer to the metaphor created by Rutazibwa 
(2010) of an “intervener-centric mechanism” to explain the EU’s ethical foreign policy 
ambitions, or to what Froitzheim, Söderbaum and Taylor consider the major 
limitations of the EU’s role as a peace and security actor in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo: the fact that the EU is more concerned with establishing a symbolic 
presence and a form of representation than with achieving specific goals (2012). 
 In this sense, she explains that the European well-intended involvement is more about 
a way to be meaningful and act abroad rather than to make an actual impact on the 
country.  Thus, EU’s massive involvement in DRC conflict resolution seems more 
about a way for the EU to remain engaged in the country, while testing its technical 
instruments, rather an effective strategy that proved to obtain results in the last twenty 
years of EU peacebuilding.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter is built on the premise of the previous one, in which we saw the evolving 
narrative of Europeans bringing peace to Africa. In this sense, it discussed the 
meaning of peacebuilding as an institutionalised tool in international interventions and 
moved to the specific framework of EU peacebuilding. Here the emphasis was put on 
the distinctiveness of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding and conflict resolution and 
on the “normative aspects” that underpins its peace approach.  
It then moved to the analysis of the EU peacebuilding approach to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. While doing so, it firstly provided a historical overview of Belgian 
“peace promotion” in Congo before decolonisation, and how the European project 
took over the development and peace policies for the country. Finally, it shows the 
EU’s involvement in conflict resolution and the instruments that have been deployed.  
This chapter is particularly relevant to serve as a context for the last two empirical 
chapters because it presented all of the EU’s peacebuilding policies towards DRC that 
will be the object of the next part. The two following chapters are dedicated to the EU 
peacebuilding policies in DRC, and more specifically to the analysis of discourses by 
peacebuilding policymakers in Brussels.  Indeed, in the next two chapters, the EU 
peacebuilding framework analysed here will be put under the critical lens of 
postcolonial analysis.   
Therefore, the analysis turns to the discourse portrayed by EU officials who are in 
charge of making the peacebuilding policies discussed in this chapter and shows where 
there are continuities with the colonial discourse. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The Colonial Question in EU Peacebuilding  
Policymaking 
 
The ultimate mark of power may be its invisibility; 
   the ultimate challenge, the exposition of its roots. 
(Trouillot, 2015) 
 
 Introduction 
Charbonneau asserted that the colonial legacy in peacebuilding scholarship is rejected 
a priori as totally irrelevant or it is simply assumed, thus leading to questionable 
straightforward comparisons between colonial violence and current peace operations 
(2014).  
 In the following last two empirical chapters, it is my intention to move away from 
both trends and locate my enquiry in the middle of these two streams. Indeed, it is my 
concern to give space to the inherent and historical power relations at work between 
peacebuilders and recipients, but at the same time not simply assuming a legacy of 
colonialism in EU peacebuilding, which could generate the risk of falling into hasty 
generalisations.  
In so doing, chapter six and chapter seven are devoted to the examination of EU 
policymakers’ speeches and actions concerning the creation of peacebuilding policies, 
in order to understand the extent of colonial legacies in this sphere.  
Specifically, this chapter focuses on the ways in which discourse on the influence of 
colonial past in EU’s peacebuilding in DRC operates within the standpoints of EU’s 
institutional representatives and individual civil servants of the Commission and the 
European External Action Service.  
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Thereby, the focus in this chapter is unpacking how the colonial legacy in DRC is 
taken into consideration by the EU peacebuilding practitioners. By doing so, this 
empirical chapter seeks to consider whether EU peacebuilding practitioners 
incorporate reflections on the EU’s colonial past while working on peacebuilding 
policies in DRC.  
By doing so, the chapter seeks to elaborate on the different perspectives gathered in 
the interviews and reflects on the main discourses that emerged around the 
inclusion/exclusion of colonial memory in peacebuilding policy making,  
In so doing, this chapter looks at the body of statements gathered, to trace what are the 
discursive representations on the EU’s colonial legacy in peacebuilding. In other 
words, the chapters look at the discursive strands that might compose the broader 
colonial discourse. 
Indeed, the body of statements is tied together in what is called a discourse strand, best 
explained as thematically interrelated sequences of homogeneous “discourse 
fragments” (Jager and Maier, 2009).   
The empirical analysis of the interviews and documents about the inclusion/exclusion 
of colonial memory in EU peacebuilding policymaking in DRC allows illuminating 
two mayor discursive strands.  
The first discursive strand is about the “colonial erasure”, which identify the 
disinterest and obliviousness of the European colonial history in EU peacebuilding 
policymaking.  
The second one – only apparently contradictory – illustrates the positive legacy of 
colonialism, focusing on the importance attributed to the former colonial ties for 
successful peacebuilding policies and in particular on the Belgian role in EU 
peacebuilding policymaking towards DRC.   
The study considers such discursive strands not as homogeneous structures of 
thoughts, but rather as part of a system of discourse that contains as discursive 
instability (see chapter two).  Drawing on the postcolonial conception of the instability 
of colonial discourse (Bhabha, 1994, among others), the study sees discursive strands 
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not as a unifying and monolithic idea, but as unstable formations that regulate the 
different representations of the same discourse. 
It is thanks to the ambivalence of the colonial discourses that the “structure of power” 
can be consolidated. Indeed, such instability allows different -and apparently 
contradictory- stereotypes or ideological justifications to be mobilised in order to 
assert and legitimise domination.  As Kapoor puts it, the discursive structure does not 
need to be homogeneous in order to be hegemonic. On the contrary, it gets reinforced 
from being ambivalent (Kapoor, 2003).  
Thus, embracing this instability, allows us to understand how different stream of 
discourses is functional to the reproduction of a “regime of truth” in peacebuilding.  
Accordingly, this chapter is divided into two main parts, dedicated to the two main 
discursive strands highlighted. The first touches on the erasure of the colonial issue 
with respect to planning, drafting and implementing peace-related policies in DRC. 
The second pinpoints the important role that Belgium, the former coloniser, assumes 
in every EU officials’ discourse on peacebuilding in DRC, with a discourse that tends 
to exalt the positive legacy of colonialism.  
By unfolding and putting those two discursive strands in communication the aim of 
this chapter is to reflect on their contradictions and limitations. A final conclusion 
reflects and summarises the main findings. 
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1. The Erasure of Colonial Memory 
 
1.1. Facing the Colonial Taboo 
In the first and third chapter, it has been explained how EU Studies, as a disciplinary 
field, has evolved around “colonial amnesia”. In the first chapter, this amnesia has 
been associated with the specific nature of the EU Studies discipline (born as a 
subfield of IR) and by the specific profile of EU Studies’ scholars  (who often were 
also EU practitioners). It also illuminates on the effort of a number of contemporary 
scholars that have started to challenge this historical erasion. 
 
Moreover, in chapter three the colonial amnesia has been put in relation to the interest 
in forging a narrative about the EU as a new entity separated by the member’ states 
past. 
 
However, in the same chapter, it has also been explained that the European Parliament 
is engaged in the reconsideration of colonialism as part of European shared past and in 
this effort, it opened the “House of the European History” (HEH). In this Museum of 
European History, colonialism is seen as a European global phenomenon to be taken 
into account in our common present. 
 
In this chapter, we can see that the EP effort in bringing to the surface the colonial 
legacy has not been perceived by the EU peacebuilding practitioners and that the 
colonial amnesia plays a central role in the EU peacebuilding policymaking.  
 
Since the very start of the data gathering in the European institutions, I realised that a 
completely different understanding of European collective history was conceived by 
the people working in peacebuilding (EEAS, DEVCO, ECHO, Council).  
 
The top-down forging of a common European history by the Parliament, symbolised 
by the construction of the HEH, was not reflected in the practitioners’ understanding, 
and the idea of colonialism as shared European phenomenon put forward by the EP 
has not been transferred at all in the other bodies of the EU.  
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This different approach, among the EP and the Commission on this particular point, 
results therefore in a very different perception of history.  It is an order of discourse 
based on an absence of colonial history.  
 This absence was first of all manifested in the attitude of my interviewees.  
It happened quite often that while asking questions about EU colonial legacy, the role 
of Belgium within EU peacebuilding in DRC or the relevance of history in the current 
peacebuilding procedures, most of my interviewees became upset, and they did not 
deny being also annoyed by my questions. 
 Such defensive attitudes seemed to generate by the fact that my interviewees were 
asked to talk about a taboo, or as if they felt accused in the first person by my 
questions. Comments by an officer exemplify this clearly: 
We are loyal: we come to the office, we obey orders of our “Heads”, we 
do our job. I do not think that there is something wrong with that. We 
work to tackle present emergencies and we look at the future in the view of 
a better Africa. I do not see the point in looking back at the past. That 
would only make us feel guilty and uncomfortable. I mean, here we do a 
lot to help the Great Lake Region emerging, and I do not believe that any 
accusation of hiding colonial ambitions -or whatever you are referring - 
could help our Division to perform better.  
                                                                              
                                                                                                              (Int.2) 
Others were giving me very sarcastic answers, meant at showing their underestimation 
and disinterest of my research topic: 
Congolese drink a lot of beer. That is the negative effect of Belgian 
colonization of Congo, in my view.                                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                              (Int.3) 
or 
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“You are talking about a  ‘fantôme’ that does not exist but that could scare 
our team and damage the dialogue with our African partners. Think about 
that.”                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                (Int.4) 
This reluctance and defensive posture that sometimes was difficult to sustain was 
hence very meaningful for my study. It implied that, besides their formal disinterest or 
diminishing of the matter, the interviewees were not feeling comfortable discussing 
this topic.  
This taboo is regulated by a specific discursive strand that is built on an absence: the 
EU’s history does not include the nation-state’s past, and therefore it is considered to 
be absolved from colonialism and any reflection on colonial legacies.  
The basis of thus taboo can be retraced indeed in the first discursive strand about 
colonial discourse in EU peacebuilding policymaking: the oblivion of the colonial 
history.  
Such discursive strand is supported and constructed around two nodal points, or 
‘privileged signs’ (Laclau & Mouffe,  2001 (1985)) that articulates the meaning and 
organises the elements of this discursive strand. Those are the separation between the 
EU and its member states’ past and the ‘presentist regime’.  
 
1.2. The Separation between the EU and Member States’ Past 
While talking about the HEH, and the Parliament effort to include colonial history in 
this Museum of European History, most of the practitioners that I interviewed declared 
that they were not even aware of the imminent opening of the HEH. What is more, 
others also rejected the very idea of “European” history altogether, stressing the 
difference among the Member States more than the similarities and the common 
historical grounds. European history is therefore considered as the history of European 
integration. 
No, I never heard about this project [construction of the HEH]. Sometimes 
communication among us is not so fluid as it should be and there are so 
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many initiatives that I cannot recall all of them. Anyhow, the challenge of 
recollecting the history of Europe it is a noble task, I think in this sense the 
European Parliament is right in pursuing such interest, but what do you 
mean for the history of Europe? That is my question.                                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                             (Int. 5) 
The separation between member states and the EU’s history in the minds of my 
interviewees assumes a stronger connotation when dealing with such a sensitive issue 
as colonialism. 
Indeed, if the very idea of a European collective memory was considered problematic, 
the concept of a European colonial shared past was even more contested. As we will 
see in the course of this chapter, the idea of colonialism as a shared European 
phenomenon suggested by the EP is almost rejected in the other bodies of the EU.  
The general perception in the departments and units interviewed was the rejection of 
any correlation between the EU and colonialism. Some of the EU personnel 
interviewed genuinely confessed that they had never thought about this, for example, 
admitting that: 
Honestly, it never came up in my mind. Well, now that you are asking me 
I remember that a network of Civil Society Organizations identified 
several recommendations for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, among which 
one was about the negative impact of former colonial powers, but this 
debate never really entered among these walls. Frankly speaking, I do not 
think it is relevant. At least as far as it concerns us [Transitional Justice 
and Human Right Department]. 
(Int.6) 
Are you asking me how people in Kinshasa perceive the EU? If we are 
responsible for their colonial past? But we [speaking also for her 
colleague, present in the interview] don’t know about this. We are inside 
the machine and it is not our task to raise such questions. 
(Int.7) 
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These two interviewees are from different sectors of EU peacebuilding: the former 
working in transitional justice in the DRC within the Human Rights Strategy and 
Policy Implementation Division of the EEAS, and the latter in charge of projects 
funded under the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace at the EU Delegation 
in Kinshasa. However, both of them frame the issue as it were not their personal 
responsibility to think about the historical role of the institution in which they work 
and the repercussion of this in their daily work.  They both answer to the question as 
individuals, rather than showing the perspective of the EU as a whole. 
Other EU personnel interviewed believe that the EU has nothing to do with the 
colonial past of its member states, and therefore that there are no repercussions on EU 
peacebuilding missions and instruments. Often, the tone of interviewees was irritated 
and not giving space for further questions. 
Why should the EU be responsible for something that happened when the 
EU did not even exist? Of course, from the member state still exist a sort 
of responsibility, I come from the UK and, I would say, it is clear there is - 
I don’t know if it is a sense of guilt or sense of responsibility. I am aware 
that there is a particular desire to stick with the former colonies.  But I 
really do not see the link with the EU.                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                             (Int.8) 
This is a very empty debate to me. There is no relevance of colonialism in 
the CSDP or in the general EU-Africa relationship. Colonialism is a 
national issue. In this department, we perform quite well and certainly, our 
credibility in crisis management is not undermined by the past of certain 
member states.                                                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                              (Int.9) 
Such findings are demonstrating that the question of colonialism is still to be 
addressed within the EU institutions. Moreover, in these statements, it is interesting to 
notice how prominently the separation between the EU and its member states is 
portrayed. 
 The EU seems to be considered a sort of artificial entity; an amalgamation of the 
member states that only consider ‘common’ their present pre-occupations and the kind 
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of history that is functional to EU goals. This corresponds to what Bickerton (2012) 
noted about the incapacity of the EU to conceptualise the Nation States as part of its 
history, but rather to always see a divide between national sovereignty and EU supra-
nationalism. And that is how the interviewees reflected on this issue: 
We cannot make a generalization, member states’ history is not European 
History. You are talking about colonialism, and this is a good example: 
Member states in their past had colonies, but Europe never had.                                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                           (Int.10) 
 I do not understand: what do you mean by colonial legacies? The EU was 
not even existing in the colonial epoch. How can we carry a heritage of 
others?   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                           (Int. 11) 
Again, the interviewees are associating European history only with the history of 
European integration and leaving aside all that happened before.   
Another excerpt, confirms this vision: 
The EU never had a colony. Our member states had. And the EU has 
nothing to do with the member states colonial past. I mean if you look at 
the origin of the Cotonou Agreement, that was Lomé, of course, it was 
created because a certain past, it was a post-colonial era. But we have 
moved beyond that. We are far beyond that. When you look at the reality 
you see some of our member states to be more active when dealing with 
peace and security in Africa, but this is because they have more extensive 
experience in the field, so there are many factors. They don’t do out of a 
former coloniser perspective, but because they have strong traditional ties, 
their knowledge of Africa, and their military expertise and experience in 
those places. 
                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                           (Int. 12) 
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The discursive instability that results from this is evident: on the one hand, every link 
between the EU and a colonial past is considered absurd, even if it is accepted that the 
Yaoundé Agreements and the Lomé Conventions between the EU and the former 
colonial world were the results of the post-colonial spirit. On the other hand, the 
current linkage between member states and former colonies in EU peace and security 
actions in the African continent is considered the result of cultural and traditional 
proximity.  However, if we accept the presence and the effect of these cultural bonds 
inherited by colonial times, we cannot deny the existence of a correlation between the 
EU and colonialism.  
 
i.  They Don’t Come Here with their Histories: Beyond the EU as a Unified Entity 
The separation between Member States’ history and EU plays a fundamental role in 
the construct the discursive strand of the erasion of colonial question in EU 
peacebuilding policymaking. This nodal point is also reflected in the discursive 
variations between the EEAS and the EC’s perception of history.  
While conducting interviews I was particularly cautious about understanding the 
background of my interviewees, in order to understand if there might be a difference 
of outcomes among officials of different EU bodies, or according to their country of 
origin and their professional background.  
Indeed, these dividing lines allow us to reflect beyond the idea of the ‘EU as an entity’ 
and allow for the understanding that political and institutional dynamics also shape the 
outcome of the EU’s policy. As Jeandesboz (2007) presented in the case of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, a variety of discursive strategies and the struggles 
among differentially positioned agents of the European bureaucracies can in general 
play a substantial role in defining the EU policies outcomes and therefore delineate a 
certain ‘specificity’ of the EU’s structure. In particular, for the case of EU’s approach 
to security in Africa, the difference between the  “rhetoric from Brussels and reality on 
the ground” (Vines, 2010: 1091) is well known. 
The first point to be addressed was that concerning discursive variations between 
officials from the Commissions and from the EEAS. As discussed in previous 
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chapters, peacebuilding policies are performed mainly in these two bodies, but I 
wanted to understand if the different components of the two institutions generated a 
difference in the interpretation of EU’s colonial history.  
Indeed, although their statements present a number of similarities, I was able to 
identify that the Commission and the EEAS do not consider the question of 
colonialism and the colonial past in exactly the same terms.  
In the Commission there is a sense of normative commitment: there is the strong idea 
of the EC as a “super partes” body, a neutral power in which the national interests are 
not playing a major role as in the EEAS. This might be influenced by decades in 
which the EU wanted to be perceived as a neutral force that acted beyond the strategic 
interest of member states, following what was generally considered its normative and 
civilian power in foreign policy.   
In the Commission, most of the officers interviewed consider that they belong to an 
institution where old colonial times are not relevant because the EU as a supranational 
organism does not reflect member state particularities, and therefore their single 
histories.  
Frequently, this neutrality is opposed to the interest-driven composition of the EEAS, 
where the member states have much more relevance.  The Deputy Head of the Africa-
EU Partnership in the Peace Facility Unit problematized the existence of Member 
States driven peacebuilding policy within the EEAS, arguing: 
I think we definitely moved from the time of responsibility for colonial 
damages. However, this never really concerned about the EU. The EU 
never had anything to be responsible for. Of course in the EEAS Member 
States are really important, therefore they concur in creating the peace 
agenda. But here [in the Commission] you can see there is no relevance of 
member states, so they don’t come here with their histories. 
(Int. 13) 
He is indeed making the point that the Commission is a space freed of the weight of 
colonialism by opposing it to the EEAS, that is associated with the Member States.  
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This consideration was also shared by others interviewees from the European 
Commission and poses interesting questions regarding the use of the history of 
member states which has perhaps not seriously been considered by the literature so far.  
Indeed, the narrative of the separation between EU and the member states past stands 
– although precariously- as far as peacebuilding decisions are taken by independent 
organs, not merged with member states interests and ambitions.  
However, in chapter three it was shown that the EU, as an institution, is not a neutral 
space, but is the result of the consolidation of Europe as a dominant subject that is the 
heir of the former European empires.  
Furthermore, in chapter three of this thesis,  recent literature was mobilized to argue 
that during European integration colonialism was never put under question but, on the 
contrary, the European Community “recycled” the colonial relationships of its member 
states and constructed its foreign policy on such colonial basis.  
Through original material found in the Historical Archives of the European Union, it 
was also demonstrated in Chapter five that this was the case in relation to the Congo.   
The implications are that we cannot consider the European Commission as a neutral 
space, even if it is not directly linked to the specific Member States (as is the case with 
the EEAS). 
Indeed, the EU agency carries a subjective identity influenced by its colonial past. In 
the EEAS, a contrasting perspective is in evidence. Frequently, the interviewees 
consider the External Action Service of the EU mainly as an empty box, filled by 
member states interests.  
I am not sure that the EU can change the pursuit of member states’ 
interest. We [the EEAS] are nothing else than the sum of the member 
states. The foreign policy is driven by the member states. And of course, 
the Member States have interests. 
                                                                                      
                                                                                                           (Int.14) 
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All I can say is that every member state has power and leverages, and in 
the EEAS more than in the Commission itself we can see that we feel such 
power and leverages. In COAFR this emerges clearly. Belgians are a very 
important part of life in DRC. Clearly, DRC is almost the number one 
foreign policy strategic objective of Belgium, and that has an impact on 
our work. This is true. But I don’t see any correlation between the EU 
itself and colonialism. 
                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                          (Int. 15) 
The discursive separation between EU and member states’ past is therefore mirrored in 
variations between EC and EEAS conception of history.  Indeed, - as these two 
statements, it is highlighted-  the EEAS, is considered a place where Member States’ 
interest plays an important role, and the EC, which –as we say before-is conceived as a 
neutral space.  
However, even admitting the importance of Member States’ interest within EEAS, 
there is no room to reflect about the weight of their historical past, and therefore 
ultimately no correlation between their colonial past and the EU. 
Even if member states are considered relevant in the creation of EU’s external action, 
and their interests are the main driving force of EU external policies, the historical 
colonial past of such member states is not considered relevant when analysing the EU.   
However, if –according to the general view of my interviewees - the EEAS is just the 
sum of Member States’ interests in foreign policy, why is it so absurd to reflect on the 
influence of Member States’ past in EU policies? The EEAS is partly composed of 
countries representatives, but not by their histories. 
This point leads me to a second important question: is the country of origin of the 
interviewees influencing the view about colonial memory and legacy in the EU? Are 
there any differences in the set of statements collected based on the Officers’ 
background? Is the colonial amnesia shared indistinctly by EU officers, despite their 
country of origin? 
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 The task here is to understand the extent to which different historical colonial pasts of 
member states impact on the discursive representations of individual officials working 
on peacebuilding. As it has been widely expressed in chapter 3, EU member states 
have a different colonial past, and therefore officers’ different personal historical 
backgrounds could lead to different opinions about colonial legacies in peacebuilding.  
For example, the difference of Member States’s interests in peacebuilding is extremely 
evident in the daily policymaking business, In the case of DRC, Belgium is the 
constant partner to consult and it is the representative with the strongest voice within 
COAFR when discussing choices on DRC. In the interviews, Officials from Belgium 
were more keen on talking about themselves as Belgians rather than as EU Officials, 
thus portraying that the nationality influenced the perception of the subject, and this is 
also the case of several officials from France and United Kingdom. 
However, in the interviews gathered it is possible to perceive that when reflecting on 
the European legacy of colonialism, there was a generally homogenous discourse built 
on the “absence of a discourse”: the erasure of colonial reflections was generally 
portrayed regardless of the country of origin of the speaker.  
This outcome might be understood in the light of a specific process of socialisation 
within the EU institutions, where the EU’s dominant narrative is strongly accepted and 
repeated without including the perspective of the non-power holding “other”.  
As Michel Foucault and poststructuralist discourse analyst saw it, a dominant 
discourse provides prevailing "accepted" rules and contains particular ideological 
beliefs and it embodies socialisation by the dominant or decision-making group. 
Several studies in this sense prove that an international organization socialises those 
who work within it and that the European Commission of the European Union is a 
crucial case in this sense because it is an autonomous international organisation with a 
vocation to defend supranational norms (see for example Hooghe, 2005). 
Despite the similarity of outcomes that I received from people from a different 
nationality, I was able to find a “competing narrative” in my interviews, that was put 
forward by a recently appointed Official with an NGO background. Indeed, among 62 
interviews gathered, only one person referred immediately to the problems that a lack 
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of reflection on the colonial history entails for the creations and implementations of 
the EU peacebuilding policies in DRC, whereas a few others interviewed only 
considered the issue after a conversation about the topic. 
And that is what emerged from the “counterfactual interviewee”: 
The EU is not dealing with its colonial past, is a problem that is not 
addressed and we [the EU] don’t want to address it because we will always 
have member states that would block it anyway. I think that in the 
hierarchies this is not even considered as a problem. Indeed, if you look at 
the list of EU Heads of Delegations in Africa, and you take their 
nationality and the country former power, you clearly see that it is not an 
issue. But I do believe it is a problematic aspect, in particular when dealing 
with countries like DRC. […] I am not sure regarding how to assess this 
negative impact. And it is difficult to find a balance because you always 
have more people expert in DRC in Belgium, so the balance is between 
having a certain people with expertise in the country and on the other hand 
to guarantee a certain level of  neutrality and independence. 
(Int. 16) 
In this statement, we can see that the standpoint of the interviewee is clearly 
heterodox compared to the others showed before in the chapter, as it argues that 
there is a problem of not dealing with colonial past.  
But at the same time, the interlocutor’s statement seems also regulated by the 
notion that the EU is somehow separated by its Member States when it is a 
matter of decision-making.  
This point of linking EU and member state “at the best convenience” seems just 
a variation of the view expressed by the respondents that have been mentioned 
earlier. 
Besides the consideration for the different bodies of the EU, the different 
countries of origin and the different backgrounds of the interviewees, another 
important aspect that determined a slightly different vision of the colonial 
memory is the gap between different generations. I could see that whereas older 
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Officers were more aware of the incumbrance of the Belgian colonial past in the 
history of DRC – possibly because some of them witnessed the transition from 
colonialism to independence -  younger Officers were, on the contrary, generally 
less receptive to consider the importance of this legacy. Following Licata and 
Klein (2010) this difference can be explained either by referring to the different 
ideological backgrounds in which different generations were socialised. 
 
1.3.  A “Presentist Regime” 
The second nodal point that contributes to the creation of the discursive strand of 
erasion of colonial memory is the one linked with the specific way the EU 
peacebuilding sector is structured. Indeed, EU peacebuilding policies are created in a 
day to day working environment that does not allow space for reflection to history. 
And when historical events are mobilised, they are only evoked to justify the present 
EU’s choice. This nodal point can, therefore, go under the name of “presentism”. 
In the particular case of the EEAS, where the majority of peacebuilding policies are 
created, the presentist regime is evident in the work dynamic that lacks engagement in 
historical continuity and privileges the contingency of present practices. This might be 
due to two factors: the short time-frame within which officials are in one post and the 
crisis response mode of working.   
 
i. Fast Mobility  
The career within the institution is quite fast compared to other public administrations 
(see Balint, Bauer & Knill, 2008). In particular, at the EEAS, “mobility of staff is a 
key element of a professional European Diplomatic Service, and is required by the 
EEAS Council Decision” considering that “complementary exercises of Mobility 
(internal process for postings in HQ) and Rotation (both internal and external 
processes for postings in Delegations) are essential” (EEAS, 2016:11).  
Moreover, at least 33% and no more than 40% of the human resources at EEAS are 
Temporary Agents from the diplomatic services of the Member States, whose 
contracts have normally a maximum duration of four years (EC, 2015). This creates a 
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situation in which rotations are quite frequent. During my personal working 
experience at EEAS, colleagues were mentioning that mobility is indeed a main asset 
in the recruitment of EEAS’ personnel and the fastest way to get promotions.  
Despite this being understandable for a diplomatic sector, the rapid exchange of posts 
might work quite well for technical positions, but it has definitely several shortfalls 
when considering the “geographic desks” (the offices working explicitly on a certain 
geographic area). Indeed, the short stay makes it very difficult for the civil servants to 
get a good knowledge of the country assigned.  Basically, there is no time to 
understand the history of the country in which they work, and no special training is 
foreseen. This renders the personnel who work in the ‘peacebuilding sector’ not 
always suitably qualified and aware of the range of ethical, methodological, as well as 
political and social issues that go along with their role. Not to mention the fact that 
they are hardly ever aware of the historical power relations they are implicated in. 
If we consider the case of DRC, when I started my traineeship at the EEAS in 
February 2016, a new person was just appointed to that desk, and she had never 
experienced working on African issues before and never visited Kinshasa. 
 She was the one to plan and write the Human Rights Strategy for the DRC, an 
important working document, that served as a basis to select the priority issues through 
a human security framework, including promoting human rights, addressing 
humanitarian crises, advancing economic development, designing and implementing 
peace missions and general allocation of funding
46
. 
Such general superficiality is mainly due to the short staying in a position, which does 
not allow the Officers to get a deep knowledge of the countries of which they are 
responsible to draft policies. In this context, history plays a minor role. The Deputy 
Head of the Central African Department, more than one time admitted that: 
“I know, most of our staff’s historical memory does not go further than the 
“First Congo War”, I could ask them to open a book and read about that, 
but I cannot oblige them to do that”. 
                                                          
46 In my staying at the EEAS, I was personally asked to draft the Human Right Strategy for the Sao 
Tome and Equatorial Guinea, even if my knowledge about these countries at the time was very 
limited.  
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(Int. 17) 
Peacebuilding policy is regarded therefore more as a practical technical aspect to 
solve, rather than considered in terms of its deeper historical context and implications.  
Possible mitigation to this is offered by the support of EU Missions on the ground. 
There, some EU experts are dislocated for a short stay, but being plunged into the 
local reality is definitely an accelerator of knowledge and offers a much stronger 
possibility to reflect on history. However, for time contingencies the Missions tend to 
be consulted only after decisions are already taken in Brussels.  
 
ii. Crisis Response Culture 
A second practical aspect that potentially limits the engagement into an analysis of the 
impact of the colonial history of DRC when making peacebuilding policies is the crisis 
response mode of working.  The day to day pressure to face constant emergencies 
impedes practitioners to actually look at the big picture and analyze the long term 
causes of a specific crisis and to link them with historical events.  Thereby, even in the 
cases in which practitioners are aware of the historical colonial past, the mode of 
working does not allow them to give it a consideration. 
For example, in the period between the 1 March and the 1 September 2016 the DRC 
faced a series of difficult moments
47
: In this sequence of daily acts of violence in 
DRC, the EU tended not to engage in a long term analysis, but just to act promptly and 
find a way to position itself via communications, declarations or speeches.   
In the opening speech to the Humanitarian Conference on the Democratic Republic of 
Congo on the 13 April 2018, Mr Christos Stylianides, European Commissioner for 
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 Political violence and government repression severely intensified in 2016: authorities deliberately 
blocked  plans to organize elections, government officials and security forces systematically repressed 
and intimidate the growing coalition of voices calling for credible, timely elections. At the same time, 
more than 100 activists and opposition leaders or supporters were arbitrarily arrested. Congo’s justice 
minister opened an investigation into one of the country’s leading opposition figures, Moïse Katumbi, 
for alleged recruitment of mercenaries. Étienne Tshisekedi come back to DRC, and the Congolese 
government blocked a Human Rights Watch senior researcher from continuing to work in Congo. 
Congolese took to the streets again to protest the electoral commission’s failure to announce 
presidential elections, three months before the end of Kabila’s term. Security forces responded with 
excessive violence, killing at least 66 people and setting at least three opposition party headquarters on 
fire. Some protesters also turned violent, beating or burning to death several police officers. At least 
eight journalists were detained in an apparent attempt to block independent reporting of the situation. 
(Human Rights Watch, 2016; 1-5 ) 
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Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management Geneva concluded his speech showing the 
time-pressure: 
“Dear friends, Time is running against us. It is now imperative to give the 
vulnerable people of DRC the help they need.” 
(Stylianides, 2018:1) 
This emerged also in one of the interviews with one of the EU functionaries, in 
which the interviewee –quite polemically- considers that there is a certain 
awareness of a possible academic debate evolving around their operations, but at 
the same time they are constrained by time-pressure 
We do read strategic documents but we are constantly under this pressure 
of immediate requests and immediate needs. So we do not have time to 
bother to check the theoretical basis of our work or to see if some of our 
actions can be interpreted from academics as a colonial act. 
(Int. 18) 
Yet, during a COAFR meeting on Election in DRC, it was recognised that the EU 
should not push African countries to “resolve” quickly a situation of conflict. A 
striking example was given by the speaker saying:  “South Africa took four years to 
establish elections. If the EU would have had the instruments to intervene at that time, 
we would have probably pushed and forced Mandela to resign or to change its 
strategy”.  
This top-down approach in peacebuilding has been broadly analyzed elsewhere by a 
number of researchers (see for example Mac Ginty, 2011; Mac Ginty & Firchow, 
2016, or in the specific case of DRC see Autesserre, 2010) and its postcolonial 
criticism has been explained in chapter two.  
However, what is relevant to consider here is that the temporal contingencies of 
diplomatic practices and cultures, therefore, go hand in hand with diplomat 
dehistoricised discourses. This generates a situation that Calligaro (2015) defines as 
“presentism” when the past is only recalled to justify the present, going back to look 
for historical accounts when needed to explain a present emergency, rather than the 
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opposite (having a solidified historical view that allows one to interpret the present). 
For instance, officials refer to simplified accounts of history when this is functional to 
their actions.  
That is clearly the case when dictatorship is mobilized to explain poverty and lack of 
development in DRC. The following is the standard introduction to the country 
background that is provided every year by the EEAS, where it is shown that the only 
cause of poverty and crisis is to be found in the decades of Mobutu’s dictatorship.  
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a vast country (more than 
2.3 million km), rich in natural resources (minerals, forests, oil and fertile 
land) and has more than 60 million inhabitants divided between 200 ethnic 
groups. Yet, despite immense resources, poverty is widespread in the DRC 
and today the recent food prices and financial crisis impacted heavily on 
the social and economic situation of the country. In addition, the DRC’s 
human development index is one of the lowest in the world (0.361 – being 
177
th
 rank out of 179 countries according to the UNDP). All this is the 
consequence of decades of dictatorship under President Mobutu Sese 
Seko, followed by regional wars (1997 and 1998-2002) leading to the 
death of an estimated 4-5 million people. Today, the DRC can be regarded 
as a fragile post-conflict state.  
                                     (EEAS, DRC Country Fiche 2016, emphasis added) 
In other words, as novelist and prominent Nigerian thinker Chimamanda Adichie said: 
“Start the story with the failure of the African state, and not with the colonial creation 
of the African state, and you have an entirely different story” (Adichie, 2009). 
Another frequent narrative is the belief that decades of dictatorship crystalized the 
possibility for the Congolese to autonomous recovery, with a clear impact in the peace 
missions and in the peace projects. This discourse is used to justify top-down 
approaches in peacebuilding. Emblematic is also the case of the chain of payment 
within the EUSEC: the EU heads of the mission did not give money directly to the 
Congolese’ soldiers believing they were not able to spend money appropriately.  
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All this explains that the African past is mobilized to explain chaos, inefficiency and 
wars, a peace-deficit but only to the extent it serves the contemporary objectives of the 
EU in showing the country situations and needs; and only to the extent that this 
reflection on African’s past does not involve a self-reflection on the European past in 
connection to Africa. 
Such over-simplification of history does not leave space to question the Western 
position towards dictatorship, and obviously, it does not allow a reflection on the link 
between colonialism and dictatorship, or on the European role in supporting Mobutu. 
 
2. The Positive Legacy of Colonialism  
 
Together with this first dominant discursive strand, a second one can be identified in 
the interviews and documents analysed. In this second discursive strand appears a 
sense of awareness regarding the legacy of colonialism, but it shows the positive 
connotations of such legacy: 
 
The EU will have always a special relationship with its former colonies. 
Even if we should not discriminate whether a country is a former colony or 
not to intervene, and we need to make a strong and neutral analysis, but the 
interest orients the EU towards those places. 
                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                           (Int. 19) 
Here emerges another important point: the EU is more likely to be interested in, and 
possibly to intervene in former colonies.  This interviewee does not deny the colonial 
link as those selections of interviews shown in the previous paragraph but sees in the 
colonial connections a positive motivation to pursue peacebuilding campaigns.   
Several other interviews tended to idealise the outcomes of colonisation: cultural links, 
language, common understanding and common history are seen as a favourable 
precondition for the success of peacebuilding in DRC. The discursive strand of a 
positive legacy of colonialism is supported by two nodal points that are explained in 
the following subheadings: the idea of the coloniser as an expert in DRC 
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peacebuilding and the idea of a certain colonial pride about the positive role of 
colonialism in DRC.  
 
2.1. Coloniser as Expert 
In the following excerpts, it is possible to understand that the narrative of a positive 
legacy of colonialism is shared by several EU Officials working on peacebuilding 
practices in DRC, along with different sectors and different competencies.  
For example, in the Geographical desk in DEVCO the Deputy Head of Unity 
admitted: 
“The influence of Belgium could be considered controversial by some, but 
I think it is important because they won’t let them go, like other countries. 
They care about DRC, and lobby for the allocation of funds and projects 
there.” 
(Int. 20) 
What is particularly interesting in this excerpt is the expression  “won’t let them go”, 
the idea – in other words - that despite decolonisation Belgium is seeking to maintain a 
continuous relationship with the former colony. According to the interviewee, it is 
clear that the Belgian role is considered positive because it lobbies for putting DRC in 
the core of the EU’s interest.  
This was already evident during the Belgian presidency of the Council in 2001 when 
the EU Council asked Belgium to develop a European policy for Central Africa and, 
unsurprisingly, DRC was included in the European priorities (see Wilen, 2013).  
Several authors argue that Belgium made use of the EU to promote its relationship 
with Africa, with a specific interest in undertaking an explicit role in DRC. Kelly 
(2008), for example, showed that Belgium adopted an intervention strategy in DRC 
that relies heavily on a European multilateral approach to security issues in this 
country, because it maintains the visibility and credibility of the Belgian state as a 
participant in intervention efforts for the DRC, while minimizing the possibility of 
Belgium being perceived as a neo-colonial actor.  
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 In the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), one of the Officials working in the 
mission EUPOL Kinshasa also reflected on the Europeanisation of Belgian 
peacebuilding efforts in DRC, confirming the underlying narrative that the Belgian 
influence is a benign factor: 
Of course, Belgians prefer to intervene through CSDP and not using a 
bilateral approach to Congo which would be too costly for a little country 
like Belgium. And in EUPOL the head of the mission was Belgian, and 
there has been a strong Belgian component in the mission. But it was a 
positive interest they had. And a positive outcome – I am indeed writing 
just now the final report. So, Belgians are our point of contact with DRC. 
They help us understand local culture and thoughts. 
                                                                                                                  (Int. 21) 
The idea that Belgians are the experts on Congolese culture, and therefore they serve 
as “interpreter” to explain DRC to the rest of EU troops, or to other Officials, is a 
common discourse shared by all the Officers contacted during this research.  
This argument is used in the moment of writing strategies (like the Country Human 
Rights Strategy, which defines the framework of action and the consequent allocation 
of money) or proposals for allocation of peacebuilding funds (like the one allowed by 
the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace) when EU officers of Belgian 
nationality or external Belgians experts are consulted, but it becomes even more 
relevant for planning and implementing CSDP missions. Indeed, it is in the CSPD 
departments that the role of Belgian military staff in the EU reaches its peak: 
 
Some people still assert that Belgium has interest in Central Africa. That is 
the problem. This is a very narrow and false picture. Why? Do you really 
think that this is the case? I am convinced that Belgians’ intervention in 
Congo is something that should be presented as positive, not negative. I 
give you an example of the importance of this kind of link: Without 
Belgians, there would have been no EUSEC, for example, or, better, the 
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EUSEC would have been a failure. And it is clear that no one better than 
Belgians can deal with Congolese, the same as us [French] in Mali. 
                                                                                                          (Int. 22) 
Another interviewee agrees on this point: 
We must say we are extremely grateful to the Belgian armed forces for the 
massive contribution they made to EUPOL and EUSEC, we completely 
relied on this. And the Belgians we had in EUSEC, particularly the ones 
working in Kamina and Kitona, established a particularly good connection 
with Congolese and this helped enormously the mission. 
(Int.23) 
In these discourses, Belgians are seen as the interpreter, the mediators, the “only ones 
capable of dealing with the Congo”. If we push this argument further, we can reflect 
on the fact that the former colonial master is the one asked for “giving voice” and 
“representing” the Congo’s interests and priorities while making peace policies. 
Again, in another interview it is clearly and explicitly admitted: 
The Belgians are sticking with them in areas that are really important to us, 
like army reform and so on. And it is good for them to have a reliable 
partner. Whatever the motivation for that partnership is – and some of this 
must be to do with guilt- nevertheless the partner is reliable and is clearly 
going to be there for a long time and they speak out for them, and in the 
EU foreign policy the size of a member state does not necessarily give 
more or fewer influences of another member state. 
                                                                                                        (Int. 24) 
My argument is that in so doing, Belgium continues to represent its former colony and 
this limits Congolese subjectivity through a process already identified by Spivak’s 
study about western representation of subaltern subjects (Spivak, 1988, 1990). 
Belgians are representing DRC as “speaking for” them, and in the process of creating 
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policies, Belgians are often considered as substitutes for DRC representatives,  and 
experts in the field.  
This representation happens as an “embodiment” and takes place on a dialogical level, 
where the Congolese reality is portrayed by Belgian Officials within EU’s institutions 
and mediated by Belgian’s perception. In so doing, the former colonised identity is 
made to exist as part of a world essentially constructed by the former colonial 
subject
48
.  
According to a rick scholarship of authors, originated by the work of Spivak “Can the 
subaltern speak?” (1988) this process is dangerous as it takes away the DRC’s ability 
to speak in the sense that their speech would be affected by the very presence of those 
trying to give them a voice. 
The same results emerged also from an interview conducted with the Action Officer in 
the Crisis Response Planning Division of the EEAS. He is in charge of the 
coordination of activities for EUSEC DRC in Brussels, and he frequently travels to the 
Headquarters of the mission in Kinshasa. He is Italian, therefore we spoke Italian in all 
our conversation and this helped to put the interviewee at ease and to speak frankly. 
Once stimulated on talking about the relevance of a postcolonial narrative in his 
relationship with the recipients of the mission, the interviewee said: 
There is a description of Belgium as a coloniser. And of course, they 
[Congolese] consider the Europeans as Belgium’s ally. But, despite this, 
they love Belgium. You just have to consider that the most popular book 
there is “Tintin in the Congo”. The generation that is 40-50 years old 
knows this book by heart. I saw people doing wooden sculptures of all 
the characters of the book, really beautiful. And they like the comics 
because it is one of the few occasions in which they are in the spotlight.                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                         (Int.25) 
The interviewee is asserting that Belgium is not seen as coloniser anymore, and to 
prove this he mobilises a very interesting example: he explains that the most popular 
                                                          
48
 The same could be seen in Congolese historiography , where most of the authors writing about Congo 
history are Belgians. 
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book in DRC is “Tintin in the Congo”, a book edited by the Belgian cartoonist Hergé 
in 1931 on the adventures of a Belgian child detective in colonial Congo.   
This comic has been infamously known for being accused of “bundling right-wing, 
reactionary and racist viewpoints into its codes of visual representation and storylines” 
(Mountfort, 2011:33 and also Hunt, 2002).  
The comic, indeed, shows a racialised humour that portrays the Congolese as 
backwards and lazy, infantile and stupid, in need of European mastery.  For these 
reasons, in 2007, the UK Commission for Racial Equality asked for it to be removed 
from sale because of its "hideous racial prejudice" (see  Medran, Uriarte & López,  
2009). 
Coming back to the above interviewee, his argument was that the Congolese like 
Belgium because they read this comic, and that this very comic is one of the few 
moments in the story of the literature in which the Congolese are the protagonist.  
What is a clearly unproblematic concept for my interviewee, reveals some problematic 
aspects in terms of colonial prejudice. The fact that the Congolese are still reading this 
comic  might also shed light on another interesting aspect:  reading  “Tintin in Congo” 
that stigmatizes the Congolese as infantile, dumb and monkey-like can be interpreted 
as a signal that Congolese are still victims of their colonial past and stereotypes, rather 
than a proof of their good relationship with Belgians.   
The assertion that “Tintin in the Congo” is a popular book in DRC, could indeed lead 
to a rethink of how much the “master culture” was persistent, so as to remain 
crystallised in the culture of those who suffered from such discrimination. Indeed, 
according to what has been portrayed by the interviewee, Congolese do not feel 
uncomfortable in reading a story that treats themselves as ignorant quasi-human being.  
Moreover, it shows that this kind of narrative still operates today in the context of EU 
peacebuilding as its actors are embedded within the same colonial culture. It shows 
then, the pervasiveness and institutionalisation of such colonial prejudices.  
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2.2. Colonial Pride 
Connected with the first nodal point about the Belgians as an interpreter, there is a 
second one that focuses on the positive achievements of colonisation.  
The same interviewee that spoke about Tintin, went on in the argumentation, telling 
me an anecdote that reflects on this:  
Look, I became friends with a local– a civilian – who lived close to us. He 
was a smart guy; however, one day when I was telling him about the 
problems of the country and how things should be, he started again with 
the classic attack to Belgians. Like if every hell would come from there. In 
short, they use colonialism as an excuse. They have the tendency of 
accusing the white man of their problems, but I want to say: “what really 
Belgians did to you? They created mines, streets; the borders have been 
created by Europeans. Who made you become the biggest country in 
Africa? They are so proud of that!
 
                                                                 
                                                                                                           (Int. 25)
 
This colonial pride of having built the Congo is a leitmotif of all Congolese 
colonisation. We can, for example, remember the letter that Henry Spaak, Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs sent to the Belgian King in 1956 after his visit in Congo, 
saying that the Blacks should feel grateful to Belgium for having created the Congo 
and pacified it.  
Il n’ya jamais eu de nation congolaise. C’est la Belgique qui a apporté au 
Congo la paix en mettant fin aux guerres que les tribus ne cessaient de se 
faire. C’est peut-être ce que les noirs sentent plus fortement: cette sécurité 
que nous créée.
49
 
(HAEU, PHS-329) 
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 "There has never been a Congolese nation. It was Belgium that brought peace to the Congo by putting 
an end to the wars that the tribes were constantly making. That's perhaps what black people feel more 
strongly: the security that we create." [author own translation].  
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Another aspect worthy of discussion is the interest in showing the positive aspects of 
colonisation, such as the building of infrastructure, schools and hospitals in the Congo, 
but ignoring or leaving out, the brutalism, racism and imperialism which were part of 
the colonial endeavour. In this respect, Nina Wilen (2013) investigates how the 
Belgian Army – in the contemporary context -  idealizes Belgian colonial experience 
as the “golden age” of Congo.  
According to Wilen, this biased view might be derived from the Belgian literature on 
colonisation (see Evans, 2003) that reproduced the idea that Belgium as a country did 
not actively seek to colonise the Congo, but was called upon to take over the country 
after King Leopold II no longer was entitled to rule it. The thesis already touched upon 
this point in Chapter Four, unmasking the inaccurate claim of Belgians as a ‘reluctant 
coloniser’, which could also be considered as a prolongation of a discursive strategy 
that allows for the avoidance of reflection around their colonial role, as shown by the 
analysis of Bobineau (2017), already analysed in this thesis. 
In the context of the main argument, we could consider that the representation of the 
DRC might be therefore influenced by Belgian’s colonial history and by the interest 
that the country still has in Congo.  
Despite the positive and benevolent impetus of CSDP Officials working in DRC and 
their genuine ambition of “bringing peace”, representation of DRC  could be 
considered partial, if it is mediated by a dominant subjectivity that rarely questions the 
colonial era. 
 As an example, Louis Michel, the Belgian former EU development commissioner and 
current prominent Liberal MEP gave a speech calling King Leopold II, a "visionary 
hero”. In that period Michel was the vice-president of the EU's Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP). In this speech, he said: 
The Belgians built railways, schools and hospitals and boosted economic 
growth. Leopold turned the Congo into a vast labour camp? Really? In 
those days it was just the way things were done. […] We can easily be 
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tempted to exaggerate when it comes to the Congo. I feel instinctive that 
he was a hero, a hero with ambitions for a small country like Belgium.
50
 
 
Conclusion 
Despite colonialism being central to the story of European integration and its relations 
with African countries, this point is far from being recognised by EU Officers in 
charge of peacebuilding policymaking.   
In this chapter, it has been analysed to what extent colonialism has been taken into 
account by EU peacebuilding practitioners, by studying its discursive representation. 
Two main interlinked discursive strands have been recognised in the interview 
process: the one concerning the total irrelevance of colonial history for EU 
peacebuilding in DRC, and the other admitting a positive legacy of colonialism in 
contemporary peacebuilding in the DRC focusing on the relevance of former 
colonisers as experts. 
 Such discursive strands confirm the presence of colonial legacy in EU peacebuilding 
policymaking and the reproduction of colonial discourse. 
Indeed, the two ambivalent discursive strands indicate a colonial rationale that is based 
on the ambivalence of forgetting the colonial past but saving its positive legacy.  
Such colonial rationale is constructed on a discursive ambiguity: different and 
sometimes competing statements are contributing to building together a complex 
discourse based on a “dehistoricised Europe”. History, in other words,  is not 
considered relevant in the EU Official’s discourses but, at the same time, a partial 
consideration of historical events and colonial ties is evoked, when it is functional to 
the legitimisation of peacebuilding practices.  
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 To read the full version of the interview: Leigh Philipps, Ex-commissioner calls Congo's colonial 
master a 'visionary hero', Eu Observer, Jun 2010. Available at:  https://euobserver.com/foreign/30345. 
Luis Michel seems not to be the only nostalgic of the myth of King Leopold the II.  For instance, the 
17th December 2015 the City of Brussels organized a ceremony and a conference to celebrate the 150th 
anniversary of the coronation of King Leopold II, which was cancelled only the day before thanks to the 
effort of association fighting for human rights and against racism in Brussels. What is certain is that 55 
years after the independence, Belgium is still trying to position itself with respect of the ghost of 
colonialism.  
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This ambivalence allows the reproduction of a colonial regime of truth, where there is 
no space to question EU’s authority on defining the truth.  
In his sense, the discursive field of EU peacebuilding politics seems to be the complex 
and constitutive field of power relations allowed by the historical dimension of 
colonial discourse. 
Indeed, it is the selective and ambivalent conception of history that reinforces the 
peacebuilding regime of truth, where history becomes a “tactical element” (Lorenzini, 
2015:3)   in the functioning of power relations between EU and DRC.  
Moving from these findings, in the next chapter, the thesis will direct its inquiry to 
identify the possible consequences of such discursive production in peacebuilding 
policymaking and practice.   
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Chapter Seven 
 
Building Peace, Reproducing Discriminations 
 
 
 
“Acknowledging the colonial past, apologising for, it is 
important.  But the real question is one of the 
modifications of exploitation’s trajectories”  
                 (Colette Braeckman, author’s own translation) 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter explained how the colonial question is perceived and 
discursively represented among EU Officers in charge of working on peacebuilding 
policies in the DRC.   
Two main interlinked discursive strands were recognised: one concerning the 
disregard for the colonial history of EU peacebuilding in the DRC and the other 
admitting a positive legacy of colonialism in contemporary peacebuilding in the DRC, 
mainly vis à vis the role of the former coloniser.  
Building on these results, this chapter is using such evidence to take a step further.  
Indeed, here the focus is on exploring whether the way in which the colonial past is 
framed can have consequences on how peacebuilding policies are created. 
The absence of reflection on the colonial past and its representation as a positive for 
Congolese’ conflict resolution can frame a certain regime of truth, in which colonial 
knowledge might be reproduced.  
The focus of this research now moves to the analysis of such a regime that allowed the 
reproduction of a colonial discourse.  The main argument advanced is that a lack of 
self-reflection about the EU’s colonial past and the selective use of history (as the two 
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main discursive strands identified in the previous chapter) might lead to a reproduction 
of colonial bias within EU peacebuilding discourses and policies.  
In doing so, this chapter is structured with the following questions in mind:  
 What are the consequences of the presence of a “colonial legacy” for the 
construction of peacebuilding practices? 
 To what extent do current EU peacebuilding practitioners tend to reproduce 
colonial knowledge related to the DRC? 
 How is the lack of self-reflection about the EU colonial past leading to the 
reproduction of colonial stereotypes and biases? 
 
In the analysis of peacebuilding discourses, colonial biases are individuated in the 
reproduction of certain discursive strategies as part of colonial knowledge/power 
relations. 
Colonial discourses are studied and operationalised by using the interpretative tool that 
was explained in chapter two, in the context of a historical discourse analysis 
methodology with evidence gathered through interviews, archival research, 
documentary analysis, and participant observation.  
Thus, an analysis is provided of the discourses of EU peacebuilding policymakers 
concerning the recipients of such policies and the way in which such discourses are 
also co-constitutive of peacebuilding practices.  
To this end, the chapter is divided into two parts. Section one uncovers the 
reproduction of discursive strategies as supporting the continuity of the colonial 
discourse in peacebuilding.  Such discursive strategies are anchored in stereotypes 
about the recipients of peacebuilding policies as well as about the peacebuilders. 
The chapter analyses several stereotypes found in the interviews and in participant 
observation (the idea of a temporal gap, infantilisation of the local, the fragility, 
peacebuilding as a burden to the EU and the description of the Congolese as lax and 
violent).  This study reveals how such stereotypes tend to reproduce the classical 
dichotomist structure of colonial discourses within the peacebuilding framework. 
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Section two demonstrates that colonial discourses are also mirrored in the practices of 
peacebuilding. This leads to a peacebuilding practice that is ideologically built on the 
criterion of double standards and reproduces the marginalisation of the “local” in 
policymaking. 
 
1. Colonial Stereotypes Uncovered 
Bhabha (1994) has elaborated on the role of a “stereotype” as a major discursive 
strategy in colonial discourses in his path-breaking work The Location of Culture.  
Stereotype, as a mode of discourse, functions by exaggerating the difference of the 
Other, whilst nevertheless attempting to produce them as stable, fully knowable 
objects (see Hook, 2005).   
Chapter two showed that the stereotype in colonial discourse works as the main mode 
of identification of the coloniser and colonised, by operating on two main aspects: the 
fixity in the ideological construction of otherness and ambivalence (Bhabha, 2012; 94-
100). 
According to Bhabha, it is the ambivalence of the stereotype that ensures its 
repeatability “in changing historical and discursive conjunctures; informs its strategies 
of individuation and marginalisation; produces the effect of probabilistic truth and 
predictability which, for the stereotype, must always be in excess of what can be 
empirically proved or logically construed” (Bhabha, 2012; 94).   
In this section, the aim is to chart the function of stereotypes as a discursive strategy 
that allows the reproduction of colonial discourse in peacebuilding policymaking.  
Moreover, an account is provided that shows how stereotypes as forms of knowledge 
and identification are employed by EU personnel to represent the Congolese recipients 
of peacebuilding policies, and how the structure of peacebuilding policymaking relies 
on such knowledge production. 
The main stereotypes identified are a temporal gap between peacebuilder and 
recipients, an infantilisation of the local recipient, the definition of the Congolese as 
fragile, the construction of Congolese identity as lax and violent, and the consideration 
of the EU’s moral responsibility as a civilising burden. 
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1.1.  Temporal Gap 
As alluded in chapter two, Western historicism still feeds and legitimises the myth of 
modernity: the idea that there is a universal scale of development that teleologically 
unfolds towards a model of Western progress and modernity. In relation to Africa in 
particular, lacking modernity has been seen as an attribute fixed to the continent and 
linked to a sense of incomplete and primordial chaos (Mbembe, 2001).  
The classification of all non-Westerners as fundamentally non-historical is tied to the 
assumption that for history to be meaningful it must be moulded into a European shape 
(see Trouillot, 1995).  
 Hegel considered Africans as non-historic people and Marx carried over this 
Eurocentric bias (see Summer 1995). Based on the reports of European explorers such 
as the Victorian Richard Burton, Europeans dismissed Africa’s achievements, systems 
of thought, and values. In this sense, Africa was considered to be without history as it 
had nothing civilised or worth mentioning as history. This followed the pretention of 
Western epistemology as being the unilateral scale of measurement of every historical 
process. In the historical evolution of the European-African relationship (see chapter 
four), Europe undertook the role of nurturing Africa with the good characteristics of 
the European community in order to raise the continent from its primordial status and 
into a modern world. In a similar vein, many scholars considered that the EU’s foreign 
policy had the task of bringing some countries out of their pre-modern status (see 
Cooper, 2006 and Aggestam, 2008).   
Despite this, chapter four considered that more recently the EU had attempted to step 
back from this messianic role by performing a more pragmatic approach in the global 
system. The interviews conducted to confirm that the officials in charge of 
peacebuilding policymaking in the DRC tend to agree on a “developmental” idea of 
time, where Congo has not reached the “modern” EU status. 
Indeed, the typical idea of linear notions of progress and modernity in which Europe is 
at the apogee is another one of the relevant similarities to colonial discourses that were 
discovered in the interviews.  In particular, twelve of those interviewed stressed this 
concept of history and fell back to different discoursive stereotypes such as 
underdeveloped/ backwards/ premodern etc. For instance, one interviewee declared: 
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They are at least 60 years behind us and I used to tell my staff that building 
an army there [in the DRC] is like creating a European army at the 
beginning of the 50s in Europe. It is easy to criticise, but we have to 
acknowledge that in Congo 20 years of history are lacking. And if you 
consider it, they are doing progress, so it is important to provide help and 
to show them how to do better. They do not necessarily need money, but 
they need competences because, as I said, they are lacking at least 20 years 
of history. 
(Int.26)  
In this sense, the Congolese are seen as unequal or fundamentally different because 
they are incomplete and backwards; but they have the potential to become equal to the 
EU-self in the future. Moreover, in the interview excerpt presented above, what 
emerges is the idea that the Congolese “lack history” - referring to the specific Civil 
War period. Conflict is seen as a non-period, a sum of years in which the country 
receded instead of proceeding in the linear progression towards modernity.   
In this regard, it is interesting to notice that the two World Wars have often been 
contrarily considered by historians as triggering historical changes.  For example, 
Sondhaus considers that the First World War was an “accelerator of revolutionary 
changes on an unprecedented scale” (Sondhaus,  2011: i) and Polenberg (1968) argues 
that World War II was a catalyst for an accelerative change in global history. This 
might also be linked to Mary Kaldor’s (1999) idea about the difference between ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ war. She describes the ‘new’ conflicts – mainly in post-colonial areas – as 
predatory and irrational, politically illegitimate and driven by private interests, 
whereas ‘old’ conflicts were rational, constitutive of collective interest and politically 
legitimate.  This creates a moral divide between the Western way of “rational” war 
and the new “non-Western” conception and allows the author to argue for a necessary 
external peacebuilding intervention to bring the respect of international law into the 
post-colonial irrational chaos.   
Another interviewee repeats the same historical conception by replicating the typical 
myth of the EU as a peace ambassador, and as a constituent of the EU’s historiography 
“myth” (see Ifversen, 2010), thereby becoming a necessary thread in the idea of the 
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EU as a normative power (Manners, 2002). The EU can spread its peace message 
because it has already overcome that stage of the war, and once reached, the internal 
pacification can spread peace externally.  
We can teach them because we already overcame this stage [the war]. 
Europe was able to do that, and thanks to our experience we can tell those 
less advanced countries that it is possible to overcome crisis and conflicts. 
(Int. 27) 
In another passage from an interview with military staff working in EUSEC, we can 
see a different angle relating to the same topic: 
The problem of the Crisis Management Missions is that they have short-
term mandates, maximum 10-15 years. But the risk then is that there is no 
appropriation of the mission, no local ownership. And if we consider 
EUPOL and EUSEC that is a big drama. There should be a follow-up by 
the Commission but I am very sceptic. You know, the risk is that all the 
work we have done will be in vain, Congolese will not appreciate the work 
we have done, they will not follow up on our achievements. Exactly as 
when Belgians left. Here everything is crystallised in 1960 when the 
Belgians left. Congolese did not do anything to take care of what Belgians 
created. 
(Int. 28) 
The aspect to notice in this paragraph concerns ownership, whereby at the end there is 
a strong analogy between the EUSEC mission and the Belgian colonial period. The 
analogy is the following: according to the interviewee, once the EU mission ends the 
Congolese will not follow up the implementations and innovation brought, exactly as 
much as they did not continue the modernisation delivered by the Belgians. It seems 
that it is Europe (Belgium first and the EU currently) that will allow the DRC to 
progress in history by pushing the country ahead.  According to the interviewee, since 
the DRC is left alone it enters into a phase of “crystallisation” where there is no 
relevant local action to follow up the European “example”, and they, therefore, fall 
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into a phase of historical paralysis. It is up to the EU (and the Belgians before) to 
render the Congolese’s history meaningful by allowing it to proceed in its evolution. 
This argument is also frequently put forward in relation to another popular discourse: 
the one relating to the Belgians leaving the Congo too early
51
. When listening to 
peacebuilding policymakers both in the EEAS, DEVCO and ECHO, one idea echoed 
is that the Congolese’s never-ending conflict is due to the quick “departure” of 
Belgians. In such discourse, it is often reiterated that the Belgians should have 
remained longer to assist in a transition period. For instance, in the following excerpt a 
Belgian senior advisor of EU-Africa relations within the EEAS stated: 
 
“We left too early due to international pressure. Congo was not ready, and 
it is still paying the consequences of our sudden retreat”.  
(Int.29) 
It is interesting that in this utterance the speaker says “we left”, speaking from a 
Belgian standpoint and despite being asked for analysis as an EU expert. Interviewees 
from other EU countries confirmed, however, that there is a general perception that 
Belgian abandonment left the DRC in institutional paralysis, which still has to be 
solved. This view is broadly shared by the historiography as well (see for instance 
Edgerton, 2002).  
What is important to consider is that the interviewees who indicated that Civil War 
and the war-torn condition of the DRC were caused by the ‘abandonment’ of Belgium, 
do not also refer to the general colonial incursion and its disruptive effects as other 
possible causes of the DRC’s ‘fragility’.  
                                                          
51
  Historical commentaries very frequently describe the fact that the Belgians were sure to remain in 
the Congo for a very long period, and that the decolonial impetus obliged them to give the Congo its 
independence, even if they considered it a very premature step. Fore instance Michel  Amory, working 
in the Belgian Minister of Colony and the in the EURATOM said : « Alors plus tard je suis entré par 
hasard au service de l’Europe parce que j'étais, comme tous les Belges de l'époque, soumis à la 
tentation africaine, comme je dis. Le Congo avait participé brillamment à l'effort de guerre et tout le 
monde croyait que nous étions encore au Congo pour au moins trente ans. » ( HAEU, HistCom.2 « 
Histoire interne de la Commission européenne 1973-1986 ») 
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1.2. The Infantilisation 
Descriptions of the colonial native as ‘child‐like’ date back to the 17th century as 
common metaphors of American and European imperialism. The infantilisation of the 
colonial Other was diffused in infamous images from various comic renderings of the 
‘White Man’s Burden’, where the white man is feeding, teaching, and nurturing the 
black infant.  
Such a notion of colonised people as “big kids” whose intellectual capacity was 
different by nature or temporarily limited, was one of the ideological tricks used to 
legitimise local censorship, authoritarianism and the need for guidance in colonial 
times. For this purpose, colonial authorities saw themselves as protectors of 
individuals unable to exercise critical judgment (see Goerg, 2012).  
Infantilisation, in fact, transforms the native from a free subject into a helpless, non‐
aggressive individual without agency. More importantly, infantilisation implies the 
creation of a strong power relation between the “adult”- white and the “child”- native 
(Nayar, 2015: 95). Given this power relation, the child-native becomes the 
responsibility of the white adult who can discipline, educate, improve, and modify the 
child, acting on their behalf and wishing for their improvement.  
Moreover, the child‐native’s wishes might be ignored or changed because it is 
assumed that the child speaks from a position of ignorance (ibid). In the case of India, 
the British were even referred to by the natives as ‘mai‐baap’: ‘our mother and father’ 
(see also Gilmour, 2006).  
The use of infantilisation can be retraced in the discourses in the Congo in the period 
just before their independence when the Belgians were considering whether to include 
the Congo in the European Common Market. For instance, during the conference in 
1959 on “Le Développement économique du Congo dans la Perspective du Marché 
Commun”, the Congo was described as a teenager, an ungrateful age in which the 
tutor is still necessary but its intervention must be less invasive and more careful: 
On a pu dire, avec justesse, que le Congo était arrivé à l’âge de la 
puberté, cet ‘âge ingrat’ ou le tuteur reste encore nécessaire, mais ou ses 
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interventions doivent être empreintes de la plus grande délicatesse.
52
                                                                                                                                    
                                                                 (HAEU, LECE-0316_03) 
Anticolonial movements and postcolonial nation-building saw concerted attempts by 
colonised and newly-independent peoples to assert their agency and challenge the 
infantilism imposed on them by colonialism. Despite this, allusions to infantilism 
persist in western discourses and imageries and continue to resonate within 
contemporary geopolitics and development.  
Several postcolonial scholars have attempted to call attention to such discursive 
strategies in today’s global politics (see Baaz 2005; Burman 1995; McEwan 2009). In 
the same way, this study can be an added value to such voices.   
Indeed, persistent discursive strategies of infantilisation have been found in the EU 
practitioner speeches. In particular, while discussing the different peacebuilding 
strategy implemented and the reasons behind this, seven interviewees used this kind of 
discursive strategy to legitimise the role of the EU and their job as peacebuilder. 
For instance, in the following paragraph, the interviewee is comparing the soldiers 
trained by EUSEC to a child starting to walk on its own feet. 
EUSEC is entered in its conclusive phase because fifteen years have 
passed and now the child is ready to walk alone. […] Yes it is like when 
you have a child: We expected the moment and we saw that they were 
able to stand with their own feet. Of course, we are not abandoning them, 
and the project “Progress” under the eleventh EDF will monitor the work 
done so far. We will follow our baby. It took us so long to achieve certain 
standards that we will not abandon the military sector there once we 
finally get some results . 
(Int. 30) 
Several other speeches referring to the Congo as a child dramatically recall the 
colonial discourses and the use of infantilisation rhetoric in colonial Congo. As a 
further example: 
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HAEU, LECE-0316_03. Le Développement économique du Congo dans la Perspective du Marché 
Commun.pg 58. 
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They never experienced real democracy. They moved from Belgium to 
Mobutu and Kabila. It was always someone to tell them what to do, and 
this trait emerges in our relationship with Kinshasa. They do not know 
how to build their own free institutions and how to stop the conflict. That 
is our major tasks. They are young and they need experienced advice on 
how to build a solid state. And we started from the military sector reform 
as it was the most problematic. After several years of activities, this 
Office is proud to say that we allowed the army to improve, being more 
accountable and respecting rights. 
(Int. 31) 
In this interview excerpt, the Officer is saying that the DRC is young and lacks 
experience because it has always been dominated by authoritarian powers. In finding 
an answer to this, his argument seems regulated by an infantilisation discourse, 
reminiscent of an earlier period: the EU has to teach the young DRC how to stop 
conflicts and build solid institutions.  
The infantilisation here seems to provide further strength to the idea of EU normative 
power explored in chapter one, and its capacity to export norms and act as a model. It 
certainly seems that the EU normative power is imbued with colonial stereotypes.  
In the understanding of continuities and discontinuity from the colonial past, however, 
it is important to make a step further and consider also the changes that are in these 
discursive strands. Indeed, whereas the strategy of infantilisation seems to retrace 
quite the same logic as old colonial stereotypes, it is also interesting to acknowledge 
that it triggers a key difference from the colonial time to the present. Indeed, the 
pedagogical rationality underpinned in the infantilisation process, we will follow our 
baby/ They are young and they need experienced advice, is also associated with a 
more technocratic perspective: achieve certain standards/we finally get some results. 
Such technocratic discourses use a patronising approach not just for the sake of 
‘teaching’ the infants/childish recipients but to pursue a specific technical goal. The 
union of old colonial discourse with this new technocratic arguments is very peculiar 
in this sense, and resonate broadly in other discourses analysed.  
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In this sense, Keene (2013) talks about the substitution of the ‘European civilisation’ 
for a kind of administrative and international ‘best practice’, in which the EU is one 
kind of competent, technically expert bureaucratic regulating mechanism in a world 
made up of exactly identical mechanisms. This is seen as a challenge for the EU’s 
ability to maintain its own sense of international identity and its ‘normative 
difference’.  
However, we see here that instead of substitution of discourses, there is more of a 
coexistence of the two: the technocratic argument remains with the more traditional 
civilisation discourse. 
Even acting on two different levels, pedagogical rationality and technocratic 
rationality are both reinforcing the binary between donor/recipient, EU/DRC with the 
effect of perpetuating dependency. In fact, this process moves in quite the opposite 
way to the official declarations about EU-African partnership and the goal of 
overcoming the donor/recipient relationship acclaimed at the Joint European African 
Strategy from 2007. On the contrary, this paternalistic way of conducting 
peacebuilding might create and perpetuate dependency instead of allowing 
autonomous ownership of the peace process.  
i. The Orphan 
The DRC is often used as a counter-example to another metaphor that emerges 
frequently when discussing Central African countries: the orphan. 
The metaphor of “Orphan State” is a recurring one within EEAS/DEVCO/ECHO, to 
refer to states where few international actors are engaged in peace and development 
policies, despite the fact that there are no significant political barriers to block 
international engagement in the country. These “orphan states” are also often 
considered “aid orphans”, due to the exclusionary effects of peacebuilding and aid 
policies in such war-torn states.   
In practice, the “orphans” are those countries that do not have the protection of 
international states and organisations. This is due to the absence of political interest – 
often where there are no former European colonial masters that lobby for them 
(Liberia for example), or those abandoned by the former colonial power. In this last 
case, it is very recurrent in the description of the Central African Republic (CAR), 
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where European states do not have an interest in putting forward a strong 
peacebuilding policy. 
In almost all the speeches during a conference on Conflict Analysis in Central Africa 
that took place on the 16
th
 April 2016 in Brussels (organised by EEAS and the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations DPKO) there was a reference to the need to 
break the isolation of orphan states, primarily CAR, but also Burundi.  
The use of the word orphan, however, is not casual and is part of the process of 
infantilisation previously discussed in this chapter. Orphan, indeed, is a word charged 
with colonial symbolism that sees the power relations among states similarly to within 
a family, where colonies are seen as the immature children and the colonial masters 
are the mature, protective, and severe parents. As often expressed in the colonial 
literature, motherland provides a comforting shelter for its colonies as in a family. And 
even if the individual state is granted its independence, the old imperial centre will still 
be 'the mother country' (see for example the analysis of Hanley, 1994). In this sense, 
an orphan (state) is one that has been abandoned by the mother (land) or that has lost 
the mother (land) irrevokably. The use of Congolese as a counter-metaphor has been 
used by four interviewees, whereas other five interviewees agreed on this use after my 
initial suggestion. As an example, the following excerpt explains: 
The EU will have always a special relationship with his former colonies. 
Even if we should not discriminate where a country is a former colony or 
not intervene, and we need to make a strong and neutral analysis, but the 
interest orient the EU toward those places. That is why we talk about the 
Orphan States. I would argue that it should not be like that because, as a 
point of principle, we should not discriminate and then we should address 
where the needs are greatest through our peacebuilding instruments. 
(Int. 32) 
As mentioned, it is interesting that the DRC is used as a counter-example to this 
metaphor, to highlight the strong bonds with its ‘motherland’. In this regard, the 
condition of “protectorate” is a positive factor in peacebuilding policymaking, as it 
allows non-orphan countries to benefit from more attention and more lobbying for 
their interests. 
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 Of course, there is the case of the orphan states, that do not have the 
protection of any member states that could advocate for them in our fora. 
But there are only a few of them, and Congo with this regard is well 
protected. 
(Int. 33) 
It is also remarkable to notice how this utterance seems to articulate an ambivalent 
relationship with the discursive strand about the non-relevance of colonial ties in 
current peacebuilding, and how this reflects the complex intertextual ambivalence of 
colonial discourse. Indeed, the obliviousness of colonial history seems once again in 
contradiction with the selective use of colonial ties, when required by the goal of 
peacebuilding policies.  
 
1.3. Fragility and Failure 
The belief in a linear sense of history and development based on European standards, 
for which the DRC’s history makes sense only if compared to the EU’s historical 
steps, can also be related to another discursive strategy that portrays the DRC as a 
fragile state.  
In chapter two, the concept of state fragility or collapsed states was unpacked from a 
postcolonial angle, considering that the term “failed states” is misleading. The 
criticism of the notion of a failed state is recurrent in literature, so prominent and 
thought-provoking contrasting examples are offered here, in the context of the usage 
of this term in the case of EU peacebuilding policymaking towards the DRC. 
As Tusalem (2016) notices, if we need to work within the concept of “failure” in post-
colonial countries, the causes of such failure should be mostly attributed to the 
colonial domination, rather than to the incapacity of the state itself to autonomously 
recover. Furthermore, the idea of failed states is attributed to very “young” states. It is 
to say, that those states are considered failed from the very beginning of their history 
as self-determined nations.   
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Deepening the analysis on the case of the DRC, and how this concept is framed in the 
construction of EU peacebuilding policies, it is relevant to notice that a precondition to 
any EU peacebuilding policy in the country is the consideration that the DRC is a 
fragile state.  
The concept of fragility is indeed extremely significant in creating peacebuilding 
practices as the discourses around fragility generate a series of policies aimed at 
“strengthening” the fragile state and avoiding it “relapsing” into violence and conflict.  
It is very common for statements on the DRC to start with a description of the country 
as fragile: 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is widely recognised as one 
of the most fragile states in the world. The incapacity of the state to deliver 
basic services to its population is a convincing indicator of fragility. 
 (ECA, 2013)
53
 
State building and progress in good governance are at the centre of the 
EU-DRC partnership. The context of extreme fragility prevailing in the 
DRC will need to be taken into consideration and defining priorities is 
necessary. 
(EEAS, 2011)
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The majority of the interpretations within the EU’s documents, factsheets and papers 
on the DRC link this fragility to the Congo Wars and tend to avoid the inclusion of 
colonialism as one of the causes of such fragility. For example, we see: 
Due in particular to the conflicts that have punctuated its history over the 
last two decades, the DRC is considered a fragile country.  
(EC, 2014) 
Or 
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The DRC’s human development index is one of the lowest in the world 
(0.361 = 177th rank out of 179 countries according to the UNDP). All 
this is the consequence of decades of dictatorship under President 
Mobutu Sese Seko, followed by regional wars (1997 and 1998-2002) 
leading to the death of an estimated 4-5 million people. Today, the DRC 
can be considered as a fragile post-conflict state. 
 (EEAS, 2016) 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this is a sign of “presentism” (Calligaro, 2015), 
where the EU is evoking a past to justify the present situation. But history itself is 
subject to a process of selection, where only that which is instrumental to the EU is 
relevant. Such accounts systematically fail to acknowledge that the structural 
weakness of Africa’s states can be traced to the colonial era and the peculiar nature of 
the political institutions that were imposed on African societies by their colonisers (see 
Englebert and Tull, 2008). The notion of DRC as failed and fragile state has been 
adopted and internalised widely also by Congolese authors. It is worth mentioning the 
case of prominent Congolese professor of African Studies, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja. 
The author is a prominent voice of Congolese autonomous recovery and critic of 
external interventions in the country (see Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1998; 2004; 2006 among 
others). Besides his well-known scepticism regarding UN and EU interventions, his 
pan-African view on the conflict on the Great Lake region,  Nzongola-Ntalaja makes 
use of the idea of Congo as failed state – such as in his exemplary paper on “The 
Failing State in the Democratic Republic of Congo” (2012) in which he attributing to 
this term a neutral and ahistorical sense proper of what Mignolo would call a ‘colonial 
grammar’.  
There is a lot to unpack with regard to the concept of failed states. But in this context, 
it should mainly be considered that the very concept of fragile state, as used in the 
EU’s peacebuilding in the DRC, embodies a colonial stereotype through which we 
analyse the DRC’s state development based on the European nation-state blueprint. In 
this sense, the concept of fragility is influenced by what Qujano (2010) defines as a 
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colonial rationality/coloniality that orders the world in accordance with former 
colonial marks.  
This idea of fragility or failure reinforces a sense of the DRC’s marginality from the 
EU’s progress and again represents the DRC in terms of absence (of a state, of peace) 
and therefore as a “terra nullius” to fill with ad hoc peacebuilding policies.  Hence, the 
underpinning idea is that the DRC failed as a state and that the EU has to bring it back 
“on track”.   
In addition, it can also be argued that it is not only the peacebuilding policy aimed at 
recovering failed states that has a colonial bias but that the term ‘failed states’ contains 
a colonial assumption. At no point in the postcolonial era has the DRC looked like an 
ideal type of the modern European policy. 
Therefore, the DRC seems failed even before starting a state-building process. As 
Englebert and Tull (2008) put it, “The evidence is overwhelming that most of Africa’s 
collapsed states at no point in the postcolonial era remotely resembled the ideal type of 
the modern Western polity”. As Patience Kabamba put it “the ‘failed’ state in Congo 
is not a reflection of Congolese ‘underdevelopment’; it is what remains of the colonial 
state in Africa” (Kabamba,2012). This invented perspective can also be the point of 
departure of a different analysis of the conflict. Indeed, instead of understanding 
Congolese as incapable of reaching a stable state, it considers that experienced and 
motivated Congolese actors will be able to rebuild their own country and overcoming 
the painful colonial burden (see also Bussy and Gallo 2016).  
 
1.4.  The EU’s Burden 
The notion that the African continent is still divided into distinct spheres of influence 
when it comes to EU crisis management is a recurring feature of the discursive 
representations expressed by the interviewees There is an unwritten rule that assigns 
the leadership task of EU assistance to certain African countries to their former 
colonisers, and this is widespread within the different EU departments. In addition to 
this, some of the people that reflected on this ‘unspoken rule’ attributed to this racial 
connotation that recall the white man’s burden and the moral legitimation of the 
intervention. Others where rather legitimising this special relationship in 
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peacebuilding with more cultural arguments, linked with the idea of the Belgians as 
experts and interpreters of Congolese society and politics as shown in the previous 
chapter. Others were instead considered this only coincidental, thus undermining the 
relevance of this issue. However, when I was asking my interviewees to reflect on the 
reasons why Belgian officials were so involved in the EU peacebuilding missions in 
DRC, it is worth noticing that nine Officers answered by providing an argument that 
was based on a moral responsibility of the Belgians to act, even within the EU 
framework.   
This updated version of the white man’s burden is justified not only by cultural links 
and economic interest but also with regard to moral responsibility:  
If the Belgians did not lead the EU coalition in Congo, the situation would 
have been worse, maybe a new genocide. So, you know on human rights 
they should tell us “congratulations”, and being more objective. Because 
people do not want to see any former colony intervening in Africa. But we 
don’t have another choice; we have to do it. It is a question of moral 
responsibility because nobody apart of France would intervene in Mali. 
And everybody would say to France: “Hey why don’t you intervene?” And 
behind you have the Ruanda genocide. And after Rwanda, all Western 
country are reluctant to intervene in Africa. It is a moral responsibility. In 
Central Africa, they say: “This is your, France, this is your obligation”. Is 
a sort of division of competences that is written nowhere. Somebody has to 
do the job. There is a lot of hypocrisies behind that because they are all 
fighting the former colony but when there is money to spend they always 
ask the former colony. 
(Int. 34) 
The former head of EUSEC also partly confirmed this picture:  
There is a moral responsibility, if you have former colonies, to take care of 
them. And within the crisis bunch in the EU we do take care of these 
sensitivities and when choosing where to engage in operation we cannot 
deny that we have to see the bigger picture, and where our member states 
feel more the urge of intervening. 
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(Int. 35) 
But the moral responsibility is not linked to the recognition of the past exploitation in 
the colonies, and therefore the need to act in the DRC is not seen as reparation. It is, 
on the contrary, associated with the need to be there again and to repeat the 
motherland-offspring relationship. In fact, when asked to clarify the concept of moral 
responsibility, the interviewees said that it comes from a sense of proximity, a shared 
memory, or: 
It is a linked destiny. A linked history. We feel much closer to the 
countries we shared the same past. But it is not for reparation. We do not 
believe in reparation. This would be just one more pretext for Kabila to 
criticise Western powers and ask money at the same time, a tactic that, for 
instance, he has been employing for all the length of EUSEC. 
(Int. 36) 
In this respect, the idea of a linked destiny very much recalls the justification that 
Belgium gave to lead the international intervention in Congo, just after independence 
in 1960.  
For example, in a letter addressed to Henry Spaak, Belgian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, one of his staff exposed that, in spite of the risk of being considered neo-
colonialist or chauvinist, he asserted the Belgians were the only ones able to lead the 
international assistance of the Congo: 
Mais à cet égard, je veux ne pas m'exposer de ta part au soupçon de "néo 
colonialisme ", encore moins de chauvinismes èconomico-politique. Il y a 
beau temps que je suis convaincu de la nécessité d'une large 
internationalisation des influences et des actions. Il faut s'y prêter, 
davantage : la favoriser. Cependant, le fait est là : pour le temps présent, 
c'est encore aux belges et à la Belgique qu'incombe, malgré qu'on en 
puisse avoir, le leadership de l'assistance sous ses diverses formes. Je dis: 
le leadership, non la charge totale, ni toutes les modalités, assurément. 
Mais la preuve est incontestablement faite - depuis trois ans et demi - que 
seuls des belges - ou ceux qui participent ou ont participé de l'action 
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colonisatrice belge - sont, sauf de très rares exceptions, capables 
d'efficacité et susceptibles de crédit et de confiance quels que soient les 
coups durs qu'on ait encaisses.
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                                                                              (HAEU, PHS-328_01) 
 
1.5. The Lax and Warlike Congolese 
As previously observed (chapter three and chapter four), many early Europeans’ 
modes of representing Africans were based on a stereotypical basis that tended to 
diminish and criticise the colonised so as to rhetorically produce a common belief in 
the ‘natural’ inferiority and delinquency of native subjects and cultures.   
These representations were sometimes made by conscious colonial propaganda that 
justified racial apartheid and allowed maintaining hegemonic control over territories 
under conquest. In other cases, dominant discourses were dispersed unconsciously by 
Western people, through spreading representations naturalised in the Western belief. 
In the fifties, the views of European scientists were not substantially different. In 1954 
Dr Carothers of the World Health Organisation declared that the African was the 
physiological equivalent of a European who had had a frontal lobotomy (Lister,1997).   
Such representations can easily be found for the Congolese in all the different phases 
of the Belgian occupation, and examples were provided in chapter four.  
What is relevant in this discussion is that even after decolonisation, these hegemonic 
discourses persisted. This cemented and perpetuated what Mignolo (2010) calls 
coloniality of power: where our contemporary world arose from colonial differences.  
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 “But with this respect, I do not want to expose myself to the suspicion of "neo-colonialism", or of 
economic-political chauvinism. It has been a long time since I am convinced of the need for a broad 
internationalisation of influences and actions. It is necessary to lend to it, more: to favor it. However, 
the fact is there: for the present time, it is still to Belgians and to Belgium that is charged with the 
burden of the leadership of the assistance in its various forms, despite of its capability of being able to 
lead it. I say: leadership, not the total burden, or all the modalities, certainly. But the evidence is 
unquestionably made - for three and a half years - that only Belgians - or those who participate or have 
participated in the Belgian colonial action - are, with very rare exceptions, capable of efficiency and 
capable of reliability and confidence whatever rolling with the punches is needed”. [author’ own 
translation]  HAEU, PHS-328_01. Letter from A.S.Gerad to P.H. Spaak, 1964 
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What is interesting for this chapter is to identify how much the European Community 
and the EU later took over the role of reproducing such representations. For instance, 
in the secret résumé of the meeting of 1964, during an ad hoc Committee on Congo, it 
is stated that it is important to remember that political opposition in Congo does not 
have any ideological feature, because they believe that blacks are not able to be a 
“faithful enemy”: 
Nous croyons qu'un semblant de calme pourrait être établi, grâce à une 
solution politique. Il ne faut pas oublier que ce qui sépare l’opposition du 
pouvoir n’a aucun caractère idéologique. On a pu dire des Noirs qu'ils 
sont fidèles dans leurs amitiés: ils ne le sont pas dans leurs inimitiés.
56
 
                  (HAEU, PHS-334)  
A characteristic that was constantly present in the way the Belgians described the 
Congolese is the representation of them as lax, negligent and careless. This mode of 
representation was intended to maintain hegemonic control over the Congolese, and 
the myth served to enslave and submit the Congolese to severe discipline. In the 
period of the Congo Free State, the infamous punishment for indigenous indolence 
was hand cutting or flagellation with the “chicotte”, a heavy leather whip. But severe 
corporal punishments from the white master remained praxis even after 
decolonisation, above all in the mining sector (see example in chapter five). 
The idea of the Congolese as lax seems to remain present in the European description 
of activities in the field of cooperation and development. 
Specifically, in several reports of the European Development Fund, there is always a 
reference to the indolence of the target population. Indeed, it is not rare to find 
statements such as « Une gestion laxiste redressèe” or “insuffisante discipline et 
volonté de travail de la main-d’oeuvre”57.  
                                                          
56
 
“
We believe that a semblance of calm could be established, thanks to a political solution. It must not 
be forgotten that what separates opposition from power is not ideological. It has been said that blacks 
are faithful in their friendships: they are not in their enmities” (author’s own translation)   HAEU, PHS-
334. Comité ad hoc sur l'Afrique. 25 Juin 1964 
 
57
 « A lax management rectified » or «  insufficient discipline and willingness to work of the 
workforce » [author own translation] HAEU, CCE INF.1982 157/82 Rapport de mission de contrôle du 
secteur ''coopération et développement'' au Congo du 21 au 26 juin 1982  
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Surprisingly, complaints about the indolence of the Congolese and the subsequent 
need to redeem them are still present. In a conversation with EU civil servants in 
charge of peacebuilding policies, some Policy Officers in the EUSEC Mission 
described their work and experiences in Kinshasa as follows: 
First time I arrived in Kinshasa I was shocked seeing all the military doing 
nothing, just being sat in the main boulevard of this gigantic city. They do 
not have our spirit of initiative, and there is little we can do to change this. 
Of course, we can reopen the military schools, as we did in Katanga, we 
can rationalize human resources and give strategic advice, but they don’t 
have the vision, I mean the vision of seeing the full project and contribute 
to it. They just don’t like working, do not like challenges and putting 
efforts to achieve a goal. 
(Int. 37) 
 Every time we tried to suggest them a better strategy in the army reform – 
like the brilliant idea to reform to the chain of payments - the first answer 
we had is that we are imposing something. But we don’t want to impose 
anything. And in these circumstances, we had to raise our voice. Although 
I know it is a bitter defeat the fact that we have to raise our voice, but 
sometimes there are no alternatives. 
(Int. 38) 
When we started the mission, the local staff was paid monthly, but we 
quickly realised that they did not know how to save money and how to 
spend it rightly –most of them were dissipating money in alcohol – so we 
started paying them weekly and now we pay them every three days.                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                 (Int. 39) 
These interview statements show certain similarities with stereotypes inherited from 
the colonial period because they are regulated according to similar principles. As 
stated, colonial stereotypes are not always unifying and monolithic concepts.  
The same can be said for the depiction of the Congolese by the EU peacebuilding 
officials. In their words, locals are considered indolent and lazy rather than proactive, 
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and also violent and warlike. In the following parts, for example, there is a reflection 
on the idea that the Congolese are not seeking peace: 
[…] they don’t want peace because they do not know how to live in a 
pacified country and they cannot profit from peace. 
 (Int. 40)  
Sometimes I wonder if they actually want peace. The EU is investing 
enormously in peace efforts in Congo and after years what is the result? 
There are still several rebel groups at war, supported by the population. 
FDLR and  Lord's Resistance Army, are still there. We can offer them a 
way forward but we cannot change their mind. 
(Int. 41) 
Such discursive instability, which was already seen as being part of all colonial 
discourses, is highlighted as a fundamental instance of the deployment of colonial 
authority. This does not imply that among the 62 interviewees contacted for this study, 
all referred to the Congolese as lax or warlike. Some interviewees used rather a more 
bureaucratic or technocratic language to approach the topic and did not mention any 
‘emotional’ representation of the Congolese. However, it is important to notice than 
eleven of the interviewed – among which the extracts are present in this thesis –
mentioned different linguistic variations of the same discourse, making it is very 
representative for the topic under study.   
Within the sample, it can be said that both the idea of lax and violent Congolese are 
functional to the EU’s peacebuilding justifications: CSDP can have a heavy-handed 
implementation as it is the only one to “shake” the lax locals, but at the same time this 
might not work because the inner soul of Congolese is considered warlike. 
In this context, it is worth recalling that these stereotypes are not limited to the EU 
discourses in DRC. We saw that in the case of the EU, some of the interlocutors were 
able to ‘tag’ the Congolese by making references to their common past, to historical 
ties. However, it is worth pointing out that such discourses, anchored in a racist 
matrix,  have been widely documented also in the case of UN missions in the country. 
For instance, Iñiguez de Heredia (2012) considered that it is not uncommon to hear 
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UN officials and diplomats tagging Congolese as ‘corrupt’, ‘lazy’, ‘opportunistic’, 
‘selfish’ or ‘backward’. She also considered how ‘bad-mouthing techniques’ had been 
instrumental to justify the indispensability of the MONUC mission (Ibid.). As in the 
case of this thesis, such stereotypes suggest that it is ultimately the fault of the 
Congolese, both elites and non-elites, for being in the situation they are. If we were to 
accept these complaints and critiques, we would immediately exonerate the 
interlocutors of their responsibility, acknowledging that they are doing their best. In 
this sense, we see that these colonial discourses are ‘travelling’ from the direct 
colonial master to be used in the broader language of the ‘developed’/peacebuilder. It 
similar to the case described by Spivak in her understanding of ‘stretching’ the idea of 
colonial discourse and a method of theoretical analysis that goes beyond the traditional 
master/slave relationship and becomes a global ‘way of worlding’ towards words 
anchored in racist stereotypes (see Spivak, 1985 and Nichols, 2010).  
Another important consideration is to be done for those colonial discourses that are not 
present. If, on the one hand, several important discourses seems to proceed along a 
line of continuity, we saw that others are not represented in the body of statements 
analysed. For instance, in the interviews performed and in the documents analysed,  
there has not been any trace of statements based on the role of ethnicities in Congo. As 
we saw in Chapter Five, Belgians had an important role in consolidating and 
transforming the mythology of ethnic difference, and several scholars considered that 
this is one of the causes of the conflict in DRC (see for instance Karbo & Mutisi, 
2012). A possible explication of this might be found in what Autesserre (2012) 
considered about the discourses on interventions in DRC, claiming that certain 
discourses are not reproduced as they cannot be translated in easily applicable 
peacebuilding policy solutions for the international interveners.  
But what is the impact of such discourse on peacebuilding? If the majority of people 
interviewed believe that the Congolese are lax or not proactive towards change, how 
can they draft and promote policies based on local ownership?  
In the second half of the chapter, we will see how the reproduction and fixation of 
such colonial classificatory, discriminatory discourses have an impact on practices. It 
is argued that this process de-authorises the Congolese from their capacity of self-
reliance and creates a much more top-down approach to peacebuilding, discarding the 
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relevance of a joint understanding of the projects, and leaving to locals the task of 
passively accomplishing the EU’s diktat (receiving moneys, follow up army reforms, 
accept the SSR as the EUMS decided to implement it, etc.).  
 
2. Double Standards in EU Peacebuilding Practices 
 
There is a high probability that the descriptions of the Congolese as childish, immature 
and war-like, and needing to be redeemed and pushed by the Europeans to reach 
modernity and development, has an impact on the way peacebuilding practices are 
created.  
The goal of this last section is to uncover to what extent a lack of reflection about 
colonialism (as seen in chapter six), and the persistence of colonial stereotypes in the 
EU’s official statements, has an impact on peacebuilding practices as well.  
Several authors already identified the asymmetry of power in international 
peacebuilding (see Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond,  2002; Sabratnam, 2011 among 
others) and in chapter one an overview was provided relating to the academic debate 
on this. Here, I will draw on these authors to move the argument further and claim that 
such asymmetry in EU peacebuilding policies could be explained by the reproduction 
of a colonial knowledge within the peacebuilding system itself.  This means that the 
colonial knowledge/power naturally permeates not only statements and standpoints of 
the EU officials but also directs their action while creating policies, and therefore has 
an impact on the way peacebuilding policies are created. Moreover, we can see how 
speeches and practices are mutually influencing themselves in the reproduction of 
colonial asymmetries, as the binomial power/knowledge is flowing towards the 
colonial discourse.  
In so doing, I will show that the discursive strategies discussed in the previous section 
affect EU peacebuilding practices in the DRC in two ways: they maintain colonial bias 
in relation to the subject of colonialism (towards a marginalisation of the local) and in 
relation to the object of peacebuilding (towards the deployment of double standards).  
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2.1 The Marginalisation of the Local in EU Peacebuilding Policymaking 
Chapter one emphasised the academic debate about the conceptual importance of 
“local involvement” in contemporary peacebuilding practices. It demonstrated that 
several scholars argue that the logic of peacebuilding is an “alien” form of rule to the 
local people (Sabaratnam, 2010: 3) and “alienating” (ibid) to the extent that it actively 
underestimates local efforts to reach an autonomous recovery. EU Studies engages in 
these debates in two ways: some scholars tend to emphasise the innovative bottom-up 
approach of the EU in peacebuilding (see Richmond, Björkdahl & Kappler, 2011) 
which is able to promote bottom-up peace due to its value-based role in the 
international sphere, whereas other scholars pinpoint EU peacebuilding shortfalls and 
its incapability of bringing true emancipatory peacebuilding (Rutazibwa, 2010). 
 
Moving the debate further, this thesis intends to show that the shortfall in building 
what has been considered in the “emancipatory peace” (see Richmond, 2007 and 
2011) might be associated with the discursive structure of EU peacebuilding practices 
that reflects colonial knowledge/power relations. 
 
Finally, as already argued elsewhere (Rayroux and Wilén, 2014) despite an important 
discursive emphasis on ownership, the idea of local ownership itself seems a 
constructed concept. The concept of “local” is often mobilised by the EU as a panacea 
of legitimacy, even if we saw that a closer look reveals it is not really taken into 
account in the peacebuilding process.  
 
Mobilising the example of EU peacebuilding in the DRC, we see in this final section 
that the stereotypes analysed previously were not only supporting and naturalising a 
colonial knowledge but also converting it into EU peacebuilding practices in the DRC, 
thereby reproducing the complex colonial discourse or what we could call the 
“colonial matrix of power”. Indeed, according to what I observed during the 
traineeship experience at the EEAS, and what resulted from the data gathering, the 
“local” is still marginalised and not taken into account in the process of making 
peacebuilding policies. I would argue that the discursive subjectification of the 
Congolese as infants, lax, violent, and “failed” has a strong impact in this process of 
marginalisation. The lack of European-like institutions and the lack of “peace” fix the 
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Congolese in a pre-modern status that excludes them from the ownership of the peace 
process.  
 
There are several observations that are relevant here. First, the old practice of 
international policymakers gathering in Brussels to decide what is to be done about the 
DRC conflict without significant local representation continues unchanged. This is 
evident at the very beginning of the chain of peacebuilding when conducting the so-
called “needs assessment” and the Recovery and Peace Building Assessments 
(RPBAs)
58
.  
 
While RPBAs are supposed to be undertaken by a range of actors, including national 
and local government representatives and members of civil society groups, local 
voices are hardly ever taken into account. A good example of this was provided during 
a conference on Conflict Analysis in Central Africa that took place on the 16
th
 April 
2016 in Brussels, organised by EEAS and DPKO. This event, which was considered 
very important for the EEAS (the whole team of the Central African Units was 
working to prepare this conference for four months), did not involve the presence of 
any local people. 
 
Among the more than 50 people present (EEAS, ECHO, DEVCO, DPKO, 
MINUSCA, MONUSCO, UNDP, UNOCA, UNOLOPS, WEB  and experts from 
Médecins Sans Frontières, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Mercy Corps and 
International Crisis Groups) there was no delegation from African Union states. 
 
Another more recent example is the Humanitarian Conference on the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) organised on 13 April 2018 by OCHA, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the EU. In this donor conference, the format is always “for donors 
                                                          
58
 The RPBA, previously known as Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) is a standardised 
mechanism that allows for identifying the underlying causes and impacts of conflict and crisis. It is used 
by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union who have committed to providing 
joint support for assessing, planning, and mobilising efforts geared towards recovery, reconstruction, 
and development in countries affected by crises as part of the 2008 Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis 
Assessment and Recovery Planning. RPBAs include both the assessment of needs and the national 
prioritisation and costing of these needs in an accompanying transitional results matrix. For more 
information see https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management/analytical-
tools_en 
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from donors”, completely excluding the voice of local authorities, political or social 
groups.   
 
This approach is often justified by the importance of having a joint view among 
donors (mainly about EEAS/ECHO/DEVCO and DPKO/WEB) before meeting and 
listening to the recipient countries. In other words, a priori idea of the causes of the 
conflict is the precondition to actively listening to the local people. In such debates, 
Congolese subjectivity is assumed to be a nearly empty space, willingly subservient to 
European models and interests. The pedagogical discourse that we saw in the 
infantilisation strategy goes hand-in-hand with peacebuilding practices that also tend 
to infantilise and therefore marginalise local voices.   
 
For the same reason, most of the debates within EEAS and DEVCO about Congo 
crises tend to drift into debates about the state and international intervention, and how 
peacebuilding and EU assistance can support local communities to achieve security, 
peace and well-being, without questioning what the “local” view is on this. Another 
problematic aspect is that EU practitioners often consider the “local partners” to be 
unreliable, and they, therefore, do not include them in the debates about peacebuilding.  
 
This is the case in several civil society organisations that came to talk to the EEAS 
when I was doing my internship there. For instance, on 25 April 2016 the EEAS 
Central African division met delegates from AFC (Alliance des Forces Congolaises), a 
political movement of the Congolese diaspora, with a base in their home country and 
delegates in Belgium, Germany, France and England.  
 
After the meeting, the EU Officials refrained from taking into consideration the 
requests and the political analysis of AFC’s delegates. According to them, this 
political movement was “not a reliable partner”.  This attitude can be justified by the 
highly corrupt situation in the DRC, where locals are often complicit in the power 
interplay. However, we should consider that in the Congolese case there are also 
several actors that gave proof of certain independence – from the currently active 
groups FILIMBI and LUCHA to the more established ones such as the Catholic 
Church.  
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The silencing of the Congolese voice can also be attributed to the belief that the 
country is always welcoming external help. In other words, the precondition of any 
policymaking is that “locals” are willingly complicit to the EU and welcoming to the 
EU’s liberal peacebuilding.  
 
During my stay at the EEAS, it became evident that the ownership of the peace 
process itself was never reclaimed by civil society organisations promoting the DRC’s 
recovery and representing local associations and movements. On the contrary, several 
delegates from political movements in the DRC, of local non-profit organisations, and 
delegates of the Congolese diaspora in Belgium, required consultations with the Head 
of Unit of the geographic desk at the EEAS to incisively ask for more intervention 
from the EU. During a meeting with delegates from the Congolese Diaspora 
Community in Belgium, several delegates requested more intervention from the EU to 
“save the Congo from Kabila” and “to have a stronger position against Kabila”59.   
 
Despite the fact that the EU’s documents do encourage consultation and engagement 
with locals, such claims have often been used as a justification that frees them from 
the incumbencies of seeking constant dialogue with them.  
 
However, when examined more closely such an argument might also show the 
naturalisation of European power and hegemony of peace, rather than the validity of 
the EU peacebuilding architecture.  
 
Despite the EU’s official claim for African ownership of the peace process, the lack of 
trust in locals – who are considered unreliable and incapable of autonomous recovery 
– might lead to a top-down approach in peacebuilding that is not sensitive to local 
needs.  
 
This is also connected to the consideration that there is an intrinsic limit of EU 
understanding about peace in the DRC. This is not a new argument of course. We have 
previously seen that the DRC has been identified by the EU as a “test case” for peace 
                                                          
59
 Meeting with Representatives of Civil Society and Political Associations from Congolese Diaspora in 
Belgium 8 April 2016, EEAS. 
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operations, and the huge financial investments that have been made might be used in 
part to test its capacities as a peacebuilding actor.  
 
In this sense, Rutazibwa (2010) speaks about ‘Intervener-Centric Mechanisms’ within 
EU policies, where the EU is more concerned about its own image and performance 
rather than about the outcomes of peacebuilding policies for the recipient country.  
Rayroux and Wilén (2014) also point to EU interventions where the raison d’être is 
more likely to be found in the different donors’ interests than in the DRC’s need for 
reform.  
 
The exclusion of locals from the analysis of the conflict, the lack of consideration for 
locals’ perspectives and their identification as unreliable, and the a priori legitimacy 
of acting as peacebuilder are all factors that contribute to creating policies where local 
ownership is not taken into account enough. This creates marginalisation that excludes 
the DRC from its own peace process.  
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that not only are the locals marginalised by EU 
peacebuilding but the idea of local per se might be considered an empty concept.  
 
For example, during the conference on “Lake Chad: Strategic Reflection”60 the 
importance of a local approach was stressed by all participants. However, not one of 
the speakers had a clear idea of what mattered at the local level. This could lead us to 
consider that the EU uses the reference to DRC “locals” in a way that Spivak calls a 
catachresis: a master term that claims to represent a group but has no literal referent 
(Spivak 1993: 139). When included in the papers and strategies, local ownership 
appears as a fixed image.  In this sense, such marginalisation and contemporary calls 
for ownership are also very similar to the colonial way of administrating. Bhabha, for 
example, explains that the colonial power was never fully operative alone, in his being 
unilateral, but has always been “hybrid”. This implies an agential capacity of the 
native subjects. As with Foucault’s notion that there is no power without resistance, 
for Bhabha agency is possible only when the colonised are operating. But this 
enablement is within the discursive ambit of the coloniser’s power (see also Kapoor, 
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 “Lake Chad Strategic Reflection” Conference hosted at the EEAS on the 4 March 2016. 
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2003 and Malreddy, 2015). Thus, EU peacebuilding practitioners need the engagement 
of the locals to make sense of what they are doing but only to the extent that it remains 
within a framework of action delimited by the EU.  
 
2.2. Conditionality  
What has been considered so far sheds light on an asymmetry in EU peacebuilding vis 
à vis the recipients of such policies in the DRC? Yet, when taking a closer look the 
asymmetry of power invades not only the subject of peacebuilding but the policy 
itself. As we saw in chapter three, the ideological underpinning that binds donors and 
recipients together might be identified in the concept of conditionality. Conditionality 
has enabled the EU to demand the implementation of certain standards of behaviour 
from Africa (Sepos 2013; Tzifakis 2007), whose application would have allowed the 
EU to “transmit elements of its domestic order beyond the EU borders” (Stivachtis, 
2015:89).  
This ideological position can be traced in the DRC peacebuilding policies, where the 
EU often warns the country about the possible use of Art. 8 (establishment of political 
dialogue on human rights issues, democratic principles, the rule of law and good 
governance.) and Art. 96 (Consultation procedure and possible measures) of the 
Cotonou Agreement.  
The DRC has to accept the ideological programme of the EU and carry out serious 
structural reforms in order to get the EU’s donations and conflict recovery or 
assistance programmes. In the story of the DRC, the EU has used this instrument 
extensively. For example, the EU suspended peacebuilding aids (and development 
cooperation more in general) for the DRC from 1992 to 2002 because of the lack of 
progress in the political democratisation process, the high degree of corruption, 
economic mismanagement, and differences between EU Member States’ policies 
towards the country. During this period, the EU maintained humanitarian aid funded 
by the DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection but did not invest in political or 
security-related cooperation.   
One of the points to consider is that even if the EU side is also subject to a range of 
possible criticisms, it does not have to comply with any standard in peacebuilding and 
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its actions are rarely judged and questioned from the recipient countries. Following 
questions that McGinty and Richmond (2013) have already asked about the unilateral 
assumptions of peacebuilding, we should indeed ask: for whose interests does the EU 
operate? Are its institutions capable? Is its involvement in DRC affairs democratic and 
accountable? Where does its legitimacy arise from and how is its authority connected 
to the representation of its many subjects? Are the personnel who work in EU 
peacebuilding in the DRC suitably qualified and aware of the range of ethical, 
methodological, as well as political and social issues that go along with their role? Are 
they aware of the historical power relations they are implicated in?  
The fact that such questions are never addressed to the EU, but at the same time a 
strong conditionality is required in DRC policy, reaffirms for many that conditionality 
is a unilateral tool. Moreover, not only is the EU never questioned in its action, but the 
moral stance and judgments that the EU wants to normatively spread are only applied 
in a selective manner.  
For instance, in March 2016 the EU used Articles 8 and 96 from the Cotonou 
Agreement to suspend direct financial support to the Burundian administration due to 
a  surge in politically-motivated violence and set out specific measures to be taken by 
the Burundian government that could lead to the resumption of full cooperation. In this 
context, in several meetings within COAFR about the escalation of violence in the 
DRC, practitioners from the Commission and EEAS asked for the application of the 
same Articles 8 and 96 to face the crisis in Kinshasa. 
However, the economic interests that most of the countries have in the DRC 
influenced the EU in its decision not to apply the conditionality. Long discussions 
about this topic in COAFR always culminated in opposition to any form of more 
effective measures to stop violence in the DRC. I have personally witnessed such 
debates in COAFR, where Belgium, in particular, was strongly opposed to any 
sanction. 
This explains the often-debated idea that conditional measures are applied selectively, 
to the extent that they are in the EU’s interests, and not reflections on conflict 
solutions to tip the scale.  
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Such “cosmetic conditionality” (The Courier ACP-EU, 2003) maintains a structure of 
discourse in which the EU is the only decision-maker and leaves no space for the DRC 
in deciding on political consultation and possible suspension of aid. Moreover, it also 
follows the colonial mindset in the way it is interested in a form of “social technology” 
(the idea of shaping the recipient country) but only to the extent that the very help is 
functional to the self-interest of the EU.  
This echoes what Ziai writes about the discursive order of development. He believes 
that development is structured with a discourse that takes place from the point of view 
of the North to objectively prove the inferiority of the Other (Ziai, 2015:33). 
Therefore, no measurement of development has ever tried to operationalise hospitality, 
crime, suicide, social networks or a non-instrumental relationship to nature, as 
indicators of a good society (Ibid). It is a unilateral monologue, that takes place also in 
the case of conditionality.  
Indeed, the double standards that conditionality highlights do not only mark the 
unilateral imposition of conditions from the EU to the DRC, which have often been 
the connotation of the colonial rationale of ordering and nurturing the colonial subject 
according to normative standards by using ‘sticks and carrots’.  
Political conditionality is increasingly disputed and criticised also by African 
governments and by representatives of African civil society. As already argued by  
Fioramonti (2009), the fact is that EU conditionality has always been contested by 
African political elites, but this state of affairs became dramatically evident during the 
Africa-EU summit in December 2007, when the head of the AU Commission, Alpha 
Oumar Konaré, expressed a widespread feeling among African leaders by arguing that 
“there are problems of governance, but Africans themselves have to sort these out, to 
tackle them head on” (Konaré, 2007 as quoted in Fioramonti, 2009). Similarly, 
professor Adebayo Olukoshi, Chair of the Cluster session for the Consultation of 
African Civil Society Organizations, argued that Africans must be co-definers of 
conditionality measures as “there is no basis for Africa to accept conditions that are 
predetermined by others” (African Union 2007).  
These statements reveal a growing discomfort at the AU level with the negative 
measures of democracy promotion. Such a critical perspective is, however, not shared 
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by all African authors. Congolese Professor Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, while 
proclaiming the failure of the international peacebuilding efforts in DRC (Dizolele, 
2014) also considers that donors’ investments in DRC’s transition “will have gone to 
waste if donors do not provide adequate oversight and place conditions on their aid” 
(2010:156) and he adds “they have been quick to dole out carrots, but unwilling to 
wield their sticks. If the international community were to invest in institution-building 
rather than propping up an individual, the DRC would have a far greater chance of 
establishing a true democracy” (Ibid.). 
Other scholars consider that political determination of promoting democracy and 
human rights certainly seem less forthcoming when the EU’s interests are in danger. 
EU scholars have critically considered conditionality with this regard. Stivachtis, for 
instance, demonstrates that the EU constitutes a modern form of empire in which 
conditionality contributes towards the strengthening of an international order that 
reflects the EU’s interests and values (ibid).  
Similarly, Rutazibwa (2010) considers that the origin of the logic of conditionality 
between the EU and the ACP group resides in the fact that the EU is presenting a 
parochial humanitarian telos as universal, and the EU set, therefore, assumes a moral 
superiority to guide Africa. 
In this sense, this chapter has integrated such approaches and moved them forward by 
assimilating the historical view on conditionality (discussed in Chapter 4) and seeing it 
not as a new or modern rationale of intervention, but an institutionalised way of 
reproducing the donor/recipient divide that stems from a historical legacy.  
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Conclusion 
The absence of an in-depth rethinking of European colonial history and of the 
postcolonial present lead to a general reproduction of a colonial epistemology in the 
EU peacebuilding practices in the DRC. The analysis of discourses on peacebuilding 
in the DRC demonstrate that such epistemology still structures the discourses in 
traditional dichotomist relations that conjure up such notions as centre vs. margin, 
peaceful vs. violent, master/knowledgeable vs. infant/recipient. These dichotomies 
continue to fix representational regimes according to which “northern/EU” are cast 
hierarchically above “southern/DRC” spaces and identities.  
Just as colonialism was based upon the construction and maintenance of borders 
between coloniser and colonised, so peacebuilding is built and given meaning through 
boundaries between expert/adult/developed/peaceable EU peacebuilding practitioners 
and immature/child/warlike/underdeveloped Congolese.  
The stereotypical caricature of the binary opposites that support the discourse makes it 
powerful and pervasive: its meanings and values appear intuitive and natural. It creates 
a code for the peacebuilding discourse and a set of values and hierarchies.  Such 
stereotypical modes of representation connote rigidity and an unchanging order based 
on a fixed donor/recipient binary order and at the same time provides a space of 
ambivalence and instability within the discourse itself. The discursive instability has 
been connoted as a fundamental instance of the deployment of the EU’s authority in 
peacebuilding as it creates a set of possibilities functional to the EU’s justifications.  
What is more, these dichotomies have become meaningful and tangible through 
constant application in the creation of peacebuilding practices, and this chapter 
highlights the double standards that such policies create. In particular, it demonstrated 
that the binary discourses reflect a reality in which the recipient of peacebuilding 
policies is not only considered discursively inferior but is also marginalised in 
peacebuilding practices. Silenced in the discourses as childish and young, the 
Congolese are also not properly taken into account in the process of policymaking.  
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Conclusion 
                                           
 
 
Introduction  
 
The central objective of this thesis has been to analyse the legacies of colonial 
discourse within the European Union’s policymaking on peacebuilding, by answering 
the research question: How can postcolonial and decolonial theory help us understand 
the dominant discourses and politics that frame the EU construction of peacebuilding 
practices in the DRC? 
In answering this question, the research has discovered that within EU peacebuilding 
policymaking towards the DRC, the European colonial legacy is mostly neglected; 
however, in addition to “colonial amnesia”, it is possible to highlight a “presentist 
regime” of historicity (Calligaro, 2005) where selective accounts of colonial memory 
are mobilised to legitimise EU peacebuilding actions. Moreover, these findings have 
determined that the omission of the European colonial past as a consideration may 
have contributed to determining continuities of colonial discourse in this context.  
Indeed, the thesis demonstrates that EU peacebuilding discourse is still regulated by an 
underlying colonial discourse which has a generative effect on EU peacebuilding 
policymaking itself. The research identified discursive strategies that reproduce 
colonial discourses in EU peacebuilding policy-making. These strategies, mainly 
based on racial stereotypes, connote an unchanging order based on a fixed 
donor/recipient binary.  
This concluding chapter first lays out the key elements of the theoretical framework 
conceptualised in this dissertation and the contributions this framework brings to the 
academic debate. Second, it presents, in light of the theoretical framework developed, 
the main empirical findings. Finally, it reflects on the insights drawn from these 
findings and on the possible further research that could be done, building on this 
thesis. 
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1. Rethinking EU Peacebuilding 
 
The thesis began with an analysis of the debate around colonialism vis-à-vis EU and 
EU Peacebuilding Studies and demonstrated that these fields have historically 
neglected Europe’s colonial past and, at the same time, have been rooted in a 
Eurocentric perspective that portrays the EU as a unique value-led force in 
international relations.  
Despite this trend in the literature, recent developments show that EU and 
peacebuilding scholars are more and more interested in discovering the present 
manifestations of the colonial past. Therefore the thesis mobilized, as a  foundation for 
the discussion, the studies about the EU’s colonial legacy  (Kiernan, 1982; Dimier, 
2014; Hansen and Jonsson, 2014; Nicolaïdis, K., & Sèbe, 2014;  Pasture, 2015) and 
about peacebuilding’s colonial roots (Chandler, 2010d; Charbonneau, 2014; Lidén, 
2011; Rutazibwa, 2010; Sabaratnam, 2013 among others). With the insights from this 
rich theoretical foundation, the thesis explained the importance of maximising insights 
from postcolonial and decolonial scholars in order to better understand the intrinsic 
presence of colonial structures in the international system, and consequently, to 
reposition the EU within such a historical framework.  
It is from this meaningful conjunction of decolonial and postcolonial theories that the 
theoretical perspective of this thesis is derived, in the interest of using both the 
postcolonial ‘discursive’ understanding – more inspired by poststructuralist analysis – 
and the useful decolonial framework of the ‘coloniality of power’. Taking the 
conjuncture of those two scholarly traditions compels this research to embrace 
intellectual resistance to the forms of epistemological and material dominance 
disseminated by the colonial order and to make them manifest in the specific case 
analysed in the thesis.  
It is, indeed, thanks to the postcolonial framework that it is possible to grasp the extent 
of the colonial underpinnings of the European project. This allows us not to take EU 
peacebuilding discourses as neutral but to commit to the critical scrutiny of EU 
peacebuilding policymaking discursive production, in order to analyse the extent of 
colonial continuities and, ultimately, to challenge and disrupt such discourses. 
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In order to undertake a postcolonial analysis of present EU peacebuilding initiatives, 
the thesis mobilised the concept of colonial discourse, which is central to such 
postcolonial analysis (see Bhabha, 1994 and Said, 1978, among others). This concept 
is influenced by a Foucauldian/poststructuralist understanding of discourse, which no 
longer refers to formal linguistic aspects or a mere system of linguistic signs, but as a 
practice that systematically constructs the subjects and the worlds of which they speak, 
contributing to creating a regime of truth (Foucault, 1971; 1972; 1976). In this sense, 
colonial discourse can be seen as a way in which colonial knowledge is produced and 
reproduced as a “system of knowledge and beliefs about the world within which acts 
of colonization take place” (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin, 1998: 42).   
Colonial discourse is produced by an authority possessing the power to make 
pronouncements on an object: the coloniser over the colonised typically, 
acknowledging a certain elasticity of the two terms (see Spivak, 2003). This power is 
exerted in a discursive way, by creating a one-sided discourse, or what decolonial 
scholars might refer to the epistemic ‘matrix of power’. This is considered in the 
literature as a way of constructing ‘the other’ through binary oppositions and 
reproducing an order that normalises a unidirectional flow of power/knowledge from 
the colonial/master to the colonised/subject.   
The study attempted to translate the concept of colonial discourse into a proper 
methodology of research by mobilizing the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) 
influenced by Colonial Discourse Theory. By doing so, it operationalised the concept 
of colonial discourse and it provided a methodological tool for the undertaken 
analysis. The thesis also explained how the methodology has been used in the main 
sources of the investigation: interviews, participant observation, archival research, and 
document analysis. 
Having established the theoretical and methodological foundations, the thesis provided 
a historical overview of the significance of conceiving the colonial past not only as 
linked to individual European former colonial powers, but as a collective European 
issue and as such, as an essential part of history that should form part of the EU’s 
collective memory. In doing so, the thesis provides a historical detour on colonialism 
framed as a European phenomenon, in order to show how colonialism is 
fundamentally linked with the birth of the European Union project.  
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Based on extensive archival work; in-depth interviews with conducted with 62 EU 
officials working on peacebuilding policies interviews conducted from April to 
December 2015 and from March to August 2016; and six months of participant 
observation at the Central African Division of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS); the main finding of this enquiry is the recognition of two main interlinked 
discursive strands: the one concerning the irrelevance of colonial history for EU 
peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the other admitting a positive 
legacy of colonialism in ongoing peacebuilding in DRC.   
Furthermore, the thesis investigated the structure of the EU peacebuilding discourse, 
and identifed that this is still regulated by colonial discourse. The study pinpoints 
several discursive strategies that sustain such order of discourse. These strategies are 
mainly based on racial stereotypes towards the recipients of EU peacebuilding 
policies: the idea of Congolese as backward, infantile, lax, and violent, and of the 
DRC as a pre-modern, failed country.  
Such stereotypes fix and naturalise a ‘coloniality of power’ based on a fixed 
donor/recipient binary, with the result being the creation of peacebuilding practices 
that marginalise the local and exert power through conditional peacebuilding. 
 
2. Contributions to the Existing Literature  
 
i. Theoretical Contributions 
The main theoretical contribution of the thesis was to provide a bridge between 
Postcolonial and Decolonial approaches and EU Peacebuilding Studies. This move 
opens the possibility to pushing the academic debate further, as this research 
represents the first analysis of EU Peacebuilding using this lens. 
Indeed, despite the welcome addition of numerous new studies on the topic of the 
postcolonial EU (Adler-Nissen, 2013; Nicholaidis, 2014; among others) and 
postcolonial peacebuilding (Jabri, 2013; Liden, 2014; Sabaratnam, 2011 among 
others), so far the field of EU peacebuilding has never been considered through a 
postcolonial lens. Combining insights from postcolonial and EU Studies leads to a 
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more nuanced understanding of the EU peacebuilding role and to question the 
universality of the values the EU is willing to bring in peacebuilding policies.  
 
A postcolonial and decolonial perspective explains why EU peacebuilding policies 
based on Eurocentric norms struggle to free themselves of paternalistic discourses 
about the recipients of such policies. By inscribing EU values and norms into a 
broader historical dimension, a postcolonial and decolonial approach challenges the 
modernity/coloniality/rationality that is carried by the EU’s discourse in conflict 
interventions. In other words, this bridge opens the door to a possible rethinking of 
some of the pernicious assumptions that the EU has inherited from colonial times, and 
that is still present in the way the EU approaches conflict resolutions. 
At the same time, the use of the EU case brings a practical application of the theories 
offered by post/decolonial studies, that often tend to be too anchored in the past (see 
2014 Nicolaïdis & Sébe, 2014; Paone, 2017) and to sometimes be limited to the 
abstract level. This has also been one of the major challenges of the thesis: providing a 
practical and accountable analysis of the modern day presence of colonial discourses, 
following the call for pursuing this research initiated by several authors. For instance, 
Merlingen acknowledged: 
The temporal structure of EU governmentality is analogous to the temporal 
structure of colonial-era discourse orders. Continuities, subtleties and 
ambiguities in how the EU and its theatres of operations stand to each 
other are black- boxed. Future research could systematically and in 
empirical detail compare CSDP governmentality and colonial- era 
governmentalities. This would go a long way towards unmasking the 
hidden continuities between these different discourse orders. This point 
has been documented empirically in relation to international interventions 
in general but not with regard to CSDP missions.                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                  (Merlingen, 2012: 201) 
Accepting the challenge presented by Merlingen, alongside Hansen (2014), and 
Pasture (2015), this research embarked on the task of charting a set of historical 
connections between the colonial mission civilisatrice and the EU normative power’s 
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representations in peacebuilding policymaking. This served as a vivid case study for 
postcolonialism, with the conviction that it is of key importance not only to consider 
the forms of resistance to nowadays coloniality but also to dig into the way in which 
the colonial project is maintained in the discursive reproduction of power/knowledge 
discourses.  
Therefore, the major contributions that the use of the ‘EU case study’ brings to 
post/decolonial studies is the possibility of providing practical examples of the 
avenues to which EU discursive continuity allows the persistence of coloniality. This 
has been done by emphasising the discoursive legitimations of peacebuilding by the 
EU – rather than the forms of resistance to coloniality – bringing a unique viewpoint 
to the post/decolonial literature. In other words, the contribution that the EU case 
study brings to post/decolonial scholarship is the one that is more concerned in 
‘demythologising’ the civilising mission of the EU peacebuilding, rather than in 
‘desilencing’ the recipient's voices. 
 
ii. Methodological Contributions 
Despite the importance of the concept of ‘colonial discourse’ as elaborated by 
Colonial Discourse Theory, the application of this theoretical lens into the empirical 
research has been often quite unsystematic and broadly interpretative, without having 
a clear reference of how to analyse colonial discourse in practice. Thus, so far, 
postcolonial and decolonial analyses of discourse have not been accompanied by a 
clear methodological ‘toolkit’ that allows for translating the conceptualisation into a 
methodological analysis of reality.  
While this problem might be not so relevant for studies about colonial times – as the 
presence of a discursive colonial ideology is more evident – the analysis of the 
manifestation of colonial discourses in the contemporary international system can pose 
more problems.  It is for this reason that the thesis conceptualized and applied a 
Discourse-Historical Approach influenced by Colonial Discourse Theory. This 
‘marriage’ of critical discourse analysis approach with the more interpretative colonial 
discourses theory allowed the research to operationalise the concept of colonial 
discourse and to retrace it in contemporary international relations. By so doing, the 
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thesis seeks to establish a foundation for all scholars interested to look at the 
discursive manifestation of colonial legacies into modern day politics.  
 
iii. Historical Reconstructions 
This thesis provided a historical rearticulation of EU peacebuilding, towards a 
reconstruction of the colonial underpinning of the EU as a subject and of 
peacebuilding as a policy. The study challenged the assumption that peacebuilding is a 
new technical tool employed by the EU only in the last decade, and it demonstrated 
that the EU’s ethical responsibility to facilitate Africa’s peace has long been embedded 
in the relationship with Africa and indeed, mostly entangled with colonial aspirations.  
By providing an overview of colonialism as a European phenomenon, and by showing 
that it is fundamental to conceive of the EU as an institution that has been funded on 
colonial bases, the thesis presented the importance of retracing the idea of 
peacebuilding within the European project of bringing peace to Africa. In so doing, the 
thesis demonstrated how the discourse of bringing peace to Africa has evolved from 
European Integration to the present, showing the fractures in the discourse, but also 
the continuities that flowed into modern day peacebuilding policymaking. 
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3. Key Empirical Findings 
 
Looking into the relevance of colonial legacies in the contemporary discourse and 
practice of EU peacebuilding in the DRC, I found that there are two major dimensions 
in which the EU’s officials working on peacebuilding in DRC articulate colonial 
legacy: a dehistoricised and ambivalent use of the colonial memory and the 
reproduction of colonial discourse. 
 
i.    A Dehistoricised and Ambivalent Use of the Colonial Memory 
The empirical analysis has shown that within the European External Action Service 
and in the European Commission the erasure of colonialism is still in place. This 
‘colonial amnesia’, has been demonstrated in the thesis by the individuation of two 
interlinked discursive strands: the first one concerns the comple disregarding of 
colonial history for EU peacebuilding in DRC. Indeed, EU officials are mostly 
convinced that the history of colonialism has no relevance for the EU. This discourse 
is anchored in the idea that the EU and Member States are two irreconcilable historical 
entities, and that the EU should not be accountable for the past of individual member 
states.  
The second, interlinked, discursive strand that has been traced in the interviews is the 
actual belief of a positive legacy of colonialism in current peacebuilding in DRC. In 
this sense, Belgium’s role within EU peacebuilding in DRC was portrayed as very 
important in the way Belgians still represent and interpret their former colony. 
Therefore, colonial ties are considered relevant opportunities for peacebuilding 
practices. 
Such discursive strands, apparently contradictory, confirm the presence of colonial 
discourse and its instability.  Such discursive strands are composed by ambivalent and 
unstable utterances, which nonetheless reproduce and naturalise a “regime of truth” 
(Foucault, 2003 [1976]) in which colonialism is silenced but reproduced in the 
promotion of the former coloniser’s role in the present.  
Indeed, the ambivalence of forgetting the colonial past but saving the ‘positive legacy’ 
could be considered as part of the colonial rationale that donates to the master subject 
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the possibility of creating regimes of truth which can be ambivalent and contradictory, 
as they are instrumental to the continuation of a colonial discourse that reproduces 
power/knowledge asymmetries between peacebuilder and recipient.   
 
ii.   The Reproduction of Colonial Discourse 
Relying on the results of interviews and participant observation, the research focused 
on finding continuities or discontinuities of colonial discourse in EU peacebuilding 
policymaking. With this goal, the study unmasked hidden continuities between the 
structure of colonial discourse and the one of EU peacebuilding policy-making. The 
analysis of discourses on peacebuilding in the DRC proves that a colonial 
epistemology is supported by a series of discursive strategies.  
The discursive strategies encountered are mainly based on a racialised order of 
discourse, underpinned by stereotypes about the donor and recipients of 
peacebuilding:  the idea of Congolese as backward, infantile, lax, violent, and of the 
DRC as a pre-modern, failed country, as well as the idea of the EU’s moral 
responsibility and burden to bring peace. Such stereotypes naturalise the dichotomist 
relationship between EU and the DRC, based on asymmetric power relations, typical 
of a colonial matrix of power. They conjure up such notions as centre vs. margin, 
peaceful vs. violent, master/knowledgeable vs. infant/recipient. These discursive 
strategies strengthen an order of discourse structured in the traditional dichotomist 
relation that continues to fix representational regimes according to which 
‘northern/EU’ is cast hierarchically above ‘southern/DRC’ spaces and identity. The 
reproduction of a colonial discourse within EU peacebuilding policymaking towards 
the DRC reproduces continuity of moral and civilisation divide. 
What is more, the research shows that these dichotomies have become tangible 
through constant application in the creation of peacebuilding practices, and the thesis 
shows the double standards that such policy creates. In particular, the study 
demonstrates that the binary discourses reflect a reality in which the recipient of 
peacebuilding policies is not only considered discursively inferior, but it is also 
marginalised in peacebuilding practices.  
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This does not leave much margin to autonomous ownership and appropriation of the 
peace process by the recipients, which is supposed to be the final goal of 
peacebuilding practices.   
Such reproduction of colonial discourse might be due to the absence of a deep 
rethinking of the European colonial history and of the consequences that this could 
entail in peacebuilding policies. Indeed, I would consider that it is the much-
uncontested nature of the EU, who never faced its own colonial past in relations to the 
‘others’, as well as the uncontested idea of “bringing peace”, that generate a continuity 
of colonial discourse.  
Peacebuilding policies, undertaken with noble intentions by benevolent practitioners, 
do not suffice to generate good outcomes. On the contrary, rather than bringing 
solutions to a conflict, peacebuilding may impose a cost on the recipients: it may 
reinforce marginalisation, inequalities, and perpetuate asymmetric power relations.  
Indeed, the reproduction of colonial discourse in peacebuilding is detrimental to the 
fulfilment of peacebuilding goals.  
 
4. Decolonising Peacebuilding? Limitations and Avenues for Further 
Research 
 
By offering a postcolonial analysis of the discourses around EU peacebuilding policies 
towards the DRC, this thesis contributed to the debate on EU peacebuilding by placing 
an emphasis on the colonial underpinnings of peacebuilding discourses. The thesis 
shows that the EU peacebuilding policies are projected to fail not only as a result of 
their practical shortcomings but also due to technical problems internal to the EU 
peacebuilding framework, as many EU scholars pointed on (see for instance Gross, & 
Juncos, 2010; Tocci, 2004 and 2007; Youngs, 2004).  
Indeed, this investigation exposes the limitation of such policy-oriented approaches, 
by showing the deeper deficiencies of the underlying principles of the EU 
peacebuilding. Even if policy-oriented approaches might have some short term 
positive effects in proposing a more “emancipatory” form of conflict resolution (see 
for instance Björkdahl, A. Richmond, O. & Kappler, S. (2009) on the post-liberal 
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peacebuilding agenda for the EU) they would not undermine the essential principles 
upon which the peacebuilding regime is based.  
Therefore, the conducted research does not aim at extracting prescriptive solutions to 
correct the EU peacebuilding approach. Rather, it suggests that if we want to take 
conflict resolution seriously, it is first and foremost important to disanchor the EU 
peacebuilding doctrine from its very underlying colonial principles.   
Thus, the thesis provides the first step towards this change, by offering the extrication 
of colonialism from the EU peacebuilding regime. It shows the discursive strategies 
and the colonial stereotypes that allow the reproduction of racial stratification in the 
EU peacebuilding discourses.  
Only a revision of the dehistoricised imprinting in which the EU was created and a 
disruption of colonial continuities can dismantle the hierarchical conception of 
subjectivities premised on the primacy of the European liberal self as against others.  
 
4.1 Reflecting on Limitations  
 
Writing a thesis is an inevitable process of selection. This means that it is not possible 
to give space to all the interesting perspectives that this topic could have allowed. 
Unfortunately, every selection necessarily implies a limitation; but, at the same time, it 
also opens avenues for further investigations. 
The first limitation of this thesis derives primarily from the methodological choice of 
focusing only on EU discourses and only interviewing EU practitioners.  
From the very beginning, the thesis asserted that it wanted to contribute to the 
post/decolonial debate by showing continuity of colonialism in the way EU officials 
talk, discuss, and produce peacebuilding policies. This inevitably might not fully do 
justice to the idea of connectivity that the postcolonial intervention wants to provide – 
specifically by not bridging enough the EU discourses with the counter-discourses of 
the peacebuilding policies’ recipients. In this case, further avenues of research could 
look at how the Congolese view the colonial legacies in EU peacebuilding, allying 
more to these scholarships that analyse local perspective on peacebuilding (see for 
instance Sabaratnam, 2011). 
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The second selection that has been done was the decision of focusing more on 
discourses on peacebuilding policymaking and less on the practices of peacebuilding 
in DRC. Consequently, we could probably argue that from this selection originates 
another limitation: the fact that this research remains confined into the deconstruction 
of the discursive sphere, without looking in detail at how the EU practices on the 
ground match such discourse.  
 
4.2 Towards a Decolonial Peace 
Most importantly, perhaps, this research opens up avenues for reconceptualising the 
concept of peacebuilding in general and the EU role in the promotion of world peace 
more specifically.  Indeed, once we realised that colonial discourse is still embedded 
in peacebuilding, it comes naturally to reflect on the very existence of peacebuilding 
and on the legitimacy of the EU role as a peace promoter.  Some questions arise: is it 
possible for the EU to change its discursive position? Is ‘peacebuilding’ a concept that 
we need to keep or are we free to discard it? Is it possible to conceive of a non-
liberal/non-normative peacebuilding, and if so what would that look like? Has the EU 
anything normatively positive to offer? What would it actually mean for the EU to 
‘come to terms with’ or ‘address’ its colonial legacy? 
Indeed, exposing ‘colonial amnesia’ and the manifestations of colonial discourse 
within EU peacebuilding is only the first step towards the change. This thesis raises 
awareness about the coloniality of power that the EU is maintaining, and it points out 
that decolonisation has been a very much unfinished project, and the discursive 
production of the EU seems an attempt to hold on the colonial status quo. 
This ultimately led me to think about to the extent to which peacebuilding itself it is 
complicit and partakers in or ever embodies coloniality of power in its very existence.  
As it has been explored in several sections of this thesis, certain African authors see 
that the African postcolonial world has remained hostage to radically asymmetrical 
power relations that developed during the colonial encounters of the fifteenth century. 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). They link the current permanence of conflict to the colonial 
experience and consider that the only way forward is the “de-linking” (Amin, 1990; 
2009) from a modernist grammar of peace and development discourses over Africa. If 
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some western authors are hearing the voices of such scholars, others are still very 
much concerned about building a top-down structure.  
Taking the case of DRC, in the last few years, the debate was monopolised by the 
dictates of establishing elections as the main solution to Congo’s troubles. An 
exemplar in this sense is the piece on “Congo’s Inescapable State” (Stearns, 
Vlassenroot, Hoffmann, and Carayannis, 2017) in which these authors argue that only 
elections and top-down institutional reforms can solve Congo’s problems, believing 
that as global, regional, and national tensions drive the ongoing violence, a local, 
bottom-up conflict resolution is largely unnecessary.  
On the contrary, in charting the history of the Congo’s own democratic traditions, 
Nzongola-Ntalaja argues that outside intervention has not assisted Congolese to 
achieve peace. Rather, outsider interventions have been detrimental to the unity of the 
Congolese democracy movement, and to the consolidation of autonomous roads to 
peace. With regards to the EU, he states that money and troops deployed in the 
country did not help the peacebuilding process, and could have been allocated 
differently (2006). Nzongola-Ntalaja argues elsewhere for the autonomous self-
recovery of the Congolese, by saying that EU and UN money and missions cannot 
deliver peace and stabilisation as “the salvation of Congo lies in the hands of her own 
sons and daughters,” (2016) . 
It is from the intersection of this thesis’ findings about the coloniality of power present 
in EU peacebuilding practices on the one hand and the call from African and 
Congolese authors from ‘less international intervention’ that we need to locate the call 
and the need to decolonise peacebuilding.  
But is it possible to conceive of a ‘decolonial peacebuilding’? According to Zondi  
(2017) and Grosfoguel (2009), a decolonial peace implies the pursuit of peace in a 
manner that also deals with the colonial continuities in the nature of their inherited 
state, with the underlying paradigm of war and violence, a coloniser model of the 
world and its colonial political economy.  
In this sense, a decolonial peacebuilding is the one that first takes seriously the 
concept of autonomous recovery, already proposed by Weinstein (2005) and 
rearticulated by Rutazibwa (2013). Rutazibwa proposes an autonomous recovery 
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framework that addresses how the international community might be an impediment to 
the construction, restoration or conservation peace and stability.  
This raises serious questions about the salience of peacebuilding and a call to 
reconsider it could be organised in such a way that its damage is minimal. In the case 
of DRC, the history of the country showed important Congolese peoples’ own 
democratic traditions that could lead to autonomous peace.  
For instance, Nzongola-Ntalaja considers the case of the Sovereign National 
Conference (Conférence Nationale Souveraine - CNS), an institution that since 1991 
brought together delegates from different regions, association, political parties, 
alongside civil society organisations, traditional leaders, the Congolese in the 
Diaspora, and guest speakers from the intelligentsia. According to Nzongola-Ntalaja 
(2004 and 2006)  the CNS established the crucial building blocks of Congolese peace 
and democracy: helped people to shed their fears of the dictatorship, gave greater 
impetus to the culture of freedom and political discourse, and promoted the right to 
discuss public affairs freely and to criticise the government, with the consolidation of 
independent press, the increasing clout of civil society, and the growth of popular 
forms of political debate and organisation have all increased the capacity to resist 
authoritarianism and oppressive rule. However, the same author also considers that 
every time a popular democratic movement was emerging in DRC, European powers 
were not there to support it (Ibid., 2006). 
A decolonial peace would thus be the one that listens to these voices. This would 
entail being prepared to rid the system of ideologies and practices that systematically 
constructed peacebuilding as a means of maintaining global inequality. At the same 
time, a decolonial peace would maintain the interest to fight for peace, conceiving a 
peace process that is aware of contributing to global justice, solidarity and reparations 
for the long-lasting inequalities. As Rutazibwa (2018) considers we need to be ready 
to abandon concepts as ‘development, ‘aid’, or ‘peacebuilding’ and to seriously 
consider also getting rid of the respective academic disciplines, as such concepts are 
‘steeped in a hierarchized understanding of the world, reveal themselves as highly 
problematic and inadequate to organizing our thinking on the betterment of people’s 
lives”. (2018: 172).   
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Finally, it is important to ask ourselves: in view of a possible decolonial peace 
delinked from peacebuilding,  what would be the role of the EU?   
The fundamental image of the EU as a model for peace, which is still reproduced in 
peacebuilding policies, clashes monumentally with a present in which the EU is more 
and more a project of exclusion. Difference and pluralities are less and less accepted at 
the heart of Europe, whereas at its borders physical and cultural fences are rejecting 
those people looking for the mirage of the “pax Europaea”.  
The thesis so far allowed to make us understand what Peo Hansen considered in 
relation to the refugee crisis (2015): it is time to see Europe as part of the problem, 
instead of as the major part of the solution. So, if the thesis contributes to a general 
‘de-mythologisation’ of the EU, unveiling what Césaire (1955:84) considered the 
‘fundamental European lie’, future avenues of research could depart from these 
conclusions.  
In this sense, the EU could still assist the DRC economically by listening to the real 
needs of the community and providing financial assistance to the country, but 
substituting the role of donor with a role of engagement in true solidarity. This needs a 
profound rethink of the EU’s role, and a clear delinking from its quasi-colonial 
economic ties with the recipient countries. 
The EU could indeed accompany the DRC to complete its transition from colonialism 
to genuine independence; but to do so, it has to detach by and taking position against 
foreign business enterprises involved in looting the country’s economy, from a 
grammar of coloniality and from a distorted vision of the history, embracing a real 
global perspective.  
I believe that future research could engage in these considerations and begin to further 
unpack methods in how to subvert the colonial discourse underpinning EU 
peacebuilding. There are a number of possible studies that could be initiated with this 
approach in mind. Further researches could explore how to bring historical 
accountability into the EU peacebuilding discourse.  This might be done in a way in 
which an ethic of reparations and of global justice is utilised in place of the current 
ethic of civilisation and bringing peace as a moral duty.  
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Indeed, the exposure of coloniality can be propedeutic for looking for substitutive 
paradigms of international relations, and to shift the paradigm from a racial discourse 
to a request of social justice. The unidirectional trajectories of EU peacebuilding 
could, therefore, be deviated to mutual learning between so-called ‘North’ and 
‘South’, allowing another syntax to take over the obsolete paternalistic and racialised 
stereotypes that fuel international interventions. This could be done for instance by 
applying the feasibility of “less intervention”  or of “autonomous recovery” - as 
concepts already proposed by Weinstein (2005) and rearticulated by Rutazibwa (2013) 
- to the study of the EU peacebuilding.  
Finally, the entire framework of this thesis could be applied to analyse another case 
study, and potentially to create a comparative project that allows for a comparison 
between different geographic areas. One of the most interesting comparisons could be 
done by analysing and comparing EU discourses in peacebuilding in the Balkans, in 
the light of recent approaches that uses postcolonial theory to the Balkans (see Baker, 
2017). 
These and more avenues for future research may be inspired by this dissertation, and I 
hope that this thesis has planted useful seeds that will grow into further investigations 
and a rich academic conversation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
256 
 
 
  
257 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
Archives Consulted  
 
Archives of European Integration (AEI) 
Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance de l'Europe (CVCE) 
Europen Integration Studies Collection 
Historical Archives European Commission (HAEC) 
Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence (HAEU) 
   Consulted fonds : 
   BAC FondS- EEC and  ECSC Commissions 
   Council of Ministers of the EEC and EURATOM (CM2) 
   Emile Noel (EN) 
   Paul Hanry Spaak (PHS) 
JFK Archives 
 
Periodica 
 
The Courier, 1985 
The Monthly Review, 1824 
The Telegraph,1874 
The Time, 1955 
European Community Information Service, 1975 
South Australian Weekly Chronicle, 1885  
258 
 
Books and Articles 
 
Abbas H. & Ndeda, N. (2009). Aid and reparations: power in the development 
discourse in Abbas, H. & Niyiragira, Y. (Eds.). (2009). Aid to Africa: 
Redeemer or coloniser?. Fahamu: Pambazuka. 
Abrahamsen, R. (2003). African Studies and the Postcolonial Challenge. African 
Affairs. 102 (407): 189-210. 
Adichie, C. N. (2009). ‘The danger of a single story’, TED Talks, July 2009. Available 
at:http://www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_sto
ry?language=en [Last accessed: 10/04/2019]. 
Agathangelou, A. M. & Ling, L. H. M. (2009). Transforming world politics: from 
empire to multiple worlds, Taylor & Francis. 
Aggestam, L. (2008). Introduction: ethical power Europe?. International affairs, 
84(1): 1-11. 
---------------- (2009). “Ethical power Europe (EPE) ‘Power for Peace’? Ethical 
perspectives of the EU’s global role” Paper presented at ISA 50th Annual 
Convention, New York, USA. February 15-18, 2009.  Available at: 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/1/2/7/pag
es311278/p311278-1.php  [Last accessed 20/02/2016]. 
Ahluwalia, P. (2001). Politics and Post-Colonial Theory: African Inflections. London 
& New. 
Alcoff, L. (1991). The problem of speaking for others. Cultural critique, (20): 5-32. 
Amin, S. (1974). Accumulation on a World Scale: A critique of the Theory of 
Underdevelopment. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
------------ (1990). Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World. London and New York: 
Zed Books.  
------------ (2009). Aid for development. in Abbas, H. & Niyiragira, Y. (Eds.) Aid to 
Africa: Redeemer or coloniser? Fahamu: Pambazuka. 
Aničić, A. (2015). The ambivalence of colonial discourse: Waiting for the barbarians 
in the gaze of the other. Glasnik Etnografskog instituta SANU, 63(2): 383-394. 
Annan, K. A. (2004). A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (Vol. 5). United Nations 
Publications. 
 
259 
 
 
Annus, E. (2017). Soviet Postcolonial Studies: A View from the Western Borderlands. 
Routledge. 
Aoi, C., De Coning R., Thakur R. (Eds.) (2007). Unintended consequences of 
peacekeeping operations. New York: United Nations University Press. 
African Peace Facility (APF) (2013). Annual Report 2013. Available at: 
http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/93560536-493d-4532-9df9-
3aefa89e0600.0002.02/DOC_1 [Last accessed: 17/07/2018]. 
African Union (AU) (2007). Second Conference of African Ministers In Charge of 
Integration (COMAI II), Ministerial Conference, Kigali, 26–27 July 2007.  
African Union and European Union (AU and EU) (2008). The Africa-EU Strategic 
Partnership. A Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EAS2007_joint_strategy_en
.pdf  [Last accessed 13 December 2018]. 
Arnould, V. & Vlassenroot, K. (2016). EU Policies in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo: Try and Fail? Human Security Study Group 2016, 1-22. 
Ashcroft, B. (2001). On post-colonial futures. London: Continuum. 
Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G., & Tiffin, H. (1998). Key concepts in post-colonial studies. 
Psychology Press. 
------------------------------------------------ (2013). Post-colonial studies: The key 
concepts. Routledge. 
Aubyn, F. K. (2018). An Overview of Recent Trends in African Scholarly Writing on 
Peacebuilding. African Peacebuilding Network, Working Papers: No. 21. 
Available at: 
http://ssrccdn1.s3.amazonaws.com/crmuploads/new_publication_3/%7BF599C
121-36AF-E811-A969-000D3A34A0AA%7D.pdf [Last accessed 17/02/2019]. 
Audio guide, Permanent Exhibition House of European History (2017). Available at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/cfsp/crisis_management/docs/com2001_21
1_en.pdf [Last accessed 12/07/2018]. 
Autesserre, S. (2010). The trouble with the Congo: Local violence and the failure of 
international peacebuilding. Cambridge University Press.  
---------------- (2012). Dangerous tales: Dominant narratives on the Congo and their 
unintended consequences. African Affairs, 111(443): 202-222. 
 
260 
 
 
Aydın-Düzgit, S. (2014). Critical discourse analysis in analysing European Union 
foreign policy: Prospects and challenges. Cooperation and Conflict, 49(3): 
354-367. 
Baaz, M. E. (2005). The Paternalism of Partnership. A Postcolonial Reading of 
Identity in Development Aid. London: Zed Books. 
Bah, A. B. (2015). People-Centered Liberalism: An Alternative Approach to 
International State-Building in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Critical Sociology 1-
19.  
Baker-Beall, C. (2014). The evolution of the European Union’s ‘fight against 
terrorism’discourse:Constructing the terrorist ‘other’. Cooperation and 
Conflict, 49(2): 212-238. 
Balint, T., Bauer, M. W., & Knill, C. (2008). Bureaucratic change in the European 
administrative space: The case of the European Commission. West European 
Politics, 31(4), 677-700. 
Baregu, M. L. (2011). Understanding obstacles to peace: actors, interests, and 
strategies in Africa's Great Lakes region. IDRC. 
Barkawi, T. & Laffey, M. (2006). The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies. 
Review of International Studies, 32: 329-352. 
Barrinha, A. (2008). Towards a Global Dimension: EU’s Conflict Management in the 
Neighborhood and beyond. Fundação Friedrich Ebert.  
Bates, R. H. (2013). The Imperial Peace in Colonial Africa and Africa’s 
Underdevelopment in Akyeampong, E., Bates, R. H., Nunn, N., & Robinson, J. 
(Eds.). (2014). Africa's development in historical perspective. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bechev, D. (2015). From the Soviet bloc to the new middle age: East-central Europe’s 
three imperial moments in Nicolaidis, K. Sebe, B. and Maas G. (Eds.), (2015). 
Echoes of empire: Identity, memory, and colonial legacies. London: I. B. 
Tauris. 
Beck, U., & Grande, E. (2007). Cosmopolitan Europe. Polity. 
Beevor, A. (2012). The Second World War. Back Bay Books. 
Behr, H. (2007). The European Union in the legacies of imperial rule? EU accession 
politics viewed from a historical comparative perspective. European Journal of 
International Relations, 13(2): 239-262. 
 
261 
 
 
Behr, H., & Stivachtis, Y. A. (Eds.). (2015). Revisiting the European Union as 
Empire. Routledge. 
Bergamaschi, I., & Diawara, M. (2014). The French Military Intervention in Mali: Not 
Exactly “Francafrique” but definitely Postcolonial. Peace Operations in The 
Francophone World: Global Governance Meets Post-Colonialism, 137-52. 
Bernasconi, R. (2001). Concepts of race in the eighteenth century. Bristol: Thoemmes. 
Best Gaya, S. (Ed.) (2007), Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa. 
Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. 
Bhabha, H. (1984). Of mimicry and man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse. 
October 28, 125-133. 
--------------- (1994). The Location of Culture, London: Routledge. 
Bhambra, G. K. (2007). Rethinking modernity. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave  
-------------------- (2009). Postcolonial Europe: Or, Understanding Europe in Times of 
the  Postcolonial in Handbook of European Studies, Rumford, C (ed). London: 
Sage. 
--------------------- (2014a). Postcolonial and decolonial dialogue. Postcolonial Studies, 
17(2): 115-121.  
---------------------(2014b). Connected Sociologies. London: Bloomsbury. 
Bhambra, G. K. and Shilliam, R. (2009). Silencing human rights: critical engagements 
with a contested project, Basingstoke [England]: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bickerton, C. J. (2012). European integration: From nation-states to member states. 
Oxford University Press. 
Bildt, C. (2009). “Speech by Mr Carl Bildt, Minister for Foreign Affairs”, transcript, 
Government Offices of Sweden, conference “ESDP@10 – What Lessons for 
the Future”, 28 July 2009; Available a 
http://www.government.se/contentassets/e1967087c2c84e09b752e9144112d97
3/speeches-20062010—carl-bildt [Last accessed 06/04/2016]. 
Björkdahl, A. Richmond, O. and Kappler, S. (2009). The EU Peacebuilding 
Framework: Potentials & Pitfalls in the Western Balkans & the Middle East. 
Jad-Pbp working paper series, n°3. 
http://www4.lu.se/upload/LUPDF/Samhallsvetenskap/Just_and_Durable_Peac
e/WorkingPaper3.pdf  [Last accessed 17/03/2017] 
 
262 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- (2011). “The emerging EU 
peacebuilding framework: confirming or transcending liberal peacebuilding?” 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 3(24). Available at: 
http://www4.lu.se/upload/LUPDF/Samhallsvetenskap/Just_and_Durable_Peac
e/WorkingPaper3.pdf   [Last accessed on 10/01/2014.] 
Blanchard, P., Lemaire, S., Bancel, N., Thomas, D. R. D. & Pernsteiner, A. (2014). 
Colonial culture in France since the revolution. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Bobineau, J. (2017). The Historical Taboo: Colonial Discourses and Postcolonial 
Identities in Belgium. Werkwinkel, 12(1): 107-123. 
Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking 
and peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement 
adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. 
Böröcz, J., Kovács, M., Mauro, E. D., Sher, A., Dancsi, K., & Kabachnik, P. (2001). 
Empire's New Clothes: Unveiling EU-Enlargement. Central Europe Review. 
Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/144/ [ Last accessed 09/09/2018]. 
Böröcz, J. and Sarkar, M. (2005). What is the EU?, International Sociology 20(2): 
153-73. 
--------------------------------- (2012). Colonialism. In Anheier, H. K., Juergensmeyer, 
M. and Faessel, V. (Eds.) Encyclopedia of Global Studies. CA: Sage. 
Bozeman, A. B. (2017). Politics and culture in international history: from the ancient 
Near East to the opening of the modern age. Routledge. 
Braekman, C. (2005). Assumer notre passé colonial. Available at: 
http://ns2.sise.ucl.ac.be/cps/ucl/doc/ac-arec/documents/Braeckman.pdf [Last 
accessed 21/6/2018]. 
Brantlinger, P. (1985). Victorians and Africans: The genealogy of the myth of the dark 
continent. Critical Inquiry, 12(1): 166-203. 
Browning, C. S. (2003). The region-building approach revisited: the continued 
othering of Russia in discourses of region-building in the European North. 
Geopolitics, 8(1): 45-71. 
Bryman, Alan (2008). Social Research Methods. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
263 
 
Burman, E. (1995). The abnormal distribution of development: policies for Southern 
women and children. Gender, Place and Culture, 2(1): 21–36.  
Bussy, J. M., & Gallo, C. J. (2016). The Great Lakes Region of Africa: Local 
Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. In The Palgrave Handbook of Disciplinary and Regional Approaches 
to Peace (pp. 312-324). Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Butler, L., & Stockwell, S. (Eds.). (2013). The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan 
and British Decolonization. Springer. 
Buzan, B., & Little, R. (2002). 10 International systems in world history: remaking the 
study of international relations. Historical Sociology of International Relations, 
200. 
Calligaro, O. (2015). Legitimation through remembrance? The changing regimes of 
historicity of European integration. Journal of Contemporary European 
Studies, 23(3): 330-343. 
Capan, Z. G. (2017). Decolonising International Relations?. Third World Quarterly, 
38(1): 1-15. 
Carr, E. H. (1946). The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939. London: Macmillan & Co. 
Carta, C. (2014). Use of Metaphors and International Discourse: the EU as an Idiot 
Power, a Deceptive Pangloss and a Don Giovanni in His Infancy, Cooperation 
and Conflict, 49(3): 334-353. 
Castañeda Lefèvre, D. (2012). Peace Laboratories in Colombia: the European 
approach to peace-building (Doctoral dissertation, Paris, Institut d'études 
politiques). 
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297 
 
Interview 26-28: Group interview with three EUMS.                                                       
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Interview 52: Interview with Officer from EEAS. Program manager at the EU 
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Interview 54-56: Joint  Interview with Three Officers from EEAS, Conflict 
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Interview 57: Interview with Officer from the World Bank. Post Conflict Needs 
Assessment. Brussels, 14 Apri 2016. 
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